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Adversaries or Allies in Understanding Science?
Martin Carrier, Rebecca Mertens, Carsten Reinhardt
1. Practices of Comparing and Narrating in the Sciences
and Humanities
In this volume, we aim to explore the ways in which comparing is related
to other social and epistemic activities in knowledge generation processes in
the sciences, humanities and the arts.1 We particularly emphasize the rela-
tionship between comparing and narrating in epistemic practice. One of our
central goals is to clarify the potential of narratives for drawing comparisons,
that is, the way in which narratives can enable, support or hinder the practice
of comparing. Furthermore, this volume seeks to locate narrating and com-
paring within the conceptual and methodological, material, and discursive
practices that are involved in knowledge generation processes. The focus on
practice also means for us to look more closely at the relations between those
activities and processes which form the conditions for using both compar-
isons and narratives successfully in the production of knowledge. We do this
1 The following chapters have been composed in the framework of the Collaborative
Research Center SFB 1288 “Practices of Comparing. Changing and Ordering theWorld”,
Bielefeld University, Germany: “Introduction,” “Historical Narrative versus Compara-
tive Description? Genre and Knowledge in Alexander von Humboldt’s Personal Narra-
tive,” “Narrating and comparing in the organization of research projects,” “Seeing, Com-
paring, Narrating, Making–of the Middle-Ages in the Early History of Art,” “Narrating
Art History: Practices of Comparing in Exhibitions and Written Surveys with regard to
documenta I.” The work has been funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG),
subproject C04: Vergleichshindernisse in denNaturwissenschaften und ihre Überwin-
dung. Das Beispiel der Molekulargenetik. We thank Gina Maria Klein for her support
in finalizing the manuscript.
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by taking into account related activities, such as measuring and classifying,
modeling, and establishing norms and categories, as well as the organization
and popularization of knowledge. In particular, we discuss and hopefully con-
tribute to dissolving the often assumed opposition between the role of narra-
tives in scientific explanation, on the one hand, and in understanding, on the
other. We propose that narrative practice is closely linked to, if not even part
of, what many scientific explanations achieve. We thus pay close attention to
the explanatory role and potential of narratives as used in the natural sciences
and the humanities, among others in historiography, anthropology and pa-
leontology, as well as physics, biology and chemistry. In line with Kaiser et
al. (2014) and Glennan (2010),2 we see a close connection between the use of
narratives in unfolding historical events, on the one hand, and as explanatory
tools in the sciences, on the other.
It does not come as a surprise that we emphasize comparing as a crucial
part in practicing the sciences and humanities. Comparing is such a pow-
erful tool in the production of knowledge that it even became part of the
very names of disciplines: comparative anatomy, comparative law, and com-
parative literature studies. In historiography, comparing became one of the
methodological cornerstones of modern social and cultural history.3 In gen-
eral, and not related to just the sciences and the humanities, the importance
and ubiquity of comparison in the establishment of social order and norms,
as well as a means of grasping the unknown in (inter-)cultural encounters,
has recently been emphasized by Angelika Epple and Walter Erhart. Drawing
comparisons is understood here as an activity which is always situated within
particular cultural practices, enforcing certain ways and ends of comparing
and suppressing others, thereby strongly shaping social discourses and struc-
tures.4 One of the best known postulates about the constitutive role of certain
2 Kaiser,Marie, andDaniel Plenge, “Introduction: Points of Contact between Biology and
History.” In Explanation in the Special Sciences. The Case of Biology and History, edited by
M.I. Kaiser, O.R. Scholz, D. Plenge, and A. Hüttemann. Amsterdam: Springer, 2013. See
as well Glennan, Stuart, “Mechanisms, Causes, and the Layered Model of the World,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81(2), 2010: 362-381.
3 Welskopp, Thomas, “Comparative History,” EuropeanHistory Online (EGO), published by
the Institute of EuropeanHistory (IEG),Mainz 2010-12-03. URL: http://www.ieg-ego.eu/
welskoppt-2010-en URN: urn:nbn:de:0159-20100921414 [2019/06/24].
4 Epple, Angelika, andWalter Erhart, “DieWelt beobachten. PraktikendesVergleichens.”
In Die Welt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, edited by A. Epple and W. Erhart,
Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2015, 7f.
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forms of comparison for modern culture has been introduced by Michel Fou-
cault in The Order of Things, where he identifies difference making as one of
the most important epistemic activities in the history of modern Western
thought, while claiming that “difference making” partially replaces analogical
thinking and similarity-driven strategies. In keeping with such approaches,
we underline the epistemic significance of comparing. Drawing comparisons
involves at least two comparata and a tertium comparationis, the latter defining
the perspective of the comparison in question.5 Thus, over the last 50 years,
comparing has been established as a well developed, andwell connected, epis-
temic activity in the sciences and humanities, placed alongside and demar-
cated from other methodologies.
While science and cultural studies have by now carved out a widely recog-
nized role for comparing in the sciences and humanities, the same cannot be
said about narrating. Although recent studies emphasizing the crucial impor-
tance of metaphors and analogies in research6 can in parts be traced back to
classics in the field, such as the work of Ludwik Fleck,7 the study of narration
has entered science studies at a broader scale only very recently.8 Partially, this
might be due to the preconceived notion that telling a story is, at best, part
of communicating results, and certainly not crucial in producing them. This
view is challenged at several levels in the contributions to this volume. More-
over, evenwell founded claims about establishing the central role of narratives
5 Epple, Angelika, “Ein praxeologischer Zugang zur Geschichte der Globalisierung/en.” In
DieWelt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, edited by A. Epple andW. Erhart, Frank-
furt a.M.: Campus, 2015, 163. See as well Sass, Hartmut von, “Vergleiche verstehen.
Einleitende Vorwegnahmen.” InHermeneutik des Vergleichens. Strukturen, Anwendungen
und Grenzen komparativer Verfahren, edited by A. Mautz and H.v. Sass, Würzburg: Kö-
nigshausen & Neumann, 2011, 27.
6 Mertens, Rebecca, The Construction of Analogy-Based Research Programs. The Lock-and-
Key Analogy in 20 Century Biochemistryth , Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2019. Frigg, Ro-
man and Stephan Hartmann, “Models in Science,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy (Summer 2018 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/
cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=models-science. Morgan, Mary S., The World
in The Model. How Economists Work and Think, Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University
Press, 2012.
7 Fleck, Ludwik,Genesis andDevelopment of a Scientific Fact, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1979.
8 Morgan, Mary S., and Norton Wise, “Narrative Science and Narrative Knowing. Intro-
duction to Special Issue on Narrative Science,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
62, 2017: 1-5.
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in research have been disputed. An example is Hayden White’s Metahistory,9
which was criticized for its rather narrow methodological approach and the
fact that it kept being restricted to a single field. The contributors to this vol-
ume both increase the number of methodological access points and widen the
range of study fields. As a result, the role of narratives in a wide spectrum of
scientific and humanistic fields is brought into view.
Arguably, the reasons for changing the status of narrating in the sciences
and humanities for the better have emerged from two recent developments.
The first has its origins in the field of science studies proper. Since the begin-
ning of social studies of science, the influence of the social context in one way
or another on scientific practice and content has been a defining feature, giv-
ing rise to new subfields, such as social epistemology. Among those, the claim
that social, cultural and political validity are crucial sources of scientific au-
thority has recently become a staple of studies in political epistemology.10The
key question that follows from this view for us is how do social acceptance,
societal validity and epistemic authority act back on research practices, and
in what circumstances do narratives play a role in this? Recently, Safia Az-
zouni and Stefan Böschen, in their introduction to a volume linking narra-
tion and scientific validity, have pointed to some general characteristics in
this regard.11 In their view, scientific and social actors create narrations, or
scenarios, of how the features of the scientific problem at hand are related to
each other. These scenarios often compete with or even exclude each other,
and this adds to the difficulty for achieving scientific and societal consensus.
The debates on climate change are a case in point where questions of evidence
come to the fore: evidence by whom, for what aim, and to what outcome? Nar-
ratives play a central role in such debates, and justly have become a key entry
point of science studies for analyzing various constellations of science in so-
ciety.
9 White, Hayden,Metahistory. TheHistorical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe, Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1973.
10 Straßheim, Holger, “Politics and Policy Expertise.” In Handbook of Critical Policy Studies,
edited by F. Fisher et al., Cheltenham UK / Northampton MA: Edward Elgar, 2015, 319-
340.
11 Azzouni, Safia, and Stefan Böschen, “Erzählung und Geltung. Ein problemorientierter
Ausgangspunkt und viele Fragen.” In Erzählung und Geltung. Wissenschaft zwischen Au-
torschaft und Autorität, edited by S. Azzouni, S. Böschen, and C. Reinhardt, Weilerswist:
Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2015, 9-31.
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This fruitful development in science studies has been strengthened by a
movement in narrative studies that has broadened the concept of narrative
and at the same time has introduced additional fields of analysis. This is the
second development that we wish to highlight here. More and more it has
become accepted in literature studies to include non-fictional texts in study-
ing narration. This has not been traditionally the case, though. In the last
decade or so, however, the narrative border between non-fiction and fiction
has been blurred by highlighting their structural similarities.While the range
for studying narratives has been widened, so has the understanding of narra-
tive. In this view, narratives are not just stories, and narrating is much more
thanmere story-telling even though it includes the latter. Here, narratives are
understood as higher-order structures of how stories are related to each other.
They constitute patterns of story-telling in both their temporal and structural
dimensions.While single stories are based on a certain timeline or stage-set-
ting, and establish individual links between the events told and the agents
described, narratives in addition often implement general temporal and con-
figurational patterns of what counts as a gripping timeline and a convincing
plot. “Good beats Evil,” or “Success after severe obstacles have been overcome”
are examples.12 It is important to note that narratives contain both temporal
and structural or configurational dimensions in constituting such higher or-
der patterns of both timeline and stage-setting (see below sect. 4).
Thus, the study of narratives points to key features of reasoning in the sci-
ences and humanities. Narratives contribute to the analysis of causality and
contingency in offering patterns of how the entities in question are linked
and in outlining what kinds of processes play a role in their evolution. It thus
may very well be that narratives support epistemic practices of drawing com-
parisons in the sciences and the humanities. Narratives sometimes enable or
facilitate comparisons and explanations.
2. Comparison and Narrative as Methodological Tools
In the following sections, we stress this productive role of narratives for draw-
ing comparisons by addressing features of scientific practice. Drawing com-
parisons is an important methodological tool for producing order in concep-
tual respect and for coping with new and unaccustomed objects and phenom-
12 Azzouni and Böschen, “Erzählung und Geltung,” 17.
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ena. What we do in creating order is assimilating what is unknown in part
to what we are familiar with. Thus, we isolate and delimit the novel and un-
expected elements. This is achieved by invoking relations of similarity so that
hopefully merely a few elements are left that do not fit established categories.
Accordingly, the method of drawing comparisons serves to anchor new items
at familiar piers and helps us navigate through uncharted waters of bewilder-
ment and surprise.
However, the handy tool of comparing does not always work well in gen-
erating transparency and clarity. Drawing comparisons is jeopardized by ob-
stacles and barriers. Sometimes it is difficult to establish a common ground
or a shared yardstick that could provide a standard of similarity against which
differences could be compared. For instance, it is difficult to assess whether
a sufficient amount of significant features is shared between the concepts of
chemical element before and after the Chemical Revolution. Prior to the Rev-
olution, chemical elements were thought to be abstract bearers of chemical
properties such as combustibility or acidity. Their abstract nature was sup-
posed to imply that elements are not material in themselves. Elements are
no substances and cannot be isolated in chemical analysis for this reason.
They rather explain properties of material substances. If they were material
themselves, we would run into a circularity. After the Chemical Revolution,
elements were conceived as end-points of chemical analysis and are thus defi-
nitely to be found in the laboratory.The explanatory and the operational con-
cepts of chemical element are widely disparate and threatened by non-com-
mensurability, i.e., the lack of significant shared properties.
In a different vein, Kuhnian semantic incommensurability is produced by a
cross-classification of similarity classes. For instance, the early notion of virus
broke the confines of the then-contemporary cluster of properties assigned to
bacteria and toxins, respectively. Viruses are contagious and reproduced in or-
ganisms, which showed them to be of the same kind as bacteria, but they pass
through filters that withhold bacteria.Therefore, viruses could not be cells and
looked rather like toxins. As a result, applying the standard procedures for
categorizing biological entities generated conflicting judgments. The newly
discovered entities transcended existing conceptual boundaries and defied
comparative analysis for this reason.
How can such obstacles to comparison be overcome? One of the options
is to introduce intermediate stages that combine features from both ends of
the conceptual spectrum or to invoke transitory steps that gradually lead from
one end to the other. A bridge notion of chemical element introduced the idea
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of active substances. Elements are recognized as material substances, to be
sure, but they are considered capable of imposing their properties on other,
more passive substances. Regarding viruses, early researchers conceived them
as cellular fluids. They were supposed to be part of cells and thus reproduced
within and together with cells, but they were thought to migrate among host
cells and could move independently of them. Such intermediate conceptual
states are often produced by appealing to analogies and metaphors. This vol-
ume thus aims to clarify the role narratives could play in the endeavor of
establishing relations of similarity and making comparisons possible.
3. Narratives in the Temporal Sense and their Roles in
Comparison and Explanation
As we said before, providing a narrative means outlining a plot and a stage
setting. The primary understanding of story-telling is to produce a time se-
ries of events. Two disparate stages are connected by a temporal sequence of
intermediate states, and narratives are patterns for how to trace such time
evolution in the phenomena studied. In this vein, each of the relevant steps
involves only a small-scale change, but adding up such steps may serve to
connect seemingly contrasting states of affairs. Consequently, narratives may
enable or facilitate comparisons. Likewise, narratives provide explanations
in virtue of the ties that bind subsequent states together. Such states may
be bound by causation or by biological evolution, and in virtue of such con-
nections the common ground between apparently unrelated or incomparable
stages is revealed.
For instance, sun-like stars, red giants, and white dwarfs look utterly dis-
similar in their characteristics, but they are easily comparable once they are
recognized as phases of stellar development. When sun-like stars have ex-
hausted their hydrogen resources in the core, thermonuclear fusion moves
outward to the shell surrounding the core. Their size is thereby greatly ex-
panded while the surface temperature is reduced because in virtue of their
vastness the radiation emitted is distributed over an enormous surface.When
nuclear fuel is used up eventually, the star collapses into a tiny and dense stel-
lar remnant of faint luminosity.This story gives a causal explanation of stellar
evolution and shows that these apparently disparate phenomena can be com-
pared by placing them on a causal and temporal scale.
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Biological evolution is another stronghold of narratives. The Darwinian
mechanism of inheritance with variation and the selection of organisms by
environmental conditions means to account for the present state of affairs by
invoking past constellations. Such historical explanations are sometimes con-
trasted with rational explanations in that seemingly less than optimal results
are traced back to different, earlier conditions. Think of the Brazilian variant
of the green sea turtle (Chelonia mydas) which reproduces only under envi-
ronmental conditions that are different from their usual habitat. This variant
migrates over a thousand miles to the mid-Atlantic Ascension Island for lay-
ing its eggs, although suitable conditions also exist much closer to their home
turf.The assumption is that this seemingly bizarre behavior evolved at a time
when the Atlantic Oceanwasmuch smaller.The reproductive pattern was sen-
sible at its inception but grew increasingly peculiar by continental drift.13 The
evolutionary narrative restores biological sense to an apparently odd behav-
ior. This is achieved by positing an initial state and then tracing intermediate
steps to the present condition. The explanatory power of this story is based
on bridging this initial state and the observed situation with a sequence of
transitional states. In this way, earlier and later stages are made comparable.
A similar case can be made for conceptual development in the history of
science. Oxygen, as conceived by Lavoisier, has barely anything in common
with the modern notion. Oxygen in its present-day understanding does not
underlie the nature of acidity, nor is it bound to the matter of heat that it
gives off in forming a compound in combustion, which was both the case in
Lavoisier’s conceptual frame. But in tracking gradual conceptual changes in
history, we can realize that earlier and later stages are connected. They are
not connected by one thread running through all stages, but by a variety of
shared features changing in each step. That is, historical sequences may be
tied together by narratives that establish Wittgensteinian family resemblance
among the stages.14
In sum, narratives may tell a causal story or an evolutionary history in
virtue of which we are able to grasp the relationship between two seemingly
distinct states of affairs. The two states become comparable in that a gradual
transition leads from one to the other. In this vein, time sequences have been
claimed to provide explanatory resources in fields traditionally considered to
13 Gould, Stephen Jay, The Panda’s Thumb, New York: Norton, 1980, 30-33.
14 Chang, Hasok, “The Persistence of Epistemic Objects Through Scientific Change,”
Erkenntnis 75, 2011: 413-429.
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be governed by universal and eternal laws of nature. In addition to realiz-
ing the importance of temporal developments in fields like astrophysics (e.g.,
stellar evolution), philosophers and historians of science have claimed that a
marked methodological shift is underway.This shift involves the growing im-
portance of computer simulations. The primary mode of explanation is said
to be no longer to subsume phenomena under higher-order laws of nature.
Rather, phenomena are understood by pursuing howmore elementary objects
build up or are grown into more complex ones. As Norton Wise claims, sim-
ulation techniques trace the development of an object through changing con-
ditions and elucidate in this way the features of this object. Such techniques
provide a story as to how this object has come about and explain its prop-
erties by following its development through a series of changes. As a result,
there is no opposition between narrative and explanation. On the contrary,
computer simulation widens the scope of explanation by bringing individual
variation into its purview. Real snowflakes, in contrast to their idealized im-
age, are non-symmetrical and variable, and these features can be accounted
for by simulating the growth of snowflakes under a variety of conditions. Such
diversity can be expounded best by tracingmany individual trajectories under
different initial and boundary conditions. This is what computer simulations
accomplish, and this is why they usher in a new narrating mode of explana-
tion.15
Turning to evolutionary biology, Wise’s claim that variability can best be
explained by narrative explanations is confirmed from a different angle by
John Beatty. He argues that giving explanations by following historical lines
is of chief importance in evolutionary biology and claims that an essential
element of valuable narrative explanations is contingency. More specifically,
narrative explanations are indispensable when we are faced with a branch-
ing-tree scenario in which alternative pathways open up at various junctures.
The path picked at such “turning points” makes a difference for the future
course. Put conversely, a particular outcome can only be explained by tracing
the choices at the turning points and pursuing the actual pathway through
the branching tree of non-actualized possibilities. As Beatty emphasizes, it
15 Wise, Norton, “Introduction: Dynamics all the Way Up.” In Growing Explanations. His-
torical Perspectives on Recent Science, edited by N. Wise, Durham: Duke University Press,
2004, 1-20. Wise, Norton, “Science as (Historical) Narrative,” Erkenntnis 75, 2011: 349-
376.
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is the existence of such turning points that makes narratives essential and a
story worth being told.
Contingency is a critical factor of a persuasive narrative. We could de-
velop a phenomenon governed by deterministic laws (such as the motion of
planets) into a series of events (giving the positions of the planets at different
times). But this would be entirely pointless. Valuable narratives need to con-
tain contingency or turning points. Beatty distinguishes between contingency
per se, such that an event was not bound to occur and could have come to be
otherwise, and contingency upon previous events, in the sense that a subse-
quent event depends on earlier events for happening. The turning points of
an interesting narrative need to be contingent in both senses. If a sequence
of organismic states is to be accounted for by an interesting evolutionary nar-
rative, two conditions need to be realized: First, later states of this sequence
need to be contingent on earlier states such that the later states would not
have evolved if the earlier states had been different. Second, early states need
to be contingent per se. It might well have been the case that earlier stages of
the organism might have gone extinct. This makes the survival of the earlier
stage a turning point and transforms the whole episode into a worthwhile
narrative.16
Staying with evolutionary explanation, one of the traditional complaints
about such a narrating mode of explanation concerns the arbitrary nature of
the historical steps assumed. In a celebrated contribution, Stephen J. Gould
and Richard C. Lewontin have castigated the carelessness of biologists in
thinking up evolutionary stories for accounting for an observed state. Count-
less unsupported hypotheses are produced for explaining why a given trait
of an organism is useful for survival. For instance, it was reported that male
bluebirds are more jealous before mating than after completed copulation.
This was supported by registering the number and fierceness of attacks of
bluebirds on dummy birds close to their nest. The explanation lies right at
hand: when mating is accomplished the male bluebird can be sure that his
genes are in the eggs. Jealousy would be futile; the optimum evolutionary
strategy is to let the competitor exhaust his forces in vain. However, the result
of the study could not be reproduced in a follow-up experiment. In this sec-
ond experiment, jealousy was observed to be weak all the time and no changes
16 Beatty, John, “What are Narratives Good for?,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biolog-
ical and Biomedical Sciences 58, 2016: 22-40.
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were recorded. Biologists were quick to produce alternative hypotheses. Ob-
viously, female bluebirds were available abundantly and the best strategy for
a male bluebird was simply to leave an unfaithful female rather than running
the risk of entering into a fight with a competitor. Gould and Lewontin are
highly critical of such “pan-adaptationist” strategies which invent selective
advantages copiously and arbitrarily and replace them without much ado in
the rare event of counterevidence arising. “Just-so stories” fail to explain.17
Being mindful of arbitrariness and insisting on independent empirical
support is certainly a recommendation worth being heeded. The initial and
intermediate states introduced or appealed to an acceptable explanatory nar-
rative should be confirmed by observational evidence. However, this impor-
tant caveat should not be exaggerated either. Sometimes evolutionary expla-
nations are of the “how possible” variety. That is, how is it conceivable that a
certain complex organ developed by variation and selection and that a cer-
tain species grew out of a prima-facie quite distinct ancestor species? In such
cases, evolutionary trajectories that are merely possible serve the purpose of
dispelling the mystery. It is true, it would be better even in such cases if sup-
porting evidence were offered. But even without such assistance, the main
explanatory purpose is served by the evolutionary narrative, namely, showing
that an evolutionary pathway is available in the first place that connects the
two states in question.
This sketch of some of the key positions on offer is supposed to show
that narratives in the temporal sense are able to establish comparability and
explain features in the physical and biological world. Reconstructing how an
outcome has been produced and how it has grown out of preceding states can
illuminate key features of this outcome.The sequence of subsequent states ex-
hibits how these states are related to each other and how the causal factors
are involved in the production and variability of its features. In this vein, nar-
rative accounts may yield explanations of the particulars of the phenomena
at hand that are inaccessible to more abstract and universalist approaches,
17 Gould, Stephen J., and Richard C. Lewontin, “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Pan-
glossian Paradigm. A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme.” In Conceptual Issues in
Evolutionary Biology. An Anthology, edited by E. Sober, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1984,
252-270 [1978]. Recently, Kaiser and Plenge have challenged the explanatory value
of “just-so-stories” in the context of historical narratives, building up on Gould’s and
Lewontin’s canonical argument. See Kaiser, Marie, and Plenge, Daniel, “Introduction:
Points of Contact between Biology andHistory.” In Explanation in the Special Sciences: The
Case of Biology and History, 1-23, on p. 9.
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and giving such explanations invokes and presupposes comparisons by intro-
ducing transitory stages that mediate between posited initial states and the
observed outcome.
4. Narratives in the Coherentist Sense and their Roles in
Comparison and Explanation
A non-temporal understanding of narratives has been developed in the past
decades and has been found increasingly appealing more recently. In this ap-
proach, the chief role of narratives is to establish a colligation of phenomena
or to create coherence. An early proponent of this view is Stephan Hartmann
who studied the relationship between a formal theory or theory-based equa-
tions, on the one hand, and “stories” (in a non-temporal sense to be clar-
ified), on the other. Hartmann’s account features the relationship between
Quantum Chromodynamics (QCD), the theory of strong interaction that is
effective in the atomic nucleus, and the properties of hadrons, i.e., particles
made of three quarks. Since the formal equations are insufficient for reach-
ing concrete explanations and predictions, models have been developed that
take special initial and boundary conditions into account and achieve such
explanations for restricted features of the particles under consideration. As
Hartmann portrays the situation, two such models are in play that empha-
size different features and neglect others. In order to justify these one-sided
approaches, stories are told, respectively, why the selected features are im-
portant and the neglected ones are insignificant. Models thrive on the story
told.
The models mostly provide causal mechanisms. These mechanisms are
neither part of the theory nor deducible from it, but they are inspired by its
formalism. The story complements the formalism and fits the model into a
larger framework in a non-deductive way. In other words, a model is an in-
terpreted formalism enriched by a story. For instance, one of the competing
models, the so-called MIT-Bag Model, owes its popularity to the convincing
story going along with it. The model concerned the failure to observe free
quarks, and the attached narrative sketched a causal process by which a quark
created an interaction-free space around it. This means that the quark was
shielded from outside intervention and could not be exposed. Although ref-
erence to a causal mechanism contains an implicit time element, this was not
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actually used in the narrative. By adding a causal account to the theory, the
narrative provides an understanding of the physical processes in play.18
The non-temporal understanding of narrative explanations has chiefly
been advanced by Mary S. Morgan. In her “configurational” account, a narra-
tive explanation is characterized by its ability to order materials by temporal,
spatial, theoretical or conceptual relations. Such an explanation is achieved by
binding events together (colligation) or by contrasting them (juxtaposition).
This means that sets of relevant elements are picked out and contrasted with
less than relevant items. Morgan insists that this production of order is the
crucial achievement of narratives, not the use of temporal relations for this
purpose.
Narratives are distinguished from models by being concrete and partic-
ular. However, they use theoretical categories and conceptual elements for
sorting concrete items and this is why they can be generalized to different
cases. Narratives are thus generic by nature, and thanks to their conceptual
structure they can be transferred to other fields. One of Morgan’s examples
is a study on the “street corner society” in a Boston slum area, conducted by
William Foote Whyte in 1943. The study introduced a variety of groups and
examined their relations: for instance, ill-educated and impoverished young
men in contrast to better educated and better-off young college men, their
relations with racketeers in contrast to those with the police. Slums had been
considered socially amorphous venues before, while in the light of the study
they appeared as organized social bodies with a social hierarchy in place and
a recognized system of social obligations.
The study employed group behavior, leadership, and community as con-
cepts for colligating and juxtaposing behavior and thus for creating coher-
ence. The use of such general concepts made it possible to transfer the dis-
covered phenomena to other communities. The study effectively coined the
generic term “slum society.” Such narrative explanationswork by showing that
events are related in a certain way so that they become significant and intel-
ligible. Morgan compares such narrative explanations to mosaics, jigsaws or
collages, in which the parts acquire their significance through their relation
18 Hartmann, Stephan, “Models and Stories in Hadron Physics.” In Models as Mediators.
Perspectives onNatural and Social Sciences, edited byM.S. Morgan andM.Morrison, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 326-346.
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to other elements. They lack a story line, but they resemble documentaries
which also analyze and show how the elements involved hang together.19
Narratives in this configurational or coherentist sense are characterized
by turning to the details and particulars. They may be invoked to provide
causal mechanisms or to establish order by sorting items into categories.
Time order does not play a significant role in either variant. Rather, expla-
nations are supplied and order is created by attending to concrete events and
phenomena by using general concepts. In this way, narratives are usually re-
lated to theories, but the claims they entail are independent of theories. Yet,
thanks to drawing on theoretical categories, narratives are generalizable and
thus pave the way toward giving explanations.
The relationship of such narratives to comparison leaps to the eye. Mor-
gan’s emphasis on creating clusters of similarity and dissimilarity obviously
thrives on drawing comparisons. Hartmann’s stress on causal stories involves
comparisons between the envisaged mechanisms and their theoretical em-
bedding. In both accounts drawing comparisons is a key activity in providing
narrative explanations.
In sum, narratives in the temporal and the configurational sense estab-
lish relations among entities in question and thereby enable comparisons.
Such comparisons are in their turn an important element in providing expla-
nations. On the whole, narratives are of instrumental significance in many
epistemic practices in the sciences.
5. Overview of the Volume
Part I of the volume centers on the general, conceptual dimensions of the in-
terplay of narrating and comparing in the sciences. Norton Wise opens the
volume with the chapter “Does Narrative Matter? Engendering Belief in Elec-
tromagnetic Theory.” He takes up and develops further the configurational
account of narratives. In agreement withHartmann,Wise stresses that the fa-
miliar criteria for judging theories, such as empirical adequacy or mathemat-
ical consistency, are often not sufficient for singling out a particular account
as superior.What is needed in addition for supplying credibility is a narrative.
19 Morgan,Mary S., “Narrative Ordering and Explanation,” Studies inHistory and Philosophy
of Science 62, 2017: 86-97.
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Wise’s examples are taken from the nineteenth-century electrodynamic the-
ories of Maxwell and Weber. Both crafted an avowedly fictional framework
which, in Maxwell’s case, assigned a place to lines of force and, in Weber’s
case, to action at a distance.These frameworks established relations, if imag-
inary, among the various elements involved. Both were anchored in features
existing in the real world, such as flow analogies in the case of Maxwell or
operations in the case of Weber, and introduced fictional features into these
familiar settings. In Maxwell, conceptual metaphors such as “lines of force”
served to link up events in the everyday world to the fictional features.
Hybrid constructions of this sort constitute narratives in Wise’s under-
standing. Following Sarah Johnston’s account of Greek mythology, Wise uses
her concept of a “story world” for denoting this combination of an existing and
familiar setting with interspersed imaginary components. Fictitious entities
are embedded in a realistic framework, and it is this connection to the real
world that conveys plausibility to the fictitious parts. Accordingly, the distinc-
tive feature of a narrative is to bring characteristics of different kinds together
in one conceptual scheme. While narratives may use time-order to achieve
such colligation, they need not. Rather, narratives serve to bind various as-
pects and details together and introduce contingency, possibility, probability,
and alternatives. Narratives produce coherence by distinguishing such con-
stellations from alternative ones. As a result, narratives emerge from drawing
comparisons and they lead to comparisons.20
In contrast to Wise, Christine Peters takes up the temporal view of nar-
ratives in her chapter “Historical Narrative versus Comparative Description?
Genre and Knowledge in Alexander von Humboldt’s Personal Narrative.” As she
argues, depending on how narratives are conceived they can support or un-
dermine the explanatory role of narratives. The latter possibility emerges if
narratives are viewed as autobiographical stories. A “historical narrative” con-
joins subsequent states of experience of an observer. The link between differ-
ent such states is produced by the chronological order in which they were
registered. With regard to the activity of comparing this means that similar
states or comparable processes may be separated by a time lag; they enter the
mind under different circumstances. Narratives based in this way on personal
history can impede significant comparison and fail to arrive at substantial ex-
planation.
20 See Morgan and Wise, “Narrative Science and Narrative Knowing.”
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Humboldt prefers a different narrative style that does not follow the trav-
eler’s experiences but rather renders the relations among the phenomena
observed. Such “comparative description” is achieved by emancipating one-
self from the accidental features of sequences of impressions supplied by
the senses and by focusing instead on the relations among different obser-
vations. For instance, when Alexander von Humboldt managed to compare
the changes in wild plants upon moving northward with such changes when
moving upward to higher altitudes, he abstracted from the contingent cir-
cumstances of the relevant observations. In order to draw such comparisons,
Humboldt needed to connect what was not linked by an uninterrupted tempo-
ral flow of observations. Rather, in his comparative description of volcanoes,
Humboldt highlighted geological relations and causal connections. Descrip-
tion emphasizes the sequence of natural events.
This outline shows that Peters draws on the temporal understanding of
narratives and locates the explanatory power of such narratives in their invo-
cation of objective relations among natural events. Uncovering causal chains
is an appropriate basis for a narrative explanation.The relevant time sequence
is shifted away from the observer and toward the phenomena (see section 3
above). Both historical narratives and comparative descriptions are based on
drawing comparisons. But only the latter are able to establish relations of sim-
ilarity that pertain to the course of nature, and thus only the latter are suited
to giving explanations.
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger deals with the “Narrative Order of Experimen-
tation.” The tradition of letting the objects of study tell their own stories
has accompanied the sciences from their inception. Rheinberger argues that
the extended process of experimentation can indeed itself be regarded as a
form of narration. Furthermore, he distinguishes three levels on which such
narratives can be accounted for historiographically. One level is experimental
systems. Such systems stimulate the production of histories of exploration
or micro-histories. The narratives created at this level are case-studies. How-
ever, second, such micro-histories stand for some more general state of
affairs and therefore need to be embedded. Moving on to the temporal meso-
range of a century rather than a decade brings experimental cultures into
view. In-vitro experimentation is an example of an experimental culture.
Taking such cultures as the object of a narrative upholds the emphasis on
practice but transcends particular experimental conditions and laboratories.
Such cultures are more fine-grained than disciplines and exhibit a focus on
practice. Specific narratives can be told by regarding experimental cultures
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as the engine of innovation and by trying to generalize their impact to
analogous cases. 
A third level (in addition to experimental systems and experimental cul-
tures) is represented by the macro-histories that can be unfolded by the tran-
sition to scientific concepts. For instance, around 1800, the concept of hered-
ity changed its meaning profoundly in that emphasis was now placed on or-
ganisms as carriers of intergenerational property transmission. This under-
standing became encapsulated in later decades in the notion of the gene.This
notion also underlies twentieth-century grand narratives such as the “geneti-
cization of society.” All in all, experimental practices in the sciences are in-
tertwined with activities of narrating, and the latter can shed light on what
scientific scrutiny and scientific change is all about.
Part II of the volume deals with the social, economic and political condi-
tions of research practice, particularly with the role of comparing and narrat-
ing in research organization and popularization.
Oliver Hochadel explores the relationship between comparing and nar-
rating in research on Neanderthals at the interface of archeology, paleon-
tology and paleofiction. In the course of the prominent archeological finds
in the Shanidar cave in Northern Iraq in the early 1950s, the image of the
Neanderthals was about to be transformed from “beast to brother”—an im-
age so powerful to lastingly influence our view of prehistoric life until the
present day. Hochadel retraces the narratives that led to the rehabilitation of
the Neanderthals, depicting them as social individuals with human-like be-
havior. He analyzes the work of the former anthropologist Ralph Solecki who
was among the first researchers and popular science writers, portraying the
Neanderthals from the Shanidar cave as compassionate and almost human
individuals. In his analysis of Solecki’s influential book “Shanidar. The First
Flower People,”21 Hochadel shows that the depiction of the Neanderthal ritu-
als resulted from Solecki’s “double field-work,” involving the interpretation
of archeological findings, on the one hand, and the observation of Kurdish
life in contemporary Northern Iraq, on the other. As a result, a continuum
between “the deep past and the present” and a convincing narrative of the re-
lationship between Homo sapiens and Neanderthals was established. In the
following decades, prehistorians and novelists would depict the Neanderthals
as emotional and even social individuals who deeply cared for their commu-
nity. Especially Solecki’s depiction of the burial of one of the Shanidar Ne-
21 Solecki, Ralph S., Shanidar, the First Flower People, New York: Knopf, 1971.
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anderthals under a “bed of flowers” became a key image in the new search
for similarities between Neanderthal and human behavior and was picked up
by Jean Auel in her prehistoric fiction series “Earth’s children,” first published
in 1980.22 Hochadel shows that these narratives, which could flourish due to
the close interaction between archeological research and science pop culture,
naturalized the comparison between prehistoric and modern life.
RebeccaMertens analyzes the role of narrating for successful comparisons
in the context of research management at the California Institute of Tech-
nology (Caltech) in the 1940s and 1950s. She claims that comparisons drawn
between different research areas and their objects in the biological and chem-
ical sciences gained their validation and persuasive power fromwhat she calls
“project organization narratives.” Her case is the history of work pursued at
Caltech’s Chemistry and Biology Divisions, led by Linus Pauling and George
Beadle, respectively. The basis of their joint work was the assumption that
structural or spatial complementarity at a molecular level was the key to un-
lock the secrets of life. The successful model for this assumption was the an-
tibody-antigen theory, which had gained traction already in the interwar pe-
riod. Its success led the way to a systematic approach guiding many scientific
and medical sub-specialties of the 1940s and 1950s into an era of collabora-
tive research.Thus, the origin of the molecular life sciences can be seen much
more directly in the paradigm of structural complementarity than in the ar-
guably better known ideas of sequence complementarity and information that
grew to dominance with the influx of physicists and the discovery of DNA’s
double helix structure. However, the role of structural complementarity kept
being strong throughout this period, and was the base for the comparability
of many different research agendas.
Support for the Caltech program in joint chemistry and biology of the
molecular understanding of life came from the Rockefeller Foundation.
Mertens’s claim is that the Foundation did not only provide financial support
but also the crucial narrative. Their program officers and science journalists
were key actors in authoring the mentioned project organization narratives.
The key part of the Rockefeller narrative in the immediate Post-WW II period
was the story of lost opportunities during the war, the exploitation of basic
research (which was deemed a limited resource), and the crucial role of
making up lost ground by a concerted effort featuring collaborative work.
Moreover, the essence of such successful research was to build the basis for
22 Auel, Jean M., The Clan of the Cave Bear, New York: Crown, 2011 [1980].
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later application in industry, medicine, and society in general. Scientific
comparative practice in a collaborative mode was thus made possible in
the frame of a narrative of basic research, highlighting both its former
shortcomings and its future promises.
Part III focuses on the material aspects of narrating and comparing with
a special emphasis on the reception and historiography of art. The thought
that epistemic practice is constituted not only by interconnected human ac-
tivities, but also by instruments and objects that themselves develop a certain
kind of material agency has been well developed in the course of the sociol-
ogy of experimentation and laboratory practice.23 For the recent history and
sociology of culture techniques in the arts and the sciences, the relationship
between material and human agency is a crucial subject of analysis.24
Joris Corin Heyder explores the relations between practices of seeing,
comparing and narrating in early historical reconstructions of medieval art.
The question of Heyder’s analysis is how comparing images and aspects of
images leads to the formation of what he calls a “narrative network,” a “non-
hierarchical interplay of actants and their narrative potential.” With this ap-
proach,Heyder begins a new section in the present volume by introducing im-
ages into the interplay of comparisons and textual narratives. Starting from
studying visual comparisons, Heyder includes paintings in the creation of
narratives. He focuses on the role of medieval art in challenging the text-
based view of the Middle Ages as a dark historical epoch. Heyder draws es-
pecially on the work of an eighteenth-century connoisseur and art critic Jean
23 See, for instance, Callon, Michel, and Bruno Latour, “Unscrewing the Big Leviathan:
How Actors Macro-Structure Reality and How Sociologists Help them to do so.” In Ad-
vances in Social Theory and Methodology. Toward an Integration of Micro- and Macro Sociolo-
gies, edited by K. Knorr-Cetina and A.V. Cicourel, Boston, London, Henley: Routledge
& Kegan Paul 1981, 277-303. Latour, Bruno, Science in Action. How to Follow Scientists
and Engineers through Society, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1987. From a
philosophical angle, Andrew Pickering has reflected on sociological concepts of hu-
man and material agency in: Pickering, Andrew, “The Mangle of Practice: Agency and
Emergence in the Sociology of Science,” American Journal of Sociology 99, 1993: 559-589.
And likewise in his book: The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, And Science, Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1995. For the role of material agency in practice theory, see
Schatzki, T., K. Knorr-Cetina, and E. Savigny, The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory,
London: Routledge, 2000.
24 See, for instance, Reckwitz, Andreas, “Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Devel-
opment in Culturalist Theorizing.” European Journal of Social Theory 5(2), 200, 243–263.
https://doi.org/10.1177/13684310222225432 [2019/02/12].
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Baptiste Séroux d’Agincourt. This enables Heyder to scrutinize the impact of
re-producing and re-presenting medieval art in the context of the Enlighten-
ment, which has been notorious for depicting the Middle Ages as a mere link
between antiquity and the Renaissance. Thus, while Séroux d’Agincourt’s tex-
tual account follows the established narrative of the degenerate Middle Ages,
the paintings chosen, assembled, and described create a different narrative
that grants medieval art an independent role and impact that it did not have
in previous historical works.
In challenging long established paradigms, such as the incompatibility of
narrative and the pictorial, and in invoking practice theory and Actor Net-
work Theory, Heyder establishes the concept of a visual-narrative network.
He does so by analyzing in a step-wise fashion the practices of seeing, com-
paring, and narrating. Alluding to the analysis of the nineteenth-century art
historian Franz Wickhoff, Heyder brings to the fore a visual narrative that re-
lies on the basic mental practices of complementing, continuing, and distin-
guishing. Comparative arrangements of images, such as Séroux d’Agincourt’s
Histoire de l’art par les monumens, afford the opportunity to introduce the cul-
tural persona of the beholder who creates stories even out of single images
and forges connections between series of images. These are often based on
comparing and lead to new comparisons, for example, by bringing in new
tertia comparationis or standards of comparison. Here, the pictorial domain is
more fruitful than the textual, there are “almost endless possibilities of identi-
fying tertia.” Of course, in the subsequent descriptions these tertia lead to new
(textual) narratives: In Heyder’s view, analysis of images and story-telling are
creatively linked through practices of comparing. However, he ends with a
note of caution. Each single configuration chosen by Séroux d’Agincourt can
set free its own narrative, no sign-posts for generalization and abstraction are
possible. But with this caveat attached, comparative image analysis can both
enrich and limit narratives.
Britta Hochkirchen explores the relationship between comparing and nar-
rating in the history of modern art. She examines how practices of compar-
ing in art exhibitions supported the narrative of modern art. Hochkirchen
specifies practices of comparing and narrating in written texts and curato-
rial activities in the historiography of modern art in the 1950s, the latter of
which is exemplified by the first documenta in Kassel in 1955. Key to her argu-
ment is the analysis of comparisons inWerner Haftmann’s canonical volumes
Malerei im 20. Jahrhundert as well as in the exhibition space and their respec-
tive role in the temporal order of the narration of modern art in post-war
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Germany. As Hochkirchen shows, both text-based and curatorial compara-
tive practices created a narrative of modern art as a unified European project,
establishing a temporal link between German art after World War I and the
art in other European countries before and during World War I. However,
the way in which comparisons were used for narration and also the narra-
tives themselves differed decisively at the linguistic and the curatorial level
of practice, even though Haftmann himself was responsible for the histori-
cal basis of the first documenta exhibition. Hochkirchen explains the different
narrative strategies by distinct rationales of temporal ordering and experi-
ences: In Haftmann’s written text, the narrative of modern European art was
created bymeans of its distinction from the oldmimetic style ofmirroring real-
ity, attributed to the period of the Renaissance, on the one hand, and from the
contemporary art style of the Soviet Union, on the other. Thus, discontinuity
played a crucial role in Haftmann’s narrative of the development of modern
art in Europe. However, the exhibition entirely focused on the continuity of the
abstract mode of art works within the European context of modern art. The
arrangement of the exhibition pieces (e.g., Picasso’s Girl before a Mirror and
Winter’s Komposition vor Blau und Gelb) encouraged a comparative view em-
phasizing their similarity with respect to the “progress” of the abstract mode.
In this third part we go beyond the sciences and explore the role of narra-
tives and comparisons in the humanities. Interestingly enough, both contri-
butions discuss how comparisons may produce narratives. Thus, they invert
the transition from narrating to comparing that has been expounded as the
dominant mode in the sciences. In reconstructing the historical evolution of
art, comparison is the means to producing narratives. Such narratives play
the role of explanations in that they make sense of the similarities and differ-
ences exhibited. Whether this feature happens to come up only in these two
contributions to this volume and is thus peculiar to these cases or whether it
is generalizable to a wider realm remains an open question.
The volume has grown out of the workshop “Practices of Comparing and
Narrating in the Sciences” within the collaborative research center on Prac-
tices of Comparison (SFB 1288, Praktiken des Vergleichens). The workshop
took place at Bielefeld University in April 2018 and was organized by Veronika
Hofer. We thank Veronika for her continued effort.

Does Narrative Matter?
Engendering Belief in Electromagnetic Theory
M. Norton Wise
What is the use then of imagining an electro-tonic state of which we have
no distinctly physical conception, instead of a formula of attraction which
we can readily understand? I would answer, that it is a good thing to have
two ways of looking at a subject, and to admit that there are two ways of
looking at it.
J. C. Maxwell, “On Faraday’s Lines of Force” (1855)1
With these words James Clerk Maxwell positioned himself with respect to the
sharply differing perspectives on electromagnetic action that were occupying
natural philosophers by the time he published his first paper on the subject
in 1855. How should they think about the action between two wires carrying
electric currents. Should they imagine an action mediated by a magnetic field
in all space describable in terms of “lines of force” and an electro-tonic state
existing at every point: “of which we have no distinctly physical conception.”
Or should they suppose the space itself to be empty and imagine instead a
direct unmediated action between moving electric particles (atoms) consti-
tuting currents: captured by a mathematical formula “which we can readily
understand.” This famous conundrum raises the question of how physicists
at the time could compare the “field theory” of Maxwell with the “action at a
distance theory” of Wilhelm Weber.2
1 Maxwell, James Clerk, “On Faraday’s Lines of Force.” In Transactions of the Cambridge
Philosophical Society 10, Part I, 1855, in The Scientific Papers of James Clerk Maxwell, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1890, 155-229, on p. 208.
2 For succinct and insightful but more technical discussions of Weber, Maxwell, Fara-
day, and others appearing below see Darrigol, Olivier, Electrodynamics from Ampère to
Einstein, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
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One way to look at the problem of comparison is in terms of believability.
How did people come to believe in one conception or the other? Apparently
the usual criteria of empirical validity, mathematical coherence, and compre-
hensiveness were not enough, since in this case both representations seemed
capable of encompassing all relevant phenomena. It wasmore nearly a matter
of belief in one sort of imagined “world” versus another. And in this situation
how the imagined world was narrated was important. In order to develop this
perspective I will consider an analogy with the function of narrative in sup-
porting belief in Greek mythology, largely following a recent analysis by Sarah
Iles Johnston.3
Note: Narratologists often think of narrative as defined by an unfolding in time of
a connected sequence of events. I use it here in the broader sense of an unfolding of a
representation or interpretation of a part of the world, without any necessary reference
to temporality. See my concluding comment below.
1. Two Conceptions of Electromagnetic Action
Before entering directly on the topic of how narratives support belief I will
first describe in Part I, more or less for themselves, Maxwell’s presentation
of field theory in terms of Faraday’s “lines of force” and the electro-tonic
state and Weber’s presentation of action at a distance between particles,
while pointing to some of their narrative characteristics. I will then in Part
II broaden the discussion to include more general considerations of how
narrative supported belief within a “story world,” using Johnston’s categories
as adapted for the examples of Michael Faraday’s Experimental Researches
for field theory and Gustav Theodor Fechner’s Atomenlehre for action-at-a-
distance.
3 Johnston, Sarah Iles, The Story of Myth, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2018.
Johnston, Sarah Iles, “NarratingMyths: Story and Belief in Ancient Greece,” Arethusa 48
(2), 2015: 173-218. Johnston, Sarah Iles, “The GreekMythic StoryWorld,” Arethusa 48 (3),
2015: 283-311.
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1.1. Maxwell, “On Faraday’s Lines of Force” (1855)
In the first thirty three pages of a seventy six page paper Maxwell carefully
unfolded verbally a picture of how lines of electric and magnetic force could
be represented in familiar terms as lines of fluid flow, as depicted in figure 1.
Figure 1: Lines of force surrounding a bar magnet with north
and south poles.
The first fifteen pages of this discursive narrative contained no mathe-
matics at all while the next eighteen employed just the simplest algebra. It
was only with an intuitive image established that he would then develop in
twenty pages a set of formal equations that might govern the interaction of
electric and magnetic lines in terms of Faraday’s electro-tonic state. A sum-
mary of the entire structure in six laws completed the account, with examples
of their application.
This is the earliest instance of Maxwell’s famous use of “physical analo-
gies”: “my aim has been to present the mathematical ideas to the mind in
an embodied form, as systems of lines and surfaces and not as mere sym-
bols, which neither convey the same ideas, nor readily adapt themselves to
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the phenomena to be explained.”4 It would be a mistake to think here of “em-
bodied mathematics” as a purely intellectual affair, in which mathematical
expressions simply receive concrete exemplification in a physical process. It
is certainly that but much more. Repeatedly through his life Maxwell em-
phasized that embodiment was also a matter of awakening the senses. As he
would put it in his Presidential Address to the British Association in 1870,
“[many physicists] calculate the forces with which the heavenly bodies pull at
one another and they feel their ownmuscles straining with the effort. To such
men momentum, energy, mass are not mere abstract expressions of the re-
sults of scientific inquiry. They are words of power, which stir their souls like
the memories of childhood.”5 It is helpful to keep this highly sensual aspect
in mind when thinking of how Maxwell sought to embody the lines of force
and their dynamical behavior in a narrative. He wanted to bring them to life
like “the memories of childhood,” or perhaps the characters in a short story.
In the embodied mathematics of a physical analogy he aimed to conceptually
integrate diverse aspects of the lines of force perspective while preserving the
“vividness” and “fertility” of sensory experience.6
To that end he asked his reader to “consider these curves not as mere
lines, but as fine tubes of variable section carrying an incompressible fluid.”7
Beginning from the simplest images, immediately accessible to anyone who
had seen water flowing, whether in a stream or simply in a basin, Maxwell
unfolded the geometrical conception of lines of flow in a three-dimensional
4 Maxwell, “Faraday’s Lines,” 156, 187. The literature is immense. For the specific religious
and cultural context in which Maxwell developed his use of physical analogy see Lam-
bert, Kevin, “The Uses of Analogy: James Clerk Maxwell's ‘On Faraday's Lines of Force’
and Early Victorian Analogical Argument,” British Journal for the History of Science 44,
2011: 61—88. On the method of reasoning see Cat, Jordi, “On Understanding: Maxwell
on the Methods of Illustration and Scientific Metaphor,” Studies in History and Philos-
ophy of Science, Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 32, 2001: 395-
441. Nersessian, Nancy, “Maxwell and ‘the Method of Physical Analogy’: Model-based
Reasoning, Generic Abstraction, and Conceptual Change.” In Reading Natural Philoso-
phy: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science and Mathematics, edited by D. B. Mala-
ment, Chicago: Open Court, 2002, 129-166. Generally see Darrigol, Electrodynamics from
Ampère to Einstein, 137-147.
5 Maxwell, James Clerk, “Address to the Mathematical and Physical Sections of the
British Association,” Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science 40,
1870, 215-229, on p. 220.
6 Maxwell, “Faraday’s Lines,” 156.
7 Ibid., 158.
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space, moving from lines to tubes of flow and gradually adding conditions
on velocity, sources and sinks, a resisting medium, pressure gradients, and
changes of medium.The result was an accessible image of a space full of flow-
ing fluid, which, although not initially developed mathematically, was easily
expressible in mathematical terms.
To put it a bit differently, lacking any physical theory of what a field of
force might be, Maxwell led his reader into a fictional world containing a
“purely imaginary substance,” which exhibited the properties he sought. “It is
not even a hypothetical fluid which is introduced to explain actual phenom-
ena. It is merely a collection of imaginary properties which may be employed
for establishing certain theorems in pure mathematics in a way more intel-
ligible to many minds and more applicable to physical problems than that in
which algebraic symbols alone are used.”8 Through this conceptually enrich-
ing if fictional narrative, rendered in everyday terms, he sought to stimulate
the reader’s imagination, giving almost sensory existence to the idea of lines
of force as analogous to lines of fluid flow.
Having established his basic image in these familiar terms Maxwell eas-
ily employed it to draw together nearly all of the phenomena of electricity
and magnetism as conceived by Faraday, replacing the idea of attraction at a
distance with lines of force conducted through space, including: the distribu-
tion of electric lines around positive and negative charges of static electricity;
the distribution of magnetic lines around north and south poles of magnets
(figure 1); the distribution of electric current lines in a conductor; and the
equivalence of electric currents and magnets in electromagnetism (so that a
small electric circuit behaved exactly like a small bar magnet). The existence
of electromagnetism meant that the two systems of electric current lines and
magnetic lines, each conceived separately in terms of flow, had to be interre-
lated dynamically, so that the properties of each system could be understood
in terms of the properties of the other.Their qualitative relation can be readily
understood with reference to a coil of wire carrying a current, which behaves
like a bar magnet with north and south poles and produces an equivalent dis-
tribution of magnetic lines (figure 2a).
8 Ibid., 160. As Lambert, “Uses of Analogy,“ 86, puts it, “Maxwell thought the manipula-
tion of objects could also discover ideas.”
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Figure 2: (a) A current-carrying coil behaves like a bar magnet. (b) An electric current
line and a magnetic line are related like a “mutual embrace.”
The pattern of the magnetic distribution by itself can be seen as a dynamic
balance, resulting from a tendency of each line to contract along its length and
for adjacent lines to repel each other laterally. But these effects are mirrored
reciprocally by the tendency of the current lines (or turns in the coil) to extend
along their length and for adjacent lines to attract laterally.
With his flair for evoking sensory perception Maxwell labelled Faraday’s
image of these interlocked rings the “mutual embrace” of electricity and mag-
netism (figure 2b).9 He had at hand no physical analogy that could account
for the interrelation of the lines but his flow analogy did provide key con-
cepts of flow velocity and pressure gradient at any point, or “quantity” and
“intensity” of the flow, in terms of which the reciprocal dynamics might be
represented mathematically. The picture of mutual embrace suggested that
just as the quantity of current passing through a surface surrounded by a
magnetic line could be expressed in terms of the intensity in the magnetic
line, so the quantity of magnetic force passing through a surface enclosed by
a current line should be expressible in terms of the current’s intensity. But no
9 Maxwell, “Faraday’s Lines,” 184, 194f. FromFaraday, Experimental Researches, III, 3265 and
plate IV, fig. 1. For Maxwell’s continuing use of the metaphor in later papers see Wise,
M. Norton, “The Mutual Embrace of Electricity and Magnetism,” Science 203 (4387),
1979: 1310-1318.
Does Narrative Matter? 35
such relation of magnetic quantity to current intensity existed. Thus mutual
embrace remained a highly suggestive image, to which Maxwell had led his
reader through an illuminating flow analogy for lines of force, but it ended
up showing that the story he had constructed was as yet incomplete.
This inadequacy was particularly troubling for Faraday’s great discovery of
electromagnetic induction, whereby an increase or decrease of the magnetic
quantity passing through a surface surrounded by a closed conductor would
induce a current in the conductor. Like Faraday, Maxwell thought there must
be some corresponding condition in the conductor, an “electro-tonic state,”
which was responsible for the current. But lacking any physical analogy with
which to embody this speculation, it remained a puzzling element within the
picture of lines of force. He therefore turned in the second half of his paper
to a purely mathematical representation of the electro-tonic state. In this ab-
stract form it served nearly to complete mathematically the symmetry of the
mutual embrace while also encompassing electromagnetic induction. But it
remained a somewhat ghostly stranger in Maxwell’s integrative narrative. He
left his readerwith the hope that an extended physical analogywould someday
complete the picture. “By a careful study of the laws of elastic solids and of the
motions of viscous fluids, I hope to discover a method of forming a mechani-
cal conception of this electro-tonic state adapted to general reasoning.”10This
aim to develop a more complete narrative, which did not depend in the first
instance on mathematical expression, would guide Maxwell’s development of
electromagnetic field theory for many years.
1.2 Weber, Elektrodynamische Maassbestimmungen (1846)
In sharp contrast to Maxwell’s aim of physical embodiment of mathemati-
cal relations, Wilhelm Weber sought an abstract mathematical relation that
would provide a Grundgesetz for all electrical action, where the term Grundge-
setz implies a foundational law governing the constitution of the phenom-
ena and from which they can be derived. And while Maxwell approached his
subject as a reflective theorist looking for a new conceptual structure, Weber
presented himself as a rigorous experimentalist seeking quantitative empir-
ical grounding for a generalized law of action at a distance, a law that would
do nothing more than express the results of his measurements, thus the title
10 Maxwell, “Faraday’s Lines,” 188.
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“Electrodynamic Measurements” (or Determinations of Electrodynamic Mea-
sure).11
As such Weber’s 170 page essay has a structure very different from
Maxwell’s. He let his reader know from the beginning that there was a
character behind the scenes that would ultimately appear as a central fig-
ure, namely electric currents represented in terms of positive and negative
particles of electric fluids flowing in opposite directions inside a conductor.
But these particles did not immediately concern him. Instead he began
his narrative from the closest expression yet attained to what he called a
“fundamental law” of the force acting between two current-carrying wires
(not the flowing electric fluids themselves). The French mathematical and
experimental physicist André-Marie Ampère had succeeded in expressing
this law as an action at a distance between any two infinitesimal elements of
the wires, depending on their current strengths, relative orientations, and
the inverse square of the distance between them.12 But to Weber, Ampère’s
accomplishment had a great weakness. He had not actually been able to
measure the force acting between two current-carrying wires. Instead he had
relied on so-called null experiments, reasoning for particular arrangements
of currents that if no effect were observed then the force had to have the form
he ascribed to it. Although justly famous, Ampère’s method could neither
give positive measurements of the forces nor establish absolute values of the
currents. He simply did not have the necessary instruments.
Weber had the solution. He devoted the first hundred pages of his book
to the design and operation of a new “electrodynamometer” of extraordinary
precision.13 From a literary perspective Weber’s presentation of his instru-
ment was itself a work of considerable rhetorical skill, another narrative un-
folding of a vivid image, but this time of the creative design, operation, and
uses of the key component—the key actor—in an empirically based narra-
tive that would ultimately lift Ampère’s “fundamental” law of action at a dis-
tance between current-carrying wires into a proper Grundgesetz. Drawings
11 Weber, Wilhelm, Elektrodynamische Maassbestimmungen, Leipzig: Weidmann’sche
Buchhandlung, 1846.
12 Ampère, André-Marie, “Mèmoire sur la théorie mathématique des phénoménes elec-
trodynamiques uniquement déduite de l’expérience,”Mémoires de l’académie royale des
sciences de l’institut de France 6, 1823 : 175-388. On Ampère’s theoretical and experimen-
tal methods see Hofmann, James R., “Ampère, Electrodynamics and Experimental Evi-
dence,”Osiris 3, 1987: 45-76.Darrigol, Electrodynamics fromAmpère to Einstein, 6-13, 23-30.
13 Darrigol, Electrodynamics from Ampère to Einstein, 54-66.
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were critical to the reader’s appreciation of the arrangement of components
and of how they functioned (figure 3).
In its basic version, an outer fixed coil of current-carrying wire sur-
rounded an inner moveable coil, which was placed perpendicularly to it
and was suspended on a pair of fine wires for sensitive detection of any
rotation produced by action between the coils. A small mirror mounted on
the inner coil allowed tiny movements to be read by reflection through a
telescope on a scale placed six meters away.14 The reader’s initial appreciation
for the refinement of the instrument and its capacities, however, was built
not only on detailed description but on Weber’s story of its origins, specific
identification of the instrument maker who perfected it, extensive calibration
data, analysis of precision, and sources of error. Fully fleshed out in this way,
the electrodynamometer functioned as the trusted agent of truth in Weber’s
account.
Only having established this material foundation did Weber return to his
reworking of Ampère, measuring with precision and with named witnesses
to the observations the action between the current-carrying coils of his elec-
trodynamometer.The result completely confirmed Ampère’s fundamental law
of the force acting at a distance between current elements. He then turned to
Faraday’s discoveries of current induction to show that the electrodynamome-
ter could similarly confirm those results, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
At this point in his narrative it would seem thatWeber had not only presented
his instrument as an agent capable of reworking experimentally all known
phenomena of electrodynamics but had made the electrodynamometer into
an instrument that in effect reified those phenomena as results of action at a
distance.
Nevertheless a major difference existed between the Ampère and Faraday
results, for while Ampère’s law referred to electric currents, the force it actu-
ally described acted on the conductors carrying the currents. In this sense, it
was not an electrical force at all. Faraday’s induction of currents, on the other
hand, concerned a force acting on the electricity itself inside a conductor to
create a current. That distinction opened the door to the second half of We-
ber’s essay, in which he revived the background image of electric fluids that he
had originally only mentioned. He now sought a general law of truly electrical
14 Weber adapted the bifilar suspension and telescopic mirror reading technique from
Gauss’s magnetic measurements, on which he collaborated. Weber, Elektrodynamische
Maassbestimmungen, 10.
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Figure 3: WilhelmWeber’s Electrodynamometer. Weber,
Elektrodynamische Maassbestimmungen, 11.
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forces acting between masses of positive and negative electricity (effectively
electric point atoms, as for Fechner below). Returning to the assumption that
currents consisted of positive and negative fluids moving inside conductors,
he asked what supplement of the familiar inverse square law ee’/r2, which
governed the electrostatic force between electric masses e and e’ at rest with a
distance r between them, would apply if the masses were in relative motion,
as in a wire carrying a current (figure 4).
Figure 4: Weber’s law of force between electric particles e and
e’ flowing in a wire carrying current: F = ee’/r2(1 – k2v2 +
2kra)
From looking at only two facts about the Ampèrian forces between
current elements he quickly inferred that the simplest supplement of the
electrostatic law would be two additional terms, one depending on the square
of the relative velocity v between the electric masses and a second depending
on their relative acceleration a:
F = (ee’/r2)(1 – k2v2 + 2kra),
 
where k is a constant. With equal facility Weber showed from a single fact
about Faraday’s induction of currents that it also fit this abstract law, con-
firming its validity.
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It may not be immediately obvious just how dramatic this result was.
Nothing in the preceding 100 pages of presentation and legitimation of the
electrodynamometer had prepared the reader for a simple mathematical ex-
pression that subsumed all of electrostatics and electrodynamics in one law
of force for electric masses. A few pages of skillful reasoning had converted
a tour de force of experimental prowess into a formula that provided the cal-
culational basis of all electrical action. After one more generalizing move (a
mathematical transformation of Ampère’s law into the new law for electric
masses), Weber reached the climax of his narrative. He could now call his ac-
complishment the “elektrische Grundgesetz”, the law of constitution of any and
all electrical phenomena.15 It remained only to prove that in fact the electri-
cal phenomena could be formally derived from the Grundgesetz, including of
course all of the refined measurements made by the electrodynamometer for
both Ampère’s constant currents and Faraday’s induced currents.
But Weber’s Grundgesetz was a law like no other. That the force between
two bodies should depend on their relative velocity and acceleration, or should
be time-dependent, challenged basic assumptions of mechanics.16 Neverthe-
less Weber pressed on, suggesting that other forces too, such as gravitation,
might have to be similarly supplemented. “A priori this question cannot be
decided, because formally in the assumption of such forces there is neither
any contradiction nor anything unclear or indeterminate.” Furthermore, the
purpose of such “fundamental laws” was not “to give an explanation of the
forces from their true grounds but only to give … a useful general method for
quantitative determination of the forces according to the fundamental mea-
sures determined in physics for space and time.”17 The Grundgesetz suggested
even that multibody forces might exist, since the acceleration between two
masses could be affected by a third, as in recently discovered catalytic forces
of chemistry. Indeed, mediating effects of an ether might be contemplated,
as Faraday’s recent discovery of magnetic rotation of the plane of polariza-
tion of light suggested.18 Thus a whole new world of possibilities opened up.
15 Weber, Elektrodynamische Maassbestimmungen, 119.
16 For the immediate controversy see Bevilacqua, Fabio, “Theoretical and Mathematical
Interpretations of Energy Conservation: The Helmholtz-Clausius Debate on Central
Forces 1852-54.” In Universalgenie Helmholtz: Rückblick nach 100 Jahren, edited by L.
Krüger, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994, 89-106. Darrigol, Olivier, “Helmholtz’s Electro-
dynamics and the Comprehensibility ofNature.” InUniversalgenieHelmholtz, 216-242.
17 Weber, Elektrodynamische Maassbestimmungen, 112-113.
18 Ibid., 168-170.
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But Weber wanted to be clear that the compelling picture he presented of di-
rect action at a distance between electric masses, was a fictional, if realistic,
construction. Concerning currents: “The simultaneous movement in opposite
directions of positive and negative electricity … may in reality not exist at all,
but for our purpose may be regarded as an idealmotion, which … [for] actions
at a distance, may represent the motions really present.”19
In summary, and somewhat like Maxwell,Weber built up an experimental
and theoretical narrative that would launch a generalized concept of action
at a distance, in which forces could be time dependent. The conception was
highly successful at drawing together disparate elements, even if fictional.The
basic object of understanding on this view was a pair of particles, or electric
atoms, between which a force acted. The force itself was an abstract relation
in space and also time: “because a time-dependent relation is just as measur-
able a quantity as distance.”20 In contrast to Maxwell, however, the space sur-
rounding the two atoms contained nothing: no force, no field, and of course
no lines of force.
2. Believability and the Techniques of Narrative
Both Maxwell and Weber carefully structured their narratives of electromag-
netic phenomena to make the unfamiliar familiar and to yield a climactic
moment in which a strange new object emerged. For Maxwell the story cul-
minated in an electro-tonic state, which had never been observed and for
which he could provide no ordinary physical conception but only a suggestive
mathematical symmetry. For Weber the culmination was a time-dependent
force, whose violation of established principlesWeber countered with appeals
to logical validity and to possible extension to other areas, such as catalytic
action.
Thinking of these fictional constructions in rhetorical terms, my question
now is what made them believable in everyday terms. This is the same ques-
tion that classicist and historian Sarah Johnston has asked for Greek mythol-
ogy: “how, exactly, does the narration of myth sustain a metaphorical con-
nection between the mythic and quotidian worlds.”21 One aspect jumps out
19 Ibid., 100.
20 Ibid., 113.
21 Johnston, Story of Myth, 79.
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immediately. Both Maxwell and Weber spent the majority of their presen-
tations making the reader feel at home within the worlds they were in the
process of building, well before they revealed their creative fictions. Maxwell
did this through the flow analogy, which was accessible to anyone who had
paid close attention to fluid flow.Weber did it through his extended presenta-
tion of the design, operation, and measurements of the electrodynamometer,
all of which confirmed Ampère’s and Faraday’s laws in terms of action at a
distance. Only after having gone to considerable length to establish this fa-
miliarity and normalcy—and thereby their own legitimacy and a suspension
of disbelief—did they guide their readers into consideration of a possible ex-
panded reality.
Techniques of this kind for introducing the fictional or extraordinary into
the quotidian are so common in narratives dealing with otherwise question-
able events or beings that it has been designated the “X/Y Format”—X for the
familiar and Y for strangeness—by the sociologist Robin Wooffitt.22 It is only
one of many techniques, however, that Johnston has highlighted in skillfully
constructed narratives, which contribute to the believability of the gods and
heroes of Greek myths.23 It is not that speculative stories about electromag-
netism are much like myths—lines of force and electric atoms are characters
of a different sort from Heracles or Theseus—but the techniques of narra-
tion that enhance their believability are similar. Among those techniques (but
adapted and reordered) I will take up the role of: conceptual metaphor, serial
narration, multipliers (Johnston’s plurimediality), and story world. Together they
help to clarify the pragmatic effect of effective narration. To explore this view
for audiences of electromagnetism I will move out from the highly focused
representations by Maxwell and Weber to the broader narratives of Faraday
and of Gustav Fechner.
A key aspect of Johnston’s entire discussion of the effectiveness of tech-
niques of narration is her treatment of emotional and cognitive responses
as integrally related. Although I will not explicitly take up that relation here,
Maxwell’s view of the sensory role of physical embodiment of mathematical
22 Johnston, Story ofMyth, 98-102;Wooffitt, Robin, Telling Tales of theUnexpected: TheOrga-
nization of Factual Discourse, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992, 114-152.
23 Mayer, Adrienne, Gods and Robots: Myths, Machines, and Ancient Dreams of Technology,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019 is also highly relevant here for its accounts
of the relation of fictional automata in Greek myths to familiar technology, with be-
lievability, and also creativity, running in both directions.
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formulas can serve as a reminder of its importance, which reappears below
for Fechner.24
2.1 Faraday, Experimental Researches in Electricity (1831-1852)
Over the course of twenty years from 1832 to 1852 Michael Faraday published
in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society and other journals the ar-
ticles that would make up the three volumes of his Experimental Researches
in Electricity. Having made his reputation with major discoveries in chemical
equivalents and electrochemistry he had turned to electricity and magnetism
proper. The Researches contained an astonishing collection of discoveries, in-
cluding electromagnetic induction (1831), specific inductive capacity (1837),
diamagnetism (1845), magnetic rotation of light (1845), and many others of
both theoretical and practical significance. Throughout these works Faraday
continued to ponder and to develop the idea of lines of force as an alternative
to action at a distance.25
Conceptual metaphor. The term “lines of force” functioned during this
development as what Johnston, borrowing from the linguists George Lakoff
and Mark Johnson, calls a conceptual metaphor. Such metaphors, she observes,
commonly functioned in the narration of Greek myths to figuratively connect
events in the everyday world to events in the world of the myth and thereby
support belief.26 In Faraday’s case, his use of lines of force as a central
metaphor not only connected many different strands in the actual world of
his laboratory experiments (as in figure 5), but connected them as well to an
imagined world in which forces had something like material status.
In retrospect, Faraday’s metaphorical language might seem to have been
highly effective. It is well to remember, however, that it was not necessarily
so, especially among those who prioritized mathematical expression.William
Thomson, for example, who would ultimately become Faraday’s first great
mathematical interpreter, when originally encountering Faraday’s language
24 Johnston, Story of Myth, e.g. 10, 66-67, and throughout.
25 Faraday,Michael, Experimental Researches in Electricity, 3 vols., facsimile reprint, London:
Quaritch, 1855, cited byparagraphnumber.On the sources and significance of Faraday’s
use of lines of force see Gooding, David, “’Magnetic Curves’ and theMagnetic Field: Ex-
perimentation and Representation in theHistory of a Theory.” In TheUses of Experiment,
edited byD.Gooding, T. Pinch, and S. Schaffer, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,
1989, 183-223. Darrigol, Electrodynamics from Ampère to Einstein, 16-22, 31-41.
26 Johnston, Story of Myth, 67, 73.
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Figure 5: Faraday’s image of iron filings mapping the lines
of force around two circular magnets with north and south
poles. Faraday, Experimental Researches, III, Plate IV,
Fig. 4.
of electrostatic “induction in curved lines” in 1843, wrote that “I have been
much disgusted with his way of speaking of the phenomena, for his theory
can be called nothing else.”27 It would be two years before he fully appreciated
that Faraday’s “way of speaking” fit quite well with his own development of a
mathematical analogy between heat conduction and electrostatic action, with
which he had shown their near mathematical equivalence.Thomson’s analogy
between flux of heat and lines of force would provide Maxwell’s starting point
for his own fluid flow analogy ten years later.The seemingly so obvious power
that we see today in Faraday’s conceptual metaphor is actually a product of
historical recountings, not unlike the way in which repeated narration and
performance of Greek myths around conceptual metaphors enhanced the be-
lievability of Gods and heroes.
Serial narration. Closely related to this historical aspect of effective
metaphors, but within Faraday’s own reports of his experiments, is their
serial narration. The articles in the three volumes were narrated serially over
27 Smith, Crosbie, and M. Norton Wise, Energy and Empire: A Biographical Study of Lord
Kelvin, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 213.
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twenty years. The seriality was quite literal, with episodes appearing at
irregular intervals with a series number and in numbered paragraphs.28
Johnston takes serial narration to have been another of the important factors
contributing to belief in myths. Offered up in small installments, each with
its own focus but always contributing to a single story line, the series encour-
aged readers to contemplate each episode in relation to previous ones and in
anticipation of what might appear next, as though following one of Charles
Dicken’s serialized novels or a TV series like Downton Abbey. Faraday encour-
aged such responses with many back-references and suggestive speculations
about future developments, as in the following excerpt from the Eleventh
Series (1837).29
1163. In the long-continued course of experimental inquiry in which I have
been engaged, this general result has pressed upon me constantly, namely,
the necessity of admitting two forces, or two forms or directions of a force
(516. 517.).
1164. When I discovered the general fact that electrolytes refused to yield
their elements to a current when in the solid state, though they gave them
forth freely if in the liquid condition (380. 394. 402.), I thought I saw an open-
ing to the elucidation of inductive action, and the possible subjugation of
many dissimilar phenomena to one law.
As this excerpt also suggests, seriality offers another interestingmode of read-
ing, namely, reading out of sequence, so that readers are able continually
to reconstruct the back-story for themselves. Such reconstruction can sug-
gest different approaches and new insights, enhancing personal engagement.
Johnston argues that all of these aspects of serial narration give characters a
life of their own, which in itself contributes to their believability.30
Multipliers. Similar effects follow from various means of multiplication,
whether by different authors, different outlets, different voices, or different
28 For extended discussion of “Seriality and Scientific Objects in the 19th Century” see the
special double issue of History of Science, 48 (2010), edited by Nick Hopwood, Simon
Schaffer,and James Secord.
29 Faraday, Experimental Researches, I, 1163-1164. As Faraday scholar Geoffrey Cantor has
observed (verbal comment) it may be significant for reader response that Faraday’s
installments appeared about a year apart rather than only aweek apart, as for Dickens.
30 Johnston, Story of Myth, 32, 91-96, 246-252. I am here collapsing the distinction of “se-
ries” from “serial” in episodic narration.
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media. Johnston develops this as plurimediality.31 Although most of Faraday’s
articles appeared in the prestigious Philosophical Transactions, for example, he
placed some of them in the more widely read Philosophical Magazine and in
the popular Proceedings of the Royal Institution, while preserving the numbered
ordering of the serial narration.These different outlets not only multiplied his
audience; they also presented his work with different degrees of speculative
freedom and different levels of technicality.
Looking more widely, a considerable variety of authors contributed to the
diversity of specific meanings and contexts that informed Faraday’s lines of
force. The chemist John Frederic Daniell dedicated his Introduction to the Study
of Chemical Philosophy to giving an elementary view of Faraday’s philosophy,
including the mediating action of lines of force. There Thomson encountered
the claims for “curved lines,” which he initially considered nothing but ver-
biage but soon elaborated mathematically through his analogy to heat con-
duction.32 AndwhileThomson admiredMaxwell’s similar use of physical anal-
ogy, he always rejected Maxwell’s introduction of Faraday’s electronic state
from mathematical symmetry alone. Thus Daniell, Thomson, and Maxwell
(among others) served asmultiple narrators of the lines of force, whose differ-
ing interpretations contributed to the sense of their underlying reality. Other
multipliers included the use of different modes of expression for the purpose
of skillful narration, most prominent here being the mix of verbal, mathe-
matical, and visual means that different authors used to capture Faraday’s
experiments and his already highly visual language.
Story world. Conceptual metaphors, serial narration, and multipliers of
various kinds work together to create what Johnston and others call a story
world. On entering the story world of Greek myths, we become familiar with
a collection of characters whose stories become intertwined with each other.
It is not so important that they appear always with the same personalities but
that they create a dense network of relationships.33 And so it was in Faraday’s
world of lines of force. Always exploring the possibilities for a reality in which
forces are more substantial and fundamental than matter itself, he regularly
repeated the view that forces of all kinds are expressions of one force and
31 Johnston, Story of Myth, 27-28, 156-176. Plurimediality takes the identity of the object
of narration outside any particular author or presentation.
32 Daniell, John Frederic, Introduction to the Study of Chemical Philosophy, 2nd ed., London:
Parker, 1843, 255-256.
33 Johnston, Story of Myth, 25-26, 121-146, as network 131-139. See also, Johnston, “The
Greek Mythic Story World,” 283-311.
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are convertible one into the other.34 His overarching narrative thus aimed
at the ultimate goal of interrelating chemical reactions and heat with elec-
tricity, magnetism, light, and even gravity. Concerning the interlocked rings
of electric and magnetic lines of force (figure 2b), which Maxwell would call
their “mutual embrace,” he offered: “their relation … probably points to the
intimate physical relation, and it may be, to the oneness of condition of that
which is apparently two powers or forms of power, electric and magnetic.”35
Similarly, with respect to the magnetic rotation of light, he remarked: “Thus
is established … a true, direct relation and dependence between light and the
magnetic and electric forces; and thus a great addition made to the facts and
considerations which tend to prove that all natural forces are tied together,
and have one common origin (2146.).”36 Within this developing story world
each of the topics and each of the installments of Faraday’s long series of
Experimental Researches became intertwined with the others through lines of
force and each gained credibility from its place in the network in relation to
the others.
Pragmatic effect. All of the techniques of effective narration that I have
briefly described contributed to the believability of Faraday’s conception of
how forces functioned in the world. When successful, these techniques made
the elusive notion of lines of force seem as real as wires and inspired his fol-
lowers to try out the experiments for themselves, enlivening the ideas with
their own experience, which Faraday always encouraged. Others formulated
their own work in corresponding terms. Thomson and Maxwell are the obvi-
ous examples. This capacity of narration to affect how others think and act
has been called the pragmatic effect.37 Although the term might be applied
to many forms of presentation, it refers here specifically to the capacity of an
audience to introduce entities from a story world into their real world without
an overly strained sense of fiction, having acquired a new openness to possi-
ble realities. Perhaps themost difficult of those realities in Faraday’s narrative
of lines of force was the electro-tonic state. As Faraday himself put it: “Again
and again the idea of an electro-tonic state (60. 1114. 1661. 1729. 1733) has been
forced on my mind; such a state would coincide and become identified with
that which would then constitute the physical lines of magnetic force.”38 On
34 Faraday, Experimental Researches, III, e.g., 57, 366, 376, 877, 961, 2071, 2146.
35 Ibid., 3268.
36 Ibid., 2221.
37 Johnston, 20- 21, 57-58, 76-80, citing work of Claude Calame.
38 Faraday, Experimental Researches, III, 3269.
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entering into Faraday’s story world, Maxwell—but not Thomson—acquired
a similar sense of the almost necessary reality of the imagined state. I have
suggested that this was in part the pragmatic effect of effective narration.
Maxwell responded by enriching the story world with his own physical anal-
ogy for lines of force and then reintroducing the electro-tonic state mathe-
matically, as yet without any physical conception of it but with the expectation
that it would soon appear in a prominent role.
2.2 Fechner, Atomenlehre (1855)
In order to obtain a similarly broad view of the believability of Wilhelm We-
ber’s Grundgesetz in narrative terms it will be instructive to consider the work
of Gustav Theodor Fechner.39 The Leipzig physicist and philosopher was al-
ready a prominent intellectual who had published essays, books, and poetry,
on everything from life after death to the mental life of plants, when in 1855
his sweeping tract on the atomistic conception of the world appeared, written
in a distinctly literary vein and usingWilhelmWeber’s work as the lynchpin of
the presentation. Fechner had suffered a debilitating mental collapse in 1839,
which effectively blinded him and which led to Weber assuming his profes-
sorship at Leipzig from 1843 to 1849, where they interacted closely.40 Fechner
had been pursuing an atomistic view of nature since the 1820s and in 1845 he
published a partial account of the relation of Faraday’s induction to Ampère’s
law of currents, modeling a current as equal and opposite motions of positive
and negative electric masses. There he was able to announce that Weber had
actually succeeded in subsuming all electrical phenomena under a single law
of force.41
But Fechner had a much more ambitious agenda, one in which physics
melded into philosophy and psychology and all three into “psychophysics,”
for which he is best known. It was the relation of physical and mental states
39 For a comprehensive analysis of Fechner’s work, which informsmy discussion here, see
Heidelberger, Michael,Nature fromWithin: Gustav Theodor Fechner and his Psychophysical
Worldview, trans. C. Klohr, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 2004.
40 Weber had himself been dismissed from his professorship at Göttingen in 1837 as one
of the political protesters known as the “Göttingen Sieben.”
41 Fechner, Gustav Theodor,Maassbestimmungen über die galvanische Kette, Leipzig: Brock-
haus, 1831. Fechner, Gustav Theodor, “Ueber die Verknüpfung der Faraday’schen
Inductions-Erscheinungen mit den Ampère’schen elektro-dynamischen Erscheinun-
gen,” Annalen der Physik und Chemie 64, 1845: 337-345, on p. 345.
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that most captured his attention. He advocated a form of monism called psy-
chophysical parallelism, arguing that psychical and physical states—indeed,
psychical and physical worlds—are two aspects of one reality and that their
relation can be studied quantitatively. This led him, building on the work of
Weber’s brother Ernst Heinrich Weber, to the so-called Weber-Fechner law,
relating the physical strength of a stimulus to its perceived psychical inten-
sity.
With respect to Weber’s Grundgesetz, Fechner’s Ueber die physikalische und
philosophische Atomenlehre of 1855 is his most important work. 42 In this wide-
ranging polemical tract, Fechner aimed to counter the currently dominant
anti-atomism among German philosophers (as opposed to physicists). Ever
since Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science a number of philoso-
phers had been pursuing forms of dynamism, meaning the view that the or-
dinarymatter of our experience is constructed in the dialectics of nature from
an underlying continuum of forces. “According tomost dynamicists, a conflict
of opposing forces is supposed to be what makes a body out of force.” Two of
Fechner’s targets were Schelling and Hegel in their pursuit of the absolute or
Ding an sich, but Herbart came in for special critique because his purely meta-
physical monadology could look similar to the physical atomism that Fechner
himself defended.43
For Fechner the real world was a world of sinnliche Erscheinungen (sensory
appearances, or phenomena) and any idea of a Ding an sich behind appear-
ances was pure fantasy. Such appearances were epitomized by what could
be directly touched or grasped, but they extended much further. “If one asks
in general what the world consists of in the last instance, then it is Erschein-
ung (Selbsterscheinung in mind and God, objective Erscheinung in nature): laws
of Erscheinung; determinations, connections, and relations of Erscheinungen;
which include the possibility of forthcoming and new Erscheinungen. Oth-
erwise there is nothing and behind them there is nothing.”44 Within this si-
multaneously realist and phenomenalist perspective Fechner presented his
atomistic world view, arguing that atomism best represented the totality of
empirical and mathematical appearances known to physicists and therefore
had themost probable claim on reality.45 In this effort he also relied on several
42 Fechner, Gustav Theodor, Ueber die physikalische und philosophische Atomenlehre, Leipzig:
Mendelssohn, 1855.
43 Fechner, Atomenlehre, 107, 164.
44 Fechner, Atomenlehre, 94, see also 90-99, 113.
45 See Heidelberger, Nature fromWithin, 137-154.
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of the tools of believability that Johnston ascribes to the narration of Greek
myths.
Conceptual metaphor. Under the conceptual framework of atomism Fech-
ner sought to integrate a wide diversity of phenomena in the physical world.
By atoms he understood discrete, indestructible atoms, Grundatome or letzten
Atome, with forces acting directly at a distance between them. And citing We-
ber, along with prominent French physicists (Moigno, Séquin, Cauchy, Am-
père), he adopted the view that these atoms could best be considered as un-
extended point atoms.46 Crucially, the forces were nothing in themselves; they
could not be thought of independent of the atoms; nor did they inhere in or
emanate from individual atoms; so one atom could not be said to act on an-
other. It was only “the category of Zusammensein [being together, or interre-
lation] that defined the concept of force, not an inner essence of matter.” Or
again, “The concept of force … is a relational concept, which has meaning only
for the Zusammensein of matter.”47 Forces were relations in space and time be-
tween atoms, which physicists knew only as laws.Thus Fechner’s basic physi-
cal image was of a pair of point atomsmoving with respect to one another and
expressing in their relation the law of force that governed their relative mo-
tion. With this concept of action at a distance between atoms Fechner sought
to open up the unobservable world to physical understanding grounded in
sinnliche Erscheinungen. “Atomism is at once the key with which the physicist
unlocks the door of a room closed to the senses and opens up its connection
with what is immediately accessible to him.”48
Serial narration. By the time Fechner’s Atomenlehre appeared in 1855 he had
been publishing articles and books that concerned atomism for thirty years.
In this sense the Atomenlehre had a serial character, although that background
appeared only occasionally in the text. More interesting is what might be
thought of as the historical seriality of other physicists, mostly French, on
whomFechner depended.He had only tomention their names at critical junc-
tures, for they were well known to all physical scientists. The series of their
works portrayed a continuing French pursuit of action at a distance between
“material points.” Its coherent development, amidst lively debate, began per-
haps from Laplace’s popular reworking of Newtonian universal gravitation in
his System of the World (1796) and in his five-volume mathematical treatise on
46 Fechner, Atomenlehre, 73, 79-81, 161-163.
47 Fechner, Atomenlehre, 109, 112.
48 Fechner, Atomenlehre, 32.
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Celestial Mechanics (1799-1825). It continued through Poisson’s adaptation of
the inverse square law to electric and magnetic fluids (1811, 1821); Fourier’s
analysis of heat conduction as radiation between molecules; Fresnel’s theory
of light as transverse waves in the ether (1822, originally much contested); and
Cauchy’s representation of this ether as an elastic medium consisting of im-
ponderable atoms (1835-36). Included of course was Ampère’s electrodynamics
(1824),which culminated inWeber’sGrundgesetz. Fechner himself had been es-
pecially active in bringing the French tradition to Germany, both in his exten-
sive translations (sometimes amounting to full rewritings) of comprehensive
textbooks by Jean-Baptiste Biot on physics (four volumes, 1824; five volumes,
1828-1829), Louis Jacques Thénard on chemistry (seven volumes, 1825), and in
his own Repertorium der Experimentalphysik (three volumes, 1832).
To think of this sequence in terms of serial narration of an atomistic world
view, rather than simply as a tradition, is to think of it as an ongoing saga with
a continuing story line and with surprising new episodes at every turn. Many
physicists had either lived through the series or followed it in retrospect, at-
tentive to the controversies within it, with expectations for what would come
next, and looking back to reinterpret earlier episodes, such as the wave theory
of light after Cauchy.49 Fechner exploited such episodes in familiar vignettes,
reiterating for example how Poisson had been forced to change his views on
the polarization of light. These are all aspects that contributed to the believ-
ability of atomism. From a rhetorical perspective it was particularly effective
for Fechner to fashion his own narrative with the ever-present foil of the dy-
namicists to enliven it throughout.
Multipliers. Here seriality merges into other multipliers of believability,
such as multiple narrators who only partially agree. For example, Fechner
could use the French series to enhance the credibility of his atomism despite
the fact that in detail it presented a contrasting conception of his basic con-
ceptual metaphor. While Fechner and Weber considered force as a shorthand
for the interrelation of a pair of atoms, their Zusammensein, the French spoke
of force as emanating from one atom and acting on another.The distinction is
striking in the case of Gauss and Weber, who worked closely together at Göt-
tingen. In a long article on inverse square forces, Gauss followed the French in
writing of “a material point out of which a repulsive or attractive force acts.”50
49 Fechner, Atomenlehre, 18.
50 Gauss, Carl Friedrich, “Allgemeine Lehrsätze in Beziehung auf die im verkehrten
Verhältnisse des Quadrats der Entfernung wirkenden Anziehungs-und Abstossungs-
Kräfte.” In Resultate aus den Beobachtungen des magnetischen Vereins im Jahre 1839,
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Figure 6: Visual depictions of (a) Gauss’s mode of representing the force at a point p
emanating from an electric mass point e and (b) Weber’s comparable representation
of the force between e and e’ as an abstract relation in space.
Expressed mathematically (and visually in figure 6a) this meant that he
calculated the force at an empty point of space produced by the material point
(i.e., at point p the force Fp of an atom e at a distance r would be Fp = e/r
2,
or the force per unit mass that would be exerted on another atom if it were
placed there). In contrast (figure 6b) Weber expressed the force as a relation
between a pair of atoms e and e’, Fp = ee’/r
2. Ironically, Hermann Helmholtz, in
formulating his classic work on energy conservation in 1847, used the Fechner-
Weber conception of force in terms of atom pairs even while citing Gauss.51
A similar multiplicity of voices continued their expression in the period
following Fechner’s Atomenlehre with its reliance on Weber’s Grundgesetz as
its epitomy. Helmholtz criticized the law for its time dependence, which he
thought violated conservation. This produced a long and sometimes acrimo-
nious dispute with Rudolph Clausius andWeber,who showed that it did not.52
edited by C. F. Gauss and W. Weber, Leipzig, 1840. Reprinted in Gauss, Carl Friedrich,
Werke, Göttingen: Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, 1877, vol. 5, 195–242,
on p. 198-201.
51 Wise, M. Norton, Aesthetics, Industry, and Science: Hermann von Helmholtz and the
Berlin Physical Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018, 271.
52 Bevilacqua, Fabio, “Theoretical and Mathematical Interpretations of Energy Conser-
vation: The Helmholtz-Clausius Debate on Central Forces 1852-54.” In Universalgenie
Helmholtz, 89-106. Darrigol , “Helmholtz’s Electrodynamics and the Comprehensibil-
ity of Nature.” In Universalgenie Helmholtz, 216-242.
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A full telling of this controversy would involve a number of other major actors
and their commitments. I emphasize here only that the controversy provided
a powerful multiplier for belief in atomism and for Weber’s Grundgesetz, even
as Maxwell’s electromagnetic field theory became a prime competitor.
Story World. In its most general form the world that Fechner presented
to his readers was a world of discrete things within which he aimed to join
all of the physical sciences in a common structure. If gravitation and elec-
tricity provided the groundwork of atom-pairs and inverse square forces to
which all else would ultimately be reduced, he came to this position within
a much broader vision of an atomic system as analogous to a planetary sys-
tem, a Laplacian system of the world, extending from the stars moving in the
heavens to the planets of the solar system to atomic systems making up the
molecules of ponderable matter and those of the imponderable ether. Under
this universal scheme of discreteness and systems all of the subjects of the
physical sciences had already made great progress: light, heat, elasticity, co-
hesion, chemical combination, crystallography, etc. “Thus through atomism
everything from the largest to the smallest and in the most diverse directions
is encompassed within a single realm, and a general clarity runs through this
realm.”53
Within this material world of unifying clarity, Fechner had also to make
room for contemplation of the “highest and final things,” of God, morality,
freedom, life and death. The dynamicists supposed that a world conceived as
a continuum of forces was more suited to relating matter and spirit than a
world of atoms, which he firmly denied. “The same spirit that runs through
atomism must be conceivable as a whiff of the same spirit that runs through
heaven itself, whether it can exist with God or God with it.” The atomistic
world in fact supplied an illuminating image of a social organization based on
the “principle of individuality” and spiritual freedom rather than of everyone
tied to their neighbor without independence. In short, “an atomistic world is
a structure worthier of the most exalted idea of God and indescribably more
beautiful than the dynamical.”54 Here was a story world into which Fechner
hoped his audience could project their most wide-ranging beliefs, or at least
suspend their disbelief in atomism.
Pragmatic effect. It was the molecular structure of matter that Fechner par-
ticularly exploited to make the superiority of atomism seem almost accessi-
53 Fechner, Atomenlehre, 36.
54 Fechner, Atomenlehre, 119, 122.
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ble to the senses. For example, if molecules consisted of atomic systems that
could take different arrangements, then phenomena like isometry, in which
substances with the same chemical composition have different properties, be-
came intuitively realistic, making “the advantage of the atomistic conception
palpable [f ühlbar] for the unprejudiced.”55That was already a major contribu-
tion to suspension of disbelief. But it also sharpened the further question of
how atomic systems could actually be structured as stable molecules by forces
between atoms.
For this question Fechner appended to his more evidentiary text a specu-
lative chapter containing a “Hypothesis on the General Force-law of Nature.”
Here he relied on the credibility of Weber’s earlier suggestions for multi-body
forces and time-dependent forces to unfold a much more expansive view. If
gravitational and electrical forces expressed the relation of two particles, why
suppose that nature would have stopped there? “Is it not possible that results
appear here that depend on forces that are determined jointly by the Zusam-
mensein of more than two particles?”56
Figure 7: A representation of Fechner’s conception of an irre-
ducible multi-body force as the Zusammensein of five parti-
cles.
On this basis (figure 7) Fechner proposed an ascending series of forces as
the number of particles in a system increased and whose strength decreased
increasingly rapidly with distance between the particles. These higher-or-
der forces would be unobserveable at large distances but would gradually
55 Fechner, Atomenlehre, 37.
56 Fechner, Atomenlehre, 184.
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come into play as more particles at smaller distances made up more com-
plex molecules. Briefly put, “In every combination of arbitrarily many parti-
cles there rules a force, whose strength and direction [attractive or repulsive]
are determined by the interrelations of the Zusammensein of all the particles at
once ….”57 This conception might extend all the way from chemical elements
as systems of Grundatome to a force governing the totality of the parts of an
organism, which would encompass within it many subordinate systems and
their forces.
Fechner would also have liked to be able to understand all of the phe-
nomena ascribed to imponderable substances, such as light, electricity, and
magnetism, in terms of the same Grundatome that made up ponderable mat-
ter, while referring them to the oscillations of individual atoms rather than to
atomic systems and higher order combinations of molecules. But too little as
yet was known about them. He could, however, suggest that Weber’s velocity
and acceleration dependent Grundgesetz for electric masses would very prob-
ably need to be extended to the atoms of normal matter. That would explain
such things as the expansion of bodies by heating, which would give their
particles a greater velocity and perhaps therefore a weaker attractive force
between them.58
It is apparent that in this last chapter Fechner was reaching for a prag-
matic effect, that having already found his atomistic world believable his au-
dience would be open to a wide range of possible realties that might well fall
within that general conception. If so, dynamism had been defeated by the
rhetorical techniques of the Atomenlehre.
3. Conclusion
I have attempted to show three things: (1) howMaxwell andWeber structured
their pictures of electromagnetic action as sophisticated narratives that in-
tegrated diverse aspects of the subject; (2) how the writings of Faraday and
Fechner placed the particular stories of Maxwell and Weber in a wider story
world, which enhanced their believability; (3) how evoking this story world
depended on the kind of narrative techniques that Johnston finds in her Story
57 Fechner, Atomenlehre, 193.
58 Fechner, Atomenlehre, 207.
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of Myth. My question now concerns the implications of this reading for com-
parison.
Thomas Kuhn once wrote that “Theories, as the historian knows them,
cannot be decomposed into constituent elements for purposes of direct com-
parison either with nature or with each other.” He was writing here about the
holistic character of what he famously called paradigms in science and the
similarly holistic character of historical narratives about science. Both theo-
ries and narratives were like “pictures” or “patterns.” The historian’s job was
to construct “a plausible narrative involving recognizable motives and behav-
iors” that fit into a coherent pattern.59 Paul Roth has discussed this perspec-
tive with reference to how Kuhn drew on the philosopher of history Louis
Mink and his concept of “synoptic judgement” in historical narratives. “The
distinctive characteristic of historical understanding,”Mink argued, “consists
of comprehending a complex event by ‘seeing things together’ in a total and
synoptic judgement which cannot be replaced by any analytic technique.”60
Maxwell seems to have intended something similar when he wrote that
the aim of his physical analogy of lines of force as flow lines had been “to
present the mathematical ideas in an embodied form … and not as mere
symbols, which neither convey the same ideas, nor adapt themselves to the
phenomena to be explained.” Not that the symbolic representation would be
wrong but that it would be too thin; it would not evoke the full depth ofmental
images and bodily sensations of the embodied analogy, marked by its vivid-
ness and fertility. Fechnermade a related point in his presentation of atomism
in terms of sensory appearances: “through their conception we better orient
ourselves in the visible and palpable.”61 Both Maxwell and Fechner, in their
very different ways, sought to arouse the creative imagination through their
use of narrative techniques, with their power to make fictional entities into
realistic possibilities.
59 Kuhn, Thomas S., “The Relations between the History and the Philosophy of Science.”
In The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1977, 3-20, on p. 19, 17. Rather: 17, 19 ?
60 Roth, Paul A., “The Silence of the Norms: The Missing Historiography of The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44, 2013: 545-
552, on p. 550-551. Mink, Louis, “The Autonomy of Historical Understanding,” History
and Theory 5, 1966: 24-47, reprint in Mink, Historical Understanding, edited by B. Fay,
I. O. Golob, and R. T. Vann, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987, 61-88, on
p. 82.
61 Fechner, Atomenlehre, 105.
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It has been notoriously difficult for historians and philosophers of sci-
ence to give a clear articulation of what exactly the something extra is that
goes beyond the component parts of holistic entities.The long-standing tradi-
tion of treating narrative and natural science as dichotomous has not helped,
most famously in Carl Hempel’s argument that only the natural sciences in
their lawlike, deductive form could provide explanations.62 But the natural
sciences themselves, in their now so pervasive studies of nonlinear dynami-
cal systems, have found it necessary to employ holistic concepts of complexity,
emergence, entanglement, order out of chaos, and embodiment that belie any
easy distinction between narrative and natural science.They have also helped
to stimulate new forms of historical analysis.63 A closely related result among
historians of science has been a growing emphasis on the functions of nar-
rative within the sciences themselves. I have argued elsewhere, for example,
that the widespread use of model-based simulations to understand complex
processes often takes the history-like form of following out the possible de-
velopmental narratives generated by the (fictional) model. These explorations
sometimes include a key role for representation of the simulations as movies,
or visual narratives.64 Such visualizations take to a literal level the idea of a
historical narrative as being like a picture or pattern.
An even more general approach to the role of narrative knowing in com-
plex domains, particularly in the social sciences, has been pursued by Mary
Morgan, who (like Kuhn, and citing Mink) emphasizes the coherence-making
power of narratives, their capacity to order and to fit together in a coher-
ent pattern a variety of disparate elements that otherwise would not seem
to belong together. This integrating capacity is very much in evidence in the
narratives of electromagnetism that I have described. As Faraday put it to Am-
père, lacking the capacity for abstract synthesis, “I am obliged to feel my way
by facts closely placed together,” by their “connexity,” as one interpreter puts
62 Hempel, Carl G., “The Function of General Laws in History.” [1942] In Aspects of Sci-
entific Explanation, and Other essays in the Philosophy of Science, edited by C. G.
Hempel, London: Macmillan, 1965, 232-243.
63 Stark, Laura, “Emergence,” in Focus section on Explanation, Isis, 110, 2019: 332-336, dis-
cusses the import of this movement, with key references.
64 Wise, M. Norton, “On the Narrative Form of Simulations,” Studies in History and Phi-
losophy of Science 62, 2017: 74-85 (special issue on narrative science, edited by M. S.
Morgan and M. N. Wise).
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it.65 Morgan uses a visual analogy from a painting by Peter Breugel, which
depicts numerous small groups of children engaged in seemingly unrelated
activities. Properly ordered, however, they fit together under the higher-or-
der concept and title of “Children’s Games.” Interpreting more contextually,
the whole ensemble represents a moral story of how in the eyes of God, peo-
ple are like children. Morgan captures the action of ordering, relating, and
knitting together in the term “colligation.”66
Interestingly, it is the same word that Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen uses to cap-
ture the “essence” of narrativism in historiography: “narratives … are colli-
gatory additions to our understanding of the past.” He has developed this
view at length in his Postnarrativist Philosophy of Historiography, where colliga-
tory concepts provide the centerpiece of his argument.67 Johnston’s concep-
tual metaphors serve a similar purpose.
All of these examples have a common theme, which I fully endorse. Many
works of both history and science—especially when dealing with complex-
ity—can be fruitfully analyzed in terms of narrative. The narrative reading
suggests that understanding accounts of particular phenomena requires that
they be treated holistically, attending to the way in which they incorporate
65 Cited by Darrigol, Electrodynamics from Ampère to Einstein, 21, using the term “con-
nexity.” Faraday to Ampère, 3 September 1822, in James, Frank, editor, The Correspon-
dence of Michael Faraday, vol. 1: 1811-1831, London: The Institution of Engineering and
Technology, 1991.
66 Morgan, Mary S. “Narrative Ordering and Explanation.” Studies in History and Philoso-
phy of Science 62, 2017: 86-97, on p. 88-89 (special issue on narrative science, edited by
M. S. Morgan and M. N. Wise). Morgan actually prefers Mink’s later discussion of “con-
figuring” to “synoptic judgement,” because it emphasizes the active process of analy-
sis that leads to “colligation” as a result and to another important mode of ordering
by “juxtaposition,” which highlights the “puzzles” within a narrative whose resolution
yields deeper understanding (pp. 90-93).
67 Kuukkanen, Jouni-Matti, “The Missing Narrativist Turn in the Historiography of Sci-
ence,” History and Theory 51, 2012, 340-363, on p. 357. Kuukkanen, Jouni-Matti, Post-
narrativist Philosophy of Historiography, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015,
97-130.While giving pride of place to colligation, Kuukkanen rejects twoother tenets of
narrativism in historiography, holism (especially for texts, but perhaps not for “holis-
tic” colligatory concepts, p. 112) and representationalism (on the analogy with visual
art and representations as pictures), both of which are characteristic of my own treat-
ments of narrative in the physical sciences. But I suspect that his rejection of these
terms results from overly strict definitions, which would not apply to the highly visual
and holistic cases of simulation that I have analyzed. The issue deserves much more
discussion than I can offer here.
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their diverse strands into a discursively elaborated conception of a portion of
the world that coheres together. It is the construction of this coherence that
has led me to treat Maxwell’s and Weber’s essays in terms of the narrative
unfolding of images of electromagnetic action, depictions designed to make
realistic fictions plausible or believable.
The two approaches of Maxwell andWeber are so radically different, how-
ever, that they appear to have belonged to different conceptual worlds, with
very little overlap between them.This has motivated my consideration of how
their believability depended in part on their being located in different story
worlds—represented by Faraday and Fechner—that extended well beyond
their particular conceptual constructions and that made them seem familiar.
That suggestion gains weight from the analogy with the believability of Greek
myths. Johnston has argued that a major problem in the treatment of myths
in classical scholarship has been their abstraction from the actual cultural
and social life of the Greeks, which has entailed removal of individual myths
from the story world and the narrative practices in which they were embed-
ded. This sort of abstraction has made it difficult to understand why (or even
that) the myths were believable. Her argument is that gods and heroes were
believable to the Greeks because they were taken as part of the real world,
either at present or in the human past, and thus seemed part of the normal
world of human action. Narrative techniques and practices performed this
familiarizing role by blurring the lines between known realities and fictional
possibilities. Something similar, I am proposing, operated with respect to
both Maxwell’s and Weber’s accounts of electromagnetism.
I have so far left open the question of how two narratives that seem to oc-
cupy different worlds can be compared. That question might seem to raise
the fraught issues of Kuhnian incommensurability of paradigms, whereby
Maxwell and Weber simply could not understand each other and comparison
was impossible. Like most other historians and philosophers of science, I do
not find this view tenable in any strict sense. But appreciation for, and a will-
ingness to entertain alternative possibilities or competing views, is a different
matter. Here is where treating scientific texts as holistic narratives occupying
different story worlds is worthwhile. Without in any way compromising an
appeal to empirical adequacy,mathematical unity, and comprehensiveness, it
immediately raises the question of how effectively narrated the two represen-
tations are, and that is a question not only of their own narrative virtues but
also of their being situated within a broader story world capable of enhancing
their credibility. The analogy with Greek myths has suggested several aspects
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of effective narration that should be important: conceptual metaphor, serial
narration, multipliers, and story world. Evaluation of their effectiveness will
of course be a subjective matter and will involve judgements of such things as
heuristic power, aesthetic appeal, emotional grip, and philosophical prefer-
ence. This does not make everything arbitrary or equal but it does imply that
comparison of competing accounts will require the kind of holistic judgement
that we expect of narratives and that is well captured by colligation.68
That returns me to my starting point and toMaxwell’s question about why
we should entertain alternative possible realities. He did all he could to pro-
vide motivation for “imagining” lines of force and an electro-tonic state occu-
pying every point of space whenWeber had already given a perfectly compre-
hensible depiction of time dependent forces acting immediately at a distance.
He did not attempt to argue on purely rational grounds that his view was
preferable, but only that it would be preferable to many minds who found the
conceptual and sensory immediacy of physical analogies more satisfying than
abstract mathematical formulas. And he was fully aware that others would
differ about which was more satisfying. For the moment, therefore, until fur-
ther empirical or theoretical developments were available to support one or
the other perspective, he could only remark that “it is a good thing to have two
ways of looking at a subject, and to admit that there are two ways of looking
at it.” Perhaps that is a key lesson of the narrative reading of scientific works.
It draws out their power to produce vivid synthetic depictions that capture
the creative imagination while also making it apparent that comparisons will
involve the same kinds of valuations that are familiar for literary works and
works of art.
3.1 A Comment on Temporality
I approach the question of whether the term narrative necessarily implies
a temporal sequence of connected events from a historian’s perspective. Many
historical works are of course devoted to temporal dynamics and philosophers
of history coming from a phenomenological perspective, such as Paul Ricoeur
in Time and Narrative, take the lived experience of time to be fundamental to
68 Kuukkanen, Postnarrativist Philosophy of Historiography, 123-128, does not include
such subjective evaluations of narratives but limits himself to a set of epistemic values
for their colligatory concepts: exemplification, coherence, comprehensiveness, scope,
and originality.
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human understanding, and thus to history. (As noted above, I have adapted
this view for the way in which simulations provide understanding of physi-
cal processes.) But much historical writing is not focused on temporality. An
example is Carl Schorske’s Fin de Siecle Vienna, which is concerned rather with
providing a vivid depiction of a memorable cultural constellation than with
analyzing its rise and fall.More generally, historians like other social scientists
are often more concerned with understanding and depicting the structure of
relations characteristic of a particular culture or situation than with tracing
or accounting for the temporal course of its development, though both are
often in play.This preference can extend even to an antipathy for the focus on
time. Louis Mink is perhaps the most famous representative, arguing that we
can understand a narrative, even a temporal narrative, only retrospectively,
for it is only in retrospect that we can obtain the synoptic judgement men-
tioned above. “In the understanding of a narrative the thought of temporal
succession vanishes” so that “time is not of the essence of narratives.”69
Surely this is too extreme, but it does suggest that the power of narra-
tives in general can be better characterized by their ability to draw things to-
gether in a conceptual scheme, their capacity for colligation, as Morgan and
Kuukkanen would have it, than by their temporality per se. While many nar-
ratives will depend on temporal ordering to attain their colligatory concepts,
and even on the experience of following a process in time to gain understand-
ing, many others will not, or they will use both temporal and non-temporal
descriptions in a complementary fashion. For example, Morgan stresses the
puzzle-raising functions of Clifford Geertz’s classic account of Balinese cock-
fighting while Kuukkanen focuses on the argumentative character of Christo-
pher Clark’s depiction of events leading up toWWI in the Sleepwalkers.70 From
69 Mink, Louis, “History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension,” New Literary History 1,
1970: 554-555, reprint in Mink, Historical Understanding, edited by B. Fay, I. O. Golob,
and R. T. Vann, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987, 56-57.
70 Morgan, “Narrative Ordering and Explanation,” 92-93. Geertz, Clifford, “Deep Play:
Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” Daedalus 101, 1972: 1-37. Clark, Christopher, The
Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, London: Penguin, 2012. Kuukkanen,
Postnarrativist Philosophy of Historiography, 92-96. Kuukkanen nevertheless speaks
of the temporal part of a historical text as the “narrative” part, or “narrativity,” (also 73-
75) but that appears to play no fundamental role in his important analysis of colligatory
concepts.
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this perspective, temporal ordering figures as a (critically important) subset
of narrative ordering.71
71 I thank Mary Morgan for her valuable comments on this paper.
Historical Narrative versus
Comparative Description?
Genre and Knowledge in Alexander von Humboldt’s
Personal Narrative
Christine Peters
Alexander von Humboldt’s Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions
of the New Continent (1814–1825)1 appears as an especially productive source
of research on the relationship between narrating and comparing in the sci-
ences. Humboldt frequently shifts from what he calls a “historical narrative,”
meaning the recounting of episodes in his voyages, to a comparative “descrip-
tion” of individual objects. These shifts between two different forms of scien-
tific travel writing do not just constitute the structure of Humboldt’s travel-
ogue. They also define large parts of the genre of travel writing in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries. What appears unconventional about Hum-
boldt’s travelogue is not the hybrid structure itself but the immense effort he
makes in commenting on this structure and in evaluating the relationship
between historical narrative and description. He frequently stages the two
as opposed modes of travel writing and even as mutually exclusive means of
structuring a travelogue. In the descriptive sections, Humboldt engages more
frequently, one might even say excessively, in comparing. In many cases, as
in, for example, his description of Tenerife, which represents a central ob-
ject of investigation in this paper, he even explicitly defines “comparison”2
1 Originally, the Personal Narrative was published in French as the Relation Historique
(1814–1825), but itwas translated almost simultaneously intoGermanandEnglish. This
paper focuses on the English translation.
2 von Humboldt, Alexander, Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of
theNewContinent, during theYears 1799–1804, vol. 2,NewYork: CambridgeUniversity
Press, 2011 [1814], on p. 221.
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or “comparing”3 as one of the main purposes of these “descriptive” passages.
Therefore, I argue that he does not contrast the historical narrative just with
description but, more specifically, with comparative description.
This paper aims to historicize Humboldt’s genre-specific notions of nar-
rating and comparing, and to interpret them in a broader epistemological
context. To do so, I firstly argue for the viability of a criteria-based but, at
the same time, scalar definition of narrative as well as for a historically re-
stricted approach to narrating and comparing—an approach that links nar-
rative theory to recent praxeological research on comparison. I shall then in-
vestigate Humboldt’s definitions of “historical narrative” and “description” in
the context of nineteenth-century travel writing. Furthermore, I shall ana-
lyze the passages in which Humboldt shifts from one to the other and use
these to outline the role of comparing in his descriptive text passages. I seek
to show that Humboldt treats the “historical narrative” and the comparative
“description” not only as opposed types of travel writing but also as conflicting
forms of knowledge acquisition; and that Humboldt’s preference for “compar-
ative” writing promotes a trans-areal and universal epistemological project.
My claim there is as follows: Humboldt seems to reject the historical narra-
tive, because the singularity and particularity which is essential to narrative
and its temporal sequentiality does not fit with his universal epistemological
aim. I shall try to show how Humboldt partially resolves this contradiction
when he turns toward the history of the Earth which he organizes as a se-
quence of geological events in order to uncover the universal laws underlying
geological change.
Against this general background, I shall show how Humboldt actually
deals with these seemingly contrasting modes of writing, focusing on acts of
comparing in his descriptive text passages. I argue that these text passages
partly contradict Humboldt’s programmatic distinction of narrative, descrip-
tion, and comparison, and that comparing temporarily adopts qualities and
functions of narrating, such as building temporal sequentiality or providing
a viable point of view.
3 von Humboldt, Alexander, Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of
theNewContinent, during the Years 1799–1804, vol. 1, NewYork: CambridgeUniversity
Press, 2011 [1814], on p. 229.
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1. Toward Scalar and Historically Restricted Definitions
of Narrative
An inquiry into Humboldt’s forms of narrating and comparing soon leads to
the question regarding what these terms actually cover. The search for defi-
nitions becomes especially central in the field of narrative theory, or what is
referred to more commonly as narratology in literary studies.Whereas schol-
ars from literary and cultural studies have produced a wide range of defini-
tions relying on various criteria such as sequentiality, a narrating instance,
an event-like nature, temporality, causality, changeability, or experientiality,4
scholars from the history of science have been reluctant to work with a cri-
teria-based definition of narrative. As Christina Brandt points out, scholars
from science studies mostly rely on a general notion of narrative, extending
the term to a variety of possible meanings such as a textual structure, a text-
independent structure, a scientific discourse, or a system of values.5 Taking
this variety of approaches into account, scholars might ask not only which
criteria are needed to define a narrative but also whether criteria are needed
at all. In the following passage, I shall briefly address the latter question us-
ing the example of cultural studies. I shall then propose a scalar definition
of narrative that takes into account the historicity and changeability of both
narrative and its definitions.
Even though scholars from cultural studies or “cultural analysis”6 have ap-
proached narrative in order to address questions of cultural significance, they
have relied heavily on what are originally structuralist categories from the
4 Bal, Mieke, Narratology: Introduction to the theory of narrative, 3rd ed., Toronto: Uni-
versity of Toronto Press, 2009. Fludernik, Monika, An introduction to narratology, Lon-
don: Routledge, 2009; Martínez, Matías, editor, Handbuch Erzählliteratur: Theorie,
Analyse, Geschichte, Stuttgart: Metzler, 2011. Martínez, Matías, editor, Erzählen: Ein
interdisziplinäres Handbuch, Stuttgart: Metzler, 2017. Nünning, Ansgar, “Wie Erzäh-
lungen Kulturen erzeugen: Prämissen, Konzepte und Perspektiven für eine kulturwis-
senschaftliche Narratologie.“ In Kultur – Wissen – Narration: Perspektiven transdiszi-
plinärer Erzählforschung für die Kulturwissenschaften, edited by A. Strohmaier, Bie-
lefeld: transcript, 2013, 15–53. Ryan, Marie-Laure, “Toward a definition of narrative.“ In
The Cambridge companion to narrative, edited by D. Herman, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007, 22–35. Schmid,Wolf, Elemente derNarratologie, 3rd ed., Berlin:
De Gruyter, 2014.
5 Brandt, Christina, “Wissenschaft.” In Erzählen: Ein interdisziplinäresHandbuch, edited
by M. Martínez, Stuttgart: Metzler, 2017, 211f.
6 Bal, Narratology, on p. 225.
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field of literary studies in order to define and analyze it. Especially the cate-
gories focalization and voice have frequently been used to explore cultural and
political issues such as questions of representation and accessibility7 or the
narrative construction of cultural identities and worlds.8Themain advantage
of these interdisciplinary approaches is, firstly, that narrative becomes the
subject of cultural studies, and, secondly, that the formal aspects constitutive
for narrativity are valued as carriers of meaning themselves—and not only as
simple technical stuff.9 I argue that, in an analogous manner, scholarly fields
such as the history of science, science studies, or historical epistemology could
gain from an approach which implies not only the interpretation of certain
narrative texts but also the investigation of their specific narrative qualities
and epistemological functions. InHumboldt’s case, so the central claim of this
paper, reflections on narration (and on comparison) as well as the actual way
of narrating (and comparing), are closely intertwined with the epistemologi-
cal claims of the text. This connection between the specific narrative setup of
a text and its epistemological implications is not exclusive to Humboldt’s sci-
entific travel writing. It appears to be rather characteristic for articles in the
life sciences during the nineteenth century where it is also combined with
extensive descriptive passages. Martina King’s attempt to combine histori-
cal narratology and the history of the life sciences in the early nineteenth
century shows that a processual understanding of nature is especially suited
for sequential representation, and that a specific type of narrator—namely,
a homodiegetic narrator who is part of the world he narrates—guarantees
epistemic authenticity. Whereas narrative sequencing in itself reduces con-
tingencies and instead brings about causality and coherence, a homodiegetic
narrator furthermore authenticates knowledge by serving as a witness and by
embedding his perceptions in a specific temporal and spatial setting.10Theev-
idence King proposes strongly suggests that the narrative setup of scientific
writing in the early nineteenth century carries epistemological meaning.
7 Bal, Mieke, “Intercultural Story-Telling.” In Kultur – Wissen – Narration: Perspektiven
transdisziplinärer Erzählforschung für die Kulturwissenschaften, edited by A. Stroh-
maier, Bielefeld: transcript, 2013, 289–305.
8 Nünning, “Wie Erzählungen Kulturen erzeugen,“ 15–53.
9 Nünning, “Wie Erzählungen Kulturen erzeugen,“ 27–31.
10 King, Martina, “’Ich habe im Sommer des Jahres 1838 eine Reihe von Beobachtungen
angestellt’: Naturwissenschaftliches Erzählen im frühen 19. Jahrhundert,“ DIEGESIS
6(1), 2017: 20–45.
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However, criteria-based definitions are usually developed in literary stud-
ies, which is why they refer mostly to fictional narratives. Therefore, they do
not necessarily provide a sufficient set of criteria to deal with the specific nar-
ratological setup of factual texts such as the scientific travelogue investigated
in this paper. Recent research on the matter shows that factual narration is
still a rather marginal subject in literary studies, even though scholars fre-
quently stress the omnipresence and anthropological importance of narra-
tive beyond literary prose.11 Not only Martínez and Klein but also Fludernik,
Falkenhayner, and Steiner distinguish between fictional and factual narrative,
in a way that explains why the two forms of narration function differently.
Whereas Martínez and Klein argue that factual narration is characterized
mainly by its referential truth claims (factual narration refers to real events or
to reality in general),12 Fludernik uses a number of criteria to outline the dif-
ferences between the two such as the possibility (or impossibility) of collective
or nonanthropomorphic actors, the extent and type of emotional immersion,
the differentiation (or nondifferentiation) of author and narrator, the level of
experientiality, the quantity and importance of argumentative text passages,
or the possibility (or impossibility) of unreliable narration.13 Criteria-based
definitions of narrative in literary studies do not usually concern themselves
with these differentiations that can, however, be central to the investigation of
scientific narration. Instead, they focus more on criteria that enable scholars
to deal with the wide range of narratological phenomena in fiction. But, as
the next example will show, the question of whether or not to rely on a fixed
set of criteria tackles both heuristic usefulness and the building of one’s cor-
pus. A definition of narrative based on strict criteria might exclude sources
that scholars aim to investigate and tentatively classify as narrative.
11 Fludernik, Monika, Nicole Falkenhayner, and Julia Steiner, “Einleitung.“ In Faktuales
und Fiktionales Erzählen: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven, edited by M. Fludernik, N.
Falkenhayner, and J. Steiner,Würzburg: Ergon, 2015, 7–22.Martínez,Matías, and Chris-
tian Klein, “Wirklichkeitserzählungen: Felder, Formen und Funktionen nicht-literari-
schen Erzählens.“ In Wirklichkeitserzählungen: Felder, Formen und Funktionen nicht-
literarischen Erzählens, edited by M. Martínez and C. Klein, Stuttgart: Metzler, 2009,
1–13.
12 Martínez and Klein, “Wirklichkeitserzählungen,“ 6.
13 Fludernik, Monika, “Narratologische Probleme des faktualen Erzählens.” In Faktuales
und Fiktionales Erzählen: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven, edited by M. Fludernik, N.
Falkenhayner, and J. Steiner, Würzburg: Ergon, 2015, 116ff.
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Binary definitions such as the ones proposed by Matías Martínez and
Michael Scheffel have proven highly productive when applied as tools for tex-
tual analysis but might be interpreted as overly exclusive when it comes to
questions of classification.14 For example, in his latest publication on this is-
sue, Martínez defines narrating as a representation of events that refers to a
specific subject; is organized in a temporal sequentiality; and shows spatial,
temporal, and causal contiguity. Apart from these three mandatory criteria,
Martínez refers to a large number of optional criteria such as a double tem-
porality, mediation through a narrator, causality, human intentionality, com-
pletion, event-like nature, experientiality, tellability, or conversational neces-
sities; and he argues that at least one of these optional criteria has to be met
in addition to the three mandatory ones in order to speak of narrating.15
Applying this definition to Humboldt’s Personal Narrative and to factual
narratives in general reveals both the analytical usefulness and the exclusive
potential of criteria-based definitions. This paper actually refers to some of
the suggested criteria, mainly temporal sequentiality and mediation through
a narrator, to describe the narrative setup of Humboldt’s Personal Narrative
and the universal and relational epistemological claims implied by it. How-
ever, if we want to go beyond the heuristic usefulness of individual criteria
and question the general usefulness of criteria-based definitions for the anal-
ysis of factual narration, definitions such as the one suggested by Martínez
appear to be too restrictive because of their binary structure. Holding a cer-
tain number of criteria as necessary increases the chances of excluding en-
tire genres from narratological analysis, especially when investigating factual
texts whose narratological setup is usually far less complex than that of fic-
tional texts.16
14 Martínez, Handbuch Erzählliteratur. Martínez, Erzählen.Martínez,Matías, andMicha-
el Scheffel, Einführung in die Erzähltheorie, 9th ed., München: C.H. Beck, 2012.
15 Martínez,Matías, “Was ist Erzählen.” In Erzählen: Ein interdisziplinäresHandbuch, edi-
ted by M. Martínez, Stuttgart: Metzler, 2017, 2–5. For another influential definition of
narrative, see Fludernik, Introduction to narratology, 6. Many of the criteria Fludernik
incorporates in her definition resemble those suggested byMartínez but are organized
in a different hierarchy. For example, whereas Martínez places “experientiality” in a
long list of optional criteria, Fludernik stresses its central importance for the consti-
tution of narrative. For a less extensive but equally restrictive binary definition, see
Schmid, Elemente der Narratologie, 3f.
16 Fludernik, “Narratologische Probleme des faktualen Erzählens,” 133.
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To enable amore flexible analysis of narrativity and its connection to epis-
temological processes, I suggest “a scalar conception of narrative” as proposed
by Marie-Laure Ryan. Some of the criteria she lists, such as causality or tem-
porality,17 resemble Martínez’ criteria, but Ryan abandons the binary struc-
ture of mandatory and optional criteria:
Rather than regarding narrativity as a strictly binary feature, that is, as a
property that a given text either has or doesn't have, the definition proposed
below presents narrative texts as a fuzzy set allowing variable degrees of
membership, but centered on prototypical cases that everybody recognizes
as stories. In a scalar conception of narrative, definition becomes an open
series of concentric circles which spell increasingly narrow conditions and
which presuppose previously stated items, as wemove from the outer to the
inner circle, and from the marginal cases to the prototypes.18
Martínez’ list of criteria is farmore extensive than Ryan’s, and can therefore be
considered a valuable tool box for analyzing all sorts of narratives. However,
Ryan’s scalar approach broadens the range of possible objects of investigation,
encouraging analysis at the margins of narrativity and especially factual nar-
rativity.19 It also encourages analyzing the specific narrative qualities of a text
instead of debating the question whether this text or the genre it represents
can be regarded as narrative in the first place.
As a last preliminary note to my analysis of Humboldt’s Personal Narra-
tive, I aim to connect these narratological suggestions to recent research on
comparison. This paper refers to a praxeological analysis of comparing that
focuses less on comparison as a logical operation but more on what actors
do when they compare.20 Even though I do not focus on the materiality of
Humboldt’s practices of comparing, as a full-fledged praxeological approach
17 Ryan, “Toward a definition of narrative,” 29.
18 Ryan, “Toward a definition of narrative,” on p. 28.
19 Fludernik suggests a scalar or gradual approach to narrativity on yet another level:
Factual and fictional narrating cannot be differentiated in a purely binary way either.
Differences between the two forms of narrating are usually rather gradual. See Flud-
ernik, “Narratologische Probleme des faktualen Erzählens,” 118f. Schmid proposed a
scalar approach concerning the event-like nature of narratives, arguing that not all
events show the same level of “eventfulness.” See Schmid, Elemente der Narratologie,
14ff.
20 Epple, Angelika, and Walter Erhart, “Die Welt beobachten und verändern: Praktiken
des Vergleichens.” In DieWelt beobachten und verändern: Praktiken des Vergleichens,
edited by A. Epple and W. Erhart, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2015, 7–31.
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would require, I refer to praxeology: This analysis focuses on practices of com-
paring that are neither exclusive to one writer or text nor unchangeable in
history. The investigation of narrative in the historical sciences could poten-
tially gain from a praxeological perspective since it would shift attention from
the analysis of narrative to the analysis of narrating. Just as Nicholas D. Paige
has proposed for fiction—namely, “that along with asking what fiction ‘is,’ we
might also ask if fiction always is, in the same way”21—I propose the follow-
ing for narrative: Along with asking what narrative “is,” we might also ask if
narrative “always is, in the same way.”This line of inquiry takes the historicity
and changeability of forms of narrating (and comparing) into account, while
simultaneously opening up the topic for a number of new questions: Why and
how do forms or types of narrating and comparing change over time? Why
are some forms more advantageous to writers at a certain point in history?
Or, why do writers perceive or present some forms as being more advantageous
than others?
Asking these questions changes the status of the definitions discussed
above: Definitions of narrating and comparing can never be absolute or time-
less. What actors do when they narrate or compare might gradually change
over time. The criteria we work with are always preliminary. We might start
analyzing a historic corpus with a certain set of criteria and then discover
that the types of narrating or comparing at this specific point or period in
history do not fully correspond with the definitions we have brought with us.
We need definitions to identify acts of narrating or comparing in the first
place, but these definitions must constantly be open to revision in light of the
historicity and changeability of literary forms of writing and the epistemolog-
ical implications that accompany them. This historical approach to narrative
corresponds partly with recent research in the field of historical narratology.
Even though much of narrative theory, especially within cultural studies, has
stressed the omnipresence of narrative and its anthropological or cultural
anchoring,22 the historicity and evolution of literary modes of writing has
been investigated occasionally by scholars on a grand scale; for example, in
the recently published volume Die Erzählung der Aufklärung by Frauke Berndt
21 Paige, Nicholas D., Before Fiction: The Ancien Regime of the Novel, Philadelphia: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, 2011, on p. 2.
22 See, for example, Bal, Narratology. Bal, “Intercultural Story-Telling,” 289–305. Flud-
ernik, Introduction to narratology. Koschorke, Albrecht, Wahrheit und Erfindung:
Grundzüge einer Allgemeinen Erzähltheorie, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 2012.
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and Daniel Fulda.23 However, this approach still has to be applied to histor-
ical types of factual narration such as scientific narratives. This paper aims
to contribute to this underestimated field of research by investigating some
narratological particularities in Humboldt’s Personal Narrative.
2. “Historical Narrative” versus “Description”
Early in his travelogue, Humboldt aims to distinguish between narrative and
descriptive travel writing:
I had left Europe with the firm intention of not writing what is usually called
the historical narrative of a journey, but to publish the fruit of my inquiries
in works merely descriptive; and I had arranged the facts, not in the order in
which they successively presented themselves, but according to the relation
they bore to each other.24
This passage first introduces the “historical narrative” as a generic term, a
term for “what is usually called the historical narrative.”25 However,Humboldt
is not referring to narrating in general but to a specific narrative form of pre-
senting a voyage’s results to the general public. He characterizes this specific
narrative form mainly by contrasting it with another form of scientific travel
writing: namely, “descriptive” writing. Humboldt does not introduce the two
as equal options but emphatically subordinates the one to the other. It is the
“historical narrative” that he initially “had (…) the intention of not writing.”
23 Stressing the omnipresence and the anthropological or cultural anchoring of narrative
does not per se exclude a historically restricted approach to narrative. For example,
Ansgar Nünning frequently urges scholars to historicize the narrative material they
work with. In the case of travel writing, Nünning is especially interested in the histor-
ical prefiguration of the genre. See Nünning, Ansgar, “Zur mehrfachen Präfiguration /
Prämediation derWirklichkeitsdarstellung im Reisebericht: Grundzüge einer narrato-
logischen Theorie, Typologie und Poetik der Reiseliteratur.” In Points of Arrival: Travels
in Time, Space, and Self, Zielpunkte: Unterwegs in Zeit, Raum und Selbst, edited byM.
Gymnich et al., Tübingen: Francke, 2008, 11–32. Nünning, “Wie Erzählungen Kulturen
erzeugen,” 15–53.
24 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 1, on p. xxxviii.
25 In the course of the travelogue, Humboldt actually uses two terms—historical and
personal narrative—synonymously; sometimes even referring to this type of travel ac-
count as an itinerary. In this first inquiry into Humboldt’s discourse on and practices of
narrating, this paper follows the trail of the term historical narrative.
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Earlier in the text, he even describes his decision to actually write a histori-
cal narrative as a pragmatic process of overcoming his “repugnance to write
the narrative of my journey.”26These reviews of Humboldt’s initial opinion on
travel writing certainly articulate a preference for descriptive writing. They
also provide some insight into what he actually associates with these forms
of writing. For him, a historical narrative unfolds the events of a voyage “in the
order in which they successively presented themselves,” meaning in the linear
and thereby chronological order in which they succeeded each other. In this
sense, he characterizes the historical narrative mainly through its temporal
sequentiality and its focus on events. On the one hand, Humboldt’s choice of
criteria brings his definition close to contemporary narrative theory, which,
in many cases, refers to both temporality and an event-like nature as char-
acteristics of narrative.27 On the other hand, the fact that Humboldt assigns
a chronological order to the historical narrative indicates a more restricted
definition of narrative—at least in the genre of travel writing.
Contrasted with narrative, description seems to be a relational way of or-
dering and presenting a voyage’s results. It abandons the temporal order of
the voyage, and focuses instead on the “relation” between the observed phe-
nomena. This definition already hints at Humboldt’s affinity for comparing
that is the subject of the next section: It is comparison that he identifies in
the text as one of the central means of uncovering universal laws and pro-
ducing relational knowledge. Nonetheless, it should be stressed at this point
thatHumboldt depicts narrative and description as opposingways of present-
ing a voyage’s results. Whereas narrative organizes observations in a chrono-
logical order, comparative description presents the relations between different
observations. The fact that narrative is not focused on universally valid rela-
tions—that it is, in other words, bound to particularities—gives Humboldt
enough grounds to dismiss it as a mode of writing that is counterproductive
to the epistemological goals of his travelogue.
At a later point in the travelogue, Humboldt gives a more detailed defi-
nition of the historical narrative that significantly expands the catalogue of
criteria while, at the same time, blurring the lines between different modes
of writing:
26 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 1, on p. xxxix.
27 Martínez, “Was ist Erzählen,” 2-5. Fludernik, Introduction to narratology, 6. Bal, Narra-
tology, 79ff. and 214. Ryan, “Toward a definition of narrative,” 28f.
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An historical narrative embraces two very distinct objects; the greater or less
important events that have a connection with the purpose of the traveler,
and the observations which he has made during his journey. The unity of
composition also, which distinguishes good works from those on an ill con-
structedplan, canbe strictly observed onlywhen the traveller describeswhat
has passed under his own eye; and when his principal attention has been
fixed less on scientific observations, than on the manners of a people, and
the great phenomena of nature. Now, the most faithful picture of manners
is that, which best displays the relations ofmen toward each other. The char-
acter of savage or civilized nature is portrayed either in the obstacles which a
travellermeetswith, or in the sensationswhich he feels. It is themanhimself
that we continually desire to see in contact with the objects that surround
him; and his narration interests us the more, when a local tint is spread over
the description of the country and its inhabitants.28
Again, Humboldt is identifying the chronological account of events as a spe-
cific quality of a historical narrative. It is the representation of “events” and
“observations” that the traveler “made during the journey” that defines the
narrative. But Humboldt adds two further criteria concerning the focal point
of the narrative and the narrator’s relationship to the world he narrates. Once
more, Humboldt’s criteria resemble criteria that contemporary narrative the-
ory frequently discusses as crucial to narrativity—referred to mostly as focal-
ization and voice.29Whereas the term focalization addresses the question whose
perception or vision is represented in a narrative, the term voice refers to the
question who is speaking in a narrative and whether or not that narrator is
embedded in theworld he narrates. Again,Humboldt’s grasp of the narrative’s
focal point and the status of the narrator appears rather restricted: First of all,
according to Humboldt’s definition, a historical narrative should be internally
focalized. He binds the account of events to the perspective of the traveler, to
a focal point determined by “what has passed under his own eye” and “the
sensations which he feels.” But not only the focalization but also the voice of
the narrative is character-bound and thereby limited. It is the “traveller” who
narrates the story, who “describes” the events of the voyage. Because of that
specification, the narrator can appear only as an embodied part of the world
28 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 1, on p. xlf.
29 Fludernik, Introduction to narratology, 37ff. Bal, Narratology, 145ff. Martínez and
Scheffel, Einführung Erzähltheorie, 66ff.
74 Christine Peters
he narrates, as a “character-bound narrator”30 or a “homodiegetic narrator.”31
This limits the scope of the narrator’s voice: Strictly applied, he can recount
only events he has been part of and observations he has made himself. Ac-
cording to Humboldt, linking the focalization and the voice of the narrative
to the “traveler-narrator” grants “the unity of composition” and thereby the
quality and authenticity of a historical narrative.
At first sight, these characteristics—temporal sequentiality and a deter-
mined, character-bound voice and focalization—seem to clearly distinguish
the historical narrative from a description that is not limited by such narra-
tological boundaries. But on closer inspection, Humboldt’s definition partly
challenges the strict distinction he establishes elsewhere in the text. Some of
the terms that he usually contrasts with the historical narrative now reappear
here in its very definition. For example, one of the most rewarding subjects
of a historical narrative for Humboldt is the “relations of men toward each
other.” Whereas he previously seemed to look for relations in a descriptive
mode, he now declares them to be one of the main goals of the historical nar-
rative. Moreover, the historical narrative seems to contain “descriptions” in
itself: for example, in the above-mentioned “descriptions of the country and
its inhabitants.” Humboldt’s strict distinction between the two does not seem
to hold up on closer inspection. In fact, just a few pages later he writes:
In order to give greater variety to my work, I have often interrupted the his-
torical narrative by simple descriptions. I first describe the phenomena in the
order in which they appeared; and I afterward consider them in the whole
of their individual relations.32
Whereas historical narrative and description appeared previously as mutually
exclusive representational modes, they now appear as complementary modes
of writing that can be incorporated into the same text. Following this logic,
the term “historical narrative” refers to both the genre and a specific form of
writing.The historical narrative, so to speak, contains both a historical narra-
tive and descriptions. It shifts between linear storytelling from the traveler’s
perspective, on the one hand, and relational descriptions of individual phe-
nomena, on the other.
30 Bal, Narratology, on p. 21.
31 Martínez and Scheffel, Einführung Erzähltheorie, on p. 84f.
32 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 1, on p. xiii.
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However, it is not only Humboldt’s partial inconsistency concerning the
differences between narrative and descriptive writing that raises doubt. His
reflections can also be analyzed with regard to the prevailing forms of narrat-
ing and describing in the genre of scientific travel writing in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Under the assumption that, to some extent, “genre
directs the ways in which we write, read, and interpret texts” and even “prescribes
artistic practices,”33 Humboldt’s repeated contrasting of historical narrative
and comparative description must seem questionable. As Nünning argues,
genre is one of the factors prefiguring the narrative and aesthetic make-up
of travel writing.34 Research on influential predecessors of Humboldt sug-
gests that the constant shifting between narrating travel events and describ-
ing individual phenomena had become conventional by the beginning of the
nineteenth century. For example, Brian W. Richardson argues that there is
a strong routine and even a certain “boredom” of comparative description in
James Cooks’ travel writing.35 Considering Cooks’ influential role in the genre,
being a travel writer who produced “a collection, a baseline, of texts on which
all subsequent navigators can and must build,”36 Humboldt’s extensive com-
menting on thematter seems remarkable and anything but necessary.The fact
that he frequently contrasts narrating and describing appears odd, given that
the travel genre conventionally allows and even encourages the combination
of the two.
Humboldt’s separation of the two seems dubious on yet another level.
From a contemporary narratological point of view, description does not ap-
pear as the counterpart of narrative, but rather as an integral part of it. Ac-
cording to Bal, description is “a particular textual form, indispensable, in-
deed, omnipresent in narrative,” appearing as “a privileged site of focaliza-
tion” that strongly influences the ideological and aesthetic make-up of a nar-
33 Pyrhönen, Heta, “Genre.” In The Cambridge companion to narrative, edited by D. Her-
man, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, on p. 109.
34 Nünning, “Präfiguration / Prämediation derWirklichkeitsdarstellung imReisebericht,“
11–32.
35 BrianW. Richardson, Longitude and Empire: HowCaptain Cook’s Voyages Changed the
World, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005, 147-157.
36 Richardson, Longitude and Empire, on p. 11.
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rative.37 Bal’s evaluation of the role of description in narrative seems to apply
to Humboldt’s case: As the next section of this paper will show, Humboldt
uses the descriptive passages of his travelogue to discuss the universal epis-
temological claims of the entire narrative. In this context, we have to ask as
follows: if he emphasizes the role of description in narrative and blurs the
criteria of narrative in the first place, why would he then insist on a strict
distinction between narrating and describing? I argue that his differentiation
of the two can be appropriately interpreted only when read in the context of
epistemological issues. His preference for descriptive writing is not just a pref-
erence of genre: It corresponds with Humboldt’s epistemological program.This
connection becomes apparent when he defines the purpose of his travels as
follows:
[B]ut preferring the connection of facts which have been long observed, to
the knowledge of insulated facts, although they were new, the discovery of
an unknown genus seemed tome far less interesting than an observation on
the geographical relations of the vegetable world, on the migration of the
social plants, and the limit of the height which their different tribes attain
on the flanks of the Cordilleras.38
Humboldt’s preference for a relational text structure corresponds with his
emphasis on relational knowledge—knowledge that focuses on the connections
between observed phenomena and on the universal laws that these connections
might disclose and not on the chronological order in which these phenomena
have been observed by the traveler.39 As the next section will clearly show,
37 Bal, Narratology, 35f. In a similar manner, Wolf Schmid argues that description and
narration are not mutually exclusive text types but are rather organized as opposite
ends of a scale. Narrative usually includes descriptive parts and vice versa. See Schmid,
Elemente der Narratologie, 6f.
38 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 1, on p. iv.
39 Ottmar Ette briefly draws attention to the role that relational logic and global compar-
ison play in Humboldt’s conception of science without inquiring further on the nature
of Humboldt’s comparative approach and its specific epistemological indications. See
Ette, Ottmar, Alexander von Humboldt und die Globalisierung: Das Mobile des Wis-
sens, Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 2009, 15 and 23. On the universal scope and claim of Hum-
boldt’s epistemological project, see also Görbert, Johannes, Die Vertextung der Welt:
Forschungsreisen als Literatur bei Georg Forster, Alexander von Humboldt und Adel-
bert von Chamisso, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014. Hey’l, Bettina, Das Ganze der Natur und
dieDifferenzierung desWissens: Alexander vonHumboldt als Schriftsteller, Berlin: De
Gruyter, 2007.
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Humboldt uses a discourse on genre, specifically on narrating, comparing,
and describing, to discuss epistemological questions.
3. Shifting from Narrating to Comparing
In this context, moments of transition in the text are of particular interest.
Because Humboldt justifies at great length why he shifts from one form of
writing to the other, thesemoments of transitionmight be interpreted asmo-
ments of crisis from a praxeological point of view. As Christian Bueger argues,
knowledge that informs the performance of a practice usually stays invisi-
ble. Implicit knowledge becomes explicit only in moments of crisis when ac-
tors can no longer perform this practice without problems or when they start
to perceive that practice as unsuitable to their needs.40 Humboldt’s rhetoric
strongly suggests such a moment of crisis; or, more specifically, a disapproval
of an established practice: namely, narrating things within travel writing.
Much of the epistemological argumentation emerges from the central role
that comparison plays in the descriptive passages.
For example, in his chapter on Tenerife, Humboldt dedicates many pages
to the island’s volcano, the Pico del Teide. After a linear account of his ascent
to the volcano in the tradition of the historical narrative, Humboldt switches
to a systematic geological description in which he compares the volcano to
a great number of other volcanos all around the world. He introduces this
transition as follows:
Not to interrupt the narrative of the excursion to the top of the Peak, I have
said nothing of the geological observations I made on the structure of this
colossalmountain, and on the nature of the volcanic rocks of which it is com-
posed. Before we quit the Archipelago of the Canaries, I shall delay a mo-
ment, and bring into one point of view what relates to the physical picture
of these countries.41
Humboldt does not introduce the following comparative description as an in-
tegral part of the historical narrative. On the contrary, he depicts this mode
40 Bueger, Christian, “Pathways to practice: Praxiography and international politics,” Eu-
ropean Political Science Review 6(3), 2014: 395-397.
41 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 1, on p. 196f.
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of writing as a potential obstacle, as something that might “interrupt the nar-
rative” and thereby interfere with the sequential recounting of events. Again,
historical narrative and comparative description appear to be mutually exclu-
sive modes of writing—mainly because the comparative description will “de-
lay” the progress of the narrative and thereby disrupt its temporal structure.
In contemporary narratological terms, the comparative description appears
to pause the story time.42 It does so by temporarily delaying the linear narra-
tion of travel events to focus on observations made in a specific scientific field
of interest; in this case, the “geological observations” on the Pico del Teide.
At the end of this comparative text passage, Humboldt’s distinction be-
comes slightly more complex. Here he integrates epistemological issues in his
argument, commenting on the function that comparison has in the acquisi-
tion of knowledge:
I have endeavoured to render these researches interesting, by comparing
the phenomena of the volcano of Teneriffe with those that are observed in
other regions, the soil of which is equally undermined by subterranean fires.
This mode of viewing Nature in the universality of her relations is no doubt
prejudicial to the rapidity suitable to an itinerary; but I thought, that, in a
narrative, the principal end of which is the progress of physical knowledge,
every other consideration ought to be subservient to those of instruction and
utility.43
Humboldt elaborates on what exactly it is about the descriptive passages that
interferes with the historical narrative. It is comparing on a global scale that
interrupts the temporal structure of a narrative; or, more precisely, hinders
the “rapidity suitable to an itinerary.” Humboldt not only comments on what
is “suitable” or useful to a certain genre, but also attaches a certain epistemic
usefulness to different forms of travel writing.Comparing first leads to the ac-
quisition of knowledge itself (“the progress of physical knowledge”); and sec-
ond, to a perception of nature that takes into account “the universality of her
relations.” Narrating and comparing no longer appear to be mutually exclu-
sive as different forms of travel writing but also as different forms with which
to produce knowledge. Humboldt aims to “[view] the Globe as a whole” and to
42 Fludernik, Introduction to narratology, 32–34. Bridgeman, Terese, “Time and Space.” In
The Cambridge companion to narrative, edited by D. Herman, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007, 58.
43 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 1, on p. 229f.
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identify “laws” and “relations” between phenomena all around the world.44 In
another comparative passage of his travel account, he points out specifically
that this kind of knowledge depends on a certain mode of travel writing:
The form of a personal narrative, and the nature of its composition, are not
well fitted for the full explanation of phenomena, which vary with the sea-
sons, and the position of places. In order to study the laws of these phenom-
ena, we must exhibit them in groups, and not separately, as they were suc-
cessively observed.45
Here, Humboldt presents the historical narrative as a potential obstacle. Its se-
quential order appears to disrupt the search for connections and laws that link
different phenomena. Narrative presents phenomena “separately” and not “in
groups,” meaning a focus on particularities and not on relations. In yet an-
other comparative description, Humboldt again specifies that it is comparing
that achieves his epistemological goal:
Each part of the Globe is an object of particular study; and when we cannot
hope to penetrate the causes of natural phenomena, we ought at least to en-
deavour to discover their laws, and distinguish, by comparison of numerous
facts, what is constant and uniform from what is variable and accidental.46
In the logic of Humboldt’s argument, comparing leads to the discovery of
laws, links, and perhaps even causalities; and it does this on a global scale.
Comparing brings about a synoptic view of all the world’s phenomena—a
synoptic view that guarantees the discovery of universal connections. There-
fore, his preference for what he calls “systematic,” “descriptive,” or “compara-
tive” travel writing is not just a genre preference but can be interpreted as an
epistemological preference for relational, systematic knowledge that explains
phenomena in the context of their global relations to each other. In contrast,
narrative appears as an almost deficient mode of travel writing with a smaller
epistemic scope that refers to the linearity of events and thereby only to sin-
gularities.
44 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 1, 230.
45 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 2, on p. 48.
46 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 2, on p. 221.
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4. The Narrativity of Comparison: Volcanic Revolutions
If one looks at the actual descriptive parts of the text, Humboldt’s compara-
tive approach at first sight seems to fit with his programmatic distinction be-
tween historical narrative and comparative description. Comparing renders
the scope of the text more global. By comparing, Humboldt leaves behind
the spatial and temporal boundaries of the travel route and creates a global
geography that carries scientific meaning. For example, his comparative de-
scription of the Pico del Teide almost reads as an account of all the world’s vol-
canoes. He compares the Pico del Teide to Mount Etna, Vesuvius, and Strom-
boli in Italy; to Cotopaxi and Tungurahua in Ecuador; and to Popocatépetl and
Pichincha in Mexico—to name just a few volcanoes he mentions for his global
comparisons.47 Comparing enables him to address issues of general interest
and global consequence. One of the general issues in which he is interested is
the relationship between a volcano’s size and the frequency of its eruptions.
He addresses this question as follows:
The eruptions of the Peak [of Teide] have been very rare for two centuries
past, and these long intervals appear to characterize volcanoes highly ele-
vated. The smallest of the whole, Stromboli, is almost always burning. At
Vesuvius, the eruptions are already rarer, though still more frequent than
those of Etna and the Peak of Teneriffe. The colossal summits of the Andes,
Cotopaxi, and Tungurahua, scarcely have an eruption once in a century. We
might say, that in active volcanoes the frequency of the eruptions is in the
inverse ratio of the height and themass. The Peak [of Teide] also had seemed
extinguished during ninety-two years, when, in 1798, it made its last erup-
tion by a lateral opening formed in themountain of Chahorra. In this interval
Vesuvius had sixteen eruptions.48
These global comparisons create a synoptic view that takes into account not
only the particular volcano that is currently being visited in the narrative,
the Pico del Teide, but a great number of other volcanoes all over the world.
Humboldt is able to offer a causal hypothesis on the relationship between size
and eruptions, because he removes these volcanoes from their original spa-
tial and temporal context and orders them according to their similarities and
differences. This comparative focus on possibly global geological causalities
47 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 1, 196ff.
48 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 1, on p. 248ff.
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contrasts with the sequentiality of the travel narrative. It is also no longer re-
stricted to the traveler’s observations during the journey. Instead, Humboldt
introduces additional information acquired at other times or by other trav-
elers such as the number of eruptions of Italian volcanoes or the number of
eruptions that occurred before or after the journey.
However, while the traditional sequential order of the historical narra-
tive is interrupted, the text implies a sequential order on another level. Na-
ture itself appears to be sequential. Humboldt refers to specific events, the
“eruptions” of the named volcanoes, and he implies their sequential order
by referring to their structure in time as “intervals.” Volcanoes appear here
as seemingly collective, nonanthropomorphic actors that are typical for fac-
tual forms of narrating.49 In addition, the chain of volcanic events does not
present itself as a random chronological succession. Humboldt attributes a
pattern to what he reports: “We might say, that in active volcanoes the fre-
quency of the eruptions is in the inverse ratio of the height and the mass.”
Thereby, Humboldt turns a random chronology into a causal sequence. Even
though Humboldt usually thinks that the search for universal laws should be
done by comparing and describing, here narrativity seems the obvious form
of identifying a universal law: it links the reported events to a general cause.
Thereby, Humboldt builds an alternative narrative that does not represent the
traveler’s experiences but geological events.
This temporal ordering of nature reappears in Humboldt’s description of
the Pico del Teide and its geological history. Humboldt is interested in geo-
logical changes over long periods of time that he describes as follows:
Every thing indicates, that the physical changes, of which tradition has pre-
served the remembrance, exhibit but a feeble image of those gigantic catas-
trophes, which have given mountains their present form, changed the posi-
tions of the rocky strata, and buried seashells on the summit of the higher
Alps. It was undoubtedly in those remote times, which preceded the exis-
tence of the human race, that the raised crust of the Globe produced those
domes of trappean porphyry, those hills of isolated basalt on vast elevated
plains, those solid nuclei which are clothed in the modern lavas of the Peak,
of Etna, and of Cotapaxi. The volcanic revolutions have succeeded each other
after long intervals, and at very different periods.50
49 Fludernik, “Narratologische Probleme des faktualen Erzählens,“ 120.
50 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 1, on p. 240f.
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Again, Humboldt adopts a comparative perspective by complementing the
description of the Pico del Teide with comparative references to other volca-
noes—in this case, Etna and Cotopaxi. Comparing enables to focus on global
geological developments. This spatial expansion of the description’s perspec-
tive is once more accompanied by a sequential ordering of nature. Again,
Humboldt refers to specific natural events, to “volcanic evolutions” and “catas-
trophes,” and he also arranges them again in a sequential order by stating that
they “succeeded each other” and by referring to their order in time as “inter-
vals” and “periods.” The use of tense implies a double temporality, which is
characteristic to narrative, a temporality on the level of the histoire aswell as on
the level of discourse. This double linearity is also stressed by Humboldt’s ref-
erence to “remote times, which preceded the existence of the human race”—a
reference that establishes a second timeline not only before “the human race”
but also before the timeline of the story. Again, Humboldt replaces the his-
torical narrative of the voyage with an alternative narrative of natural events.
Comparing therefore breaks with the traditional setup of the historical nar-
rative, but it involves narrative functions on another level—in this case, the
sequencing of natural events. This temporal ordering of nature is not just
a formal arrangement but serves as a way to create scientific meaning. By
sequencing natural events, no matter how generally and vaguely, Humboldt
identifies those events as part of a mutual causal process, the shaping of the
earth and its “crust.”51
It is important to note that the character-bound focalization that Hum-
boldt finds necessary for the historical narrative also occurs in these descrip-
tive text passages. Even though global comparisons broaden the scope of the
text passage, Humboldt often authenticates these comparisons by referring
to what he himself has seen, read, heard, or witnessed; for example:
51 As recent research on narrativity in the sciences has shown, scientific explanations
become especially difficult when they are concerned with “historical events in na-
ture”; and that, in many cases, “only narratives of the (special, singular, historical)
events can be produced.” Humboldt’s efforts to establish a history of geological events
suggest a similar epistemic situation and problem. However, whether or not we can
actually assume a certain historical continuity here could be decided only by a fur-
ther inquiry into narrating in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See Fuchs,
Hans, “Typology of Uses of Narrative in Science: From Positioning Science in Culture
through Creating Affect to Providing Explanations and Suggesting Concepts,” nar-
rativescience.org, www.narrativescience.org/Argument/Argument_Fuchs_01.html (ac-
cessed May 4, 2018).
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From the information of several well instructed persons, to whom I ad-
dressed myself, I found, that there are calcareous formations in the Great
Canary, Fortaventura, and Lanzerota.52
Of all the written testimonies, the oldest I have found of the activity of this
volcano dates from the beginning of the sixteenth century.53
But there are shifts of focalization to be noted in the descriptive parts. Re-
ferring to events in ”remote times” before humankind implies a less limited
focalization—a perceptional scope that is not bound to any single agent in
the universe of the narrative but involves times and places beyond the indi-
vidual perception of a single character. However, when he reports those very
events that are not directly accessible to the traveler-narrator as something he
has read or heard from other sources, as shown above, Humboldt often uses
a focalized perspective bound to the narrator. But there are also moments in
the text when this limitation is momentarily replaced by an external focaliza-
tion that is not bound to the perception of any character in the world of the
narrative. For example, Humboldt writes:
From those dark times, when the elements, subjected to the same laws, had
not yet attained their present equilibrium, I come back to a period less tu-
multuous, nearer our own age, and onwhich tradition andhistorymay throw
some light.54
With a single small comment, “I come back,” the narrator moves effortlessly
from seemingly prehistoric events to recent history. This move through time
and space can be interpreted as a shift of perception, a shift of gaze that can-
not be ascribed to the character of the traveler. The narrator appears as a
temporally and spatially flexible witness to natural events. This shift of fo-
calization is linked to a shift of voice. For a moment, it is not the traveler
who speaks but a heterodiegetic narrator who is located outside the world of
the narrative. This narrator is able to speak about events beyond the traveler-
narrator’s knowledge, events that are of relevance to the general history of
nature.
In conclusion, these examples show that comparing is closely intertwined
with narrating.They also show that the specific narrative qualities of the com-
parative passages touch the epistemological scope of the text. A combination
52 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 1, on p. 236.
53 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 1, on p. 246.
54 Humboldt, Personal Narrative, 1, on p. 242.
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of sequencing nature and shifting between different types of focalization al-
lows a synoptic view of nature, its laws, and most importantly: its history.
Humboldt puts a lot of energy in contrasting historical narrative and compar-
ative description while articulating a strong distaste for narrative. He justifies
this hierarchy by referring to his epistemological goal of uncovering global
causalities and laws—a goal that does not match the particularity that is es-
sential to narrative and its temporal sequentiality. Only when nature itself
appears to be organized as a sequence of events does Humboldt’s quest for
universal natural laws become compatible with the particularity of narrativ-
ity.This sequencing of nature requires a shift in voice and focalization, a shift
from a homodiegetic to a heterodiegetic narrator, as well as from a character-
bound to an external focalization. In this way, narrativity, in spite of its partic-
ularity, can in fact strengthen a synoptic perspective and thereby contribute
to Humboldt’s search for universal or at least global laws and relations.
On the Narrative Order of Experimentation
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger
The claim to do nothing else than to let the things themselves tell their stories
has a long tradition in the sciences.The venerable metaphor of the legibility of
the world and of the letters in which the book of nature is written plainly cor-
respondswith that demand of self-exposure. AsHans Blumenberg has shown,
it has accompanied the sciences from the early modern times to the present,
from the mathematical vision of Galileo Galilei to the letter-universe of the
Human Genome Project.1 The demarcation criterion for a discourse that can
rightly claim to be scientific would thus be to allow things to express them-
selves according to their own grammar and their own lexicon. Succeeding in
creating such a space of self-exposure would render scientific discourse trans-
parent, and the congenial knowledge would be one that is essentially undis-
torted by the medium of its representation. To put it in another way: It would
coincide with that representation. The question would thus not so much be
whether scientific texts do narrate or not. Their scientificity would not con-
sist in the fact that they would operate, in contrast to a descriptive narration,
in the mode of an explanation, or according to different, but equivalent epis-
temological distinctions. Scientific texts would rather distinguish themselves
from the many and multiple, invented or true stories that we tell ourselves
about anything and everything, by the fact that they have another author.What
I would like to do in this paper is to give this vision a particular twist: In trying
to subvert it, I will take it up in a peculiar way.2
Posing the question of narration with respect to scientific knowledge thus
means not only to pose the question of its content, or object, but in the last
1 Blumenberg, Hans, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981.
2 For an early and preliminary exposé of the following, see Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg,
„Noch etwas über die experimentelle Ordnung der Dinge.“ In Wissenschaft undWelt-
erzählung: Fakt & Fiktion. Die narrative Ordnung der Dinge, edited by M. Michel, Zü-
rich: Chronos, 2013, 270-271.
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instance, the question of the subject of the sciences. In trying to answer this
question, one sooner or later faces the alternative that can be formulated as
follows. In both there is narrative, albeit of a different author: Either one
chooses the line sketched above and thus makes the scientist disappear be-
hind the transcendence of the divine—or secular—order of things; then the
subject of the sciences are the objects announcing themselves in their proper
idiom. Or one opposes this kind of objectivism and aligns the scientific dis-
course about the order of things with the stream of all those stories that we
tell us ourselves. As a consequence, according to temperament, the sciences
present themselves as one grand ormany small narrations.This is the classical
dividing line.
In Toward a History of Epistemic Things I attempted to show that the exper-
imental order of things is realized in a dynamic process condensed in exper-
imental systems.3 An attentive historical consideration of experimental sys-
tems opens a perspective pointing beyond the noted dichotomy. Experimental
systems can be seen as the actual and actualizing technical setups for things
of epistemic interest, for objects to become constituted as epistemic entities
at all. A context of this kind is needed in order to endow an object with the
very character of a thing of knowledge. For the experimenter, this context
presents itself primarily as an instrumental one, as a necessary condition of
manipulation. At a second look, however, one realizes that this context al-
ways consists already of what can be called “sedimented” knowledge, taking
up an expression of Edmund Husserl.4 Research technologies are material-
ized knowledge environments. One can consider them as collectively autho-
rized vehicles, carriers that in their relation to an epistemic object constitute
something like trans-subjective generators of events and of surprises. They
are machines for producing what could be called epistemo-differences.5 Sed-
imented knowledge brought into a research configuration thus has agency.
Now,we can reasonably argue that the essence of history is canalized con-
tingency. History lives from and through events. Without boundary condi-
3 Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg, Toward a History of Epistemic Things. Synthesizing Proteins
in the Test Tube. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.
4 Husserl, Edmund, “The origin of geometry.” In EdmundHusserl’s “Origin of Geometry”:
An Introduction, edited by J. Derrida, translated by J. P. Leavey, Jr., New York: Harvester,
1978.
5 Wilhelm Johannsen talked about “genodifferences” as the epistemic objects of the ge-
netic experimental systems of his time. Johannsen, Wilhelm, “The genotype concep-
tion of heredity.” American Naturalist 45, 1911: 129-159, on p. 150.
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tions, however, an incident cannot present itself as an event. And without
events, there is no historical process. Even so, there is no good story without
a certain amount of surprising turns in the framework of a plot. And in a re-
ally good story, it is the plot itself that provokes the turns. In his book Grains
et issues, published in 1935, Tristan Tzara, the Romanian writer and one of the
leading figures of French surrealism, characterized his view of a good liter-
ary story as follows. The passage is titled “The Experimental Dream”: “Thus
the story follows, and spreads across the frame of a logical development that
reduces itself to an account of successive facts, but leaving an irrational and
lyrical remnant open for discovery.This, in turn, overflows the vessel intended
for it, and at times engulfs and floods the base, the foundation, the traditional
scaffolding of the story. It is a lyrical superstructure whose elements are de-
rived from the base structure and which, once it is realized, impacts back
onto that structure from the heights of its new power. Occasionally, its force
intensifies to such an extent that it undermines the meaning of the structure,
corrupts it, abolishes it, annihilates it in its essence.”6 This is how Tzara sees,
in the realm of literary production, a scaffold that allows, as he put it, to “bring
forth new events not foreseen by the original plan.”7
In the realm of science, we know of such structures precisely as experi-
mental systems. They provide the space for knowledge provoking contingen-
cies, for epistemic surprises that are more than the spurious sparks and ac-
cidents of a lucky intuition.They are arrangements that both produce history
through their temporal order and stories through the permanent shift and
displacement of meaning that characterizes them. The history and the sto-
ries that the sciences bring forth are written by experimental systems, which
we have to address as difference machines. They do not have a once-for-all
shape: Case studies are needed to set them in a proper light. They are to ex-
pose what could be called a poetology of research.
There is a line by Michael Polanyi — who started his career as a physical
chemist and later became a philosopher of science — a stance that is telling
in many respects in our context. Marjorie Grene quotes one of its versions
in her book The Knower and the Known. It is a statement about what might be




called the research situation8 and reads as follows: “This capacity of a thing to
reveal itself in unexpected ways in the future, I attribute to the fact that the
thing observed is an aspect of reality, possessing a significance that is not
exhausted by our conception of any single aspect of it. To trust that a thing
we know is real is, in this sense, to feel that it has the independence and power
for manifesting itself in yet un-thought of ways in the future.”9
From the perspective of the researcher,we could say that what we are deal-
ing with is an act of delegation. Setting up an experimental system revolving
around an epistemic object and exploring some of the inexhaustible aspects
of its thingness means to undercut the traditional subject-object relation in
the sense of a face-to-face relation between an observer and something being
observed. In an experiment, the act of observing is mediated by a technical
arrangement of sorts that one brings into interaction with the epistemic ob-
ject. According to Blumenberg, the action at a distance that this implies lies
at the very basis of conceptualization überhaupt. Research, then, is second or-
der conceptualization. It focuses on the process of conceptualization itself.
An interaction of this sort has to be crafted in a way that the outcome —
the traces that the interaction leaves behind — is not completely determined
in advance. If it were, we would be dealing with a demonstration and not a
research experiment. A research experiment lives from its aspect of “un-con-
ceptuality,” to use Blumenberg’s notion for this peculiar tension.10 It results
from the effort to expand the realm of the conceptual which, in the very same
movement, always also risks to reveal itself inappropriate.
Epistemic entities are thus things that by necessity leave something to be
desired.They represent a knowledge-generating relation to the world: We can
call it epistemicity. It is exploratory, driven by the desire to find, not to assert
what is already given.When the great French experimental physiologist of the
nineteenth century, Claude Bernard, once confided to his laboratory notebook
8 On this and the following, see also Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg, “On epistemic objects, and
around.” InWdWReview: Arts, Culture, and Journalism in Revolt, edited by D. Ayas and
A. Kleinman, Rotterdam: Witte de With Publishers, 2017, 376-381.
9 Polanyi, Michael, Duke Lectures (1964), Microfilm, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1965, Library Photographic Service, 4th Lecture, 4–5. Quoted in Grene, Marjorie,
The Knower and the Known, Washington DC: Center for Advanced Research in Phe-
nomenology & University Press of America, 1984, 219.
10 Blumenberg,Hans, Theorie derUnbegrifflichkeit, Frankfurt amMain: Suhrkamp, 2007.
On the Narrative Order of Experimentation 89
that “where one is no longer in the position to know, one must find,”11 he ex-
pressed this situation in an exemplary and succinct manner.12 Experimenters
are specialists in creating situations in which such finding becomes possible.
The movement of finding in science neither obeys the logic of mere chance
nor that of pure necessity. It obeys a logic of its own, composed of elements
of both, and in so doing, undercuts the stochastic rigor of the former and the
deterministic rigor of the latter. It is a peculiar engagement with the mate-
rial world that, on the one hand, requires intimacy with the matter at hand,
and on the other, disentanglement, the capacity of Verfremdung. It has become
common to address the event-provoking character of research under the label
of serendipity, and it is probably not by chance that the term, which Robert
Merton smuggled into the discourse on science, can be traced back to a fairy-
tale from Persia.13
A reminiscence that dates back to the time when I was working on my
case study on the history of protein biosynthesis research may illustrate the
future-oriented power of finding, which at the same time acts as a recur-
sive narrative force. Paul Zamecnik, whose laboratory at the Massachusetts
General Hospital in Boston was the focus of this study, had been invited on
several occasions, from the late 1950s to the middle of the 1980s, to lecture on
the achievements of his lab. It is striking to see how he reported on theway the
main steps of the research trajectory of his group changed over the distance of
twenty years. In 1958, at a time his work was just beginning to enter the lime-
light of emerging molecular biology,14 he presented a story that described the
main findings strictly along his experimental trajectory. He used a vocabulary
that remained largely operational and reflected the techniques his group was
using to dissect the biosynthetic process under investigation: Amino acids
were “incorporated” into protein, reflecting the fact that radioactivity added
11 Bernard, Claude, Cahier de notes 1850–1860, présenté et commenté par M. Grmek,
Paris : Gallimard, 1965, 135.
12 It may be of linguistic interest here to note that the unit of research that usually leads
to a publication is “the finding.”
13 Merton, Robert K., and Elinor Barber, The Travels and Adventures of Serendipity: A
Study in Sociological Semantics and the Sociology of Science, Princeton: PrincetonUni-
versity Press, 2006. As it were, the title of the book sees its subject matter itself as
dominated by the principle of serendipity.
14 See, e.g., Zamecnik, Paul, “Historical and current aspects of the problemof protein syn-
thesis.” In The Harvey Lectures 1958-59, New York and London: Academic Press, 1960,
256-281.
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in the form of radioactive amino acids was found to be associatedwith protein
in the course of the experiment. “Microsomes” and later “ribonucleoprotein
particles” were identified as the sites of protein synthesis, the former term re-
ferring to a cellular fraction that could be sedimented at high speed, the latter
to the chemical constitution of a purified fraction. “Soluble RNA” was found
to take up amino acids, referring to a ribonucleic acid fraction that remained
soluble during high speed fractionation, and so on.The terminology carefully
remained at the level of the technical set-up of the experimental system. In
terms of theory, it was deliberately non-committal. In 1979, thus twenty years
later,15 the vocabulary hat completely changed, Now, the laboratory had en-
gaged in “ribosome” studies from its beginning in the late 1940s, discovered
“transfer RNA” around the middle of the 1950s, and with that, contributed a
decisive link to understand the “language of the gene and that of the protein,”
that is, the process of “translation” as it was delineated at the end of the 1950s.
Now, the story was told as one of molecular biology from the very outset, in
a form that would have been unthinkable at the point where it started.
In the second part of this paper, I would like to explore the historiographi-
cal consequences of this deliberately epistemic view on the scientific research
process. If experimental systems are to be seen as units of making scientific
events happen, they can and should, of course, also become units of historio-
graphical narration.The challenge of such case studies is to escape the illusion
created by mapping the historiography directly onto the historical dynamics
of the process. Georges Canguilhem has warned insistently against such a
conflation. In his seminal paper on the object of the history of the sciences,
he pleads for a clear distinction between objects of nature, objects of the sci-
ences, and objects of the history of the sciences. In his address to the Cana-
dian Society for the History and Philosophy of Science in 1966 in Montreal, he
framed their respective differences with the following words: “The object in
the history of the sciences has nothing to do with the object of a science. The
scientific object, constituted by methodical discourse, is secondary, however
not derived with regard to the natural, initial object that one might call pre-
text, in playing with the sense of that word. The history of the sciences oc-
cupies itself with these secondary, non-natural, cultural objects, but it is not
derived from them, as little as they are derived from the first. The object of
the historical discourse is, in effect, the historicity of the scientific discourse,
15 Zamecnik, Paul, “Historical aspects of protein synthesis.“ Annals of the New York
Academy of Sciences 325, 1979: 269-301.
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inasmuch as this historicity represents the effectuation of a project that is
internally normalized, but traversed by accidents, retarded or diverted by ob-
stacles, interrupted by crises, that is,moments of judgment and of truth.”16 In
his paper, Canguilhem polemicizes against a historical narrative that would
nothing but emulate the scientific object by making use of the vocabulary of
the sciences themselves.What is thus needed is a vocabulary that tries to cap-
ture the historical nature of scientific development, the dynamics of a process
that, according to Canguilhem, is “normalized” and “interrupted by crises” at
the same time. It thus creates the conditions of its own regulation and the
conditions of critical transcendence without which that kind of historicity
would not exist. For the perspective from experimental systems, this means
that we need to think about the conceptual historical tools of a particular kind
of micro-history. It is a micro-history that stands in contrast to other forms
of traditional micro-history that have their place in the overall agenda of the
history of the sciences, such as biographical or institutional narratives.
The focus of this kind ofmicro-history is on themateriality of the research
process, with particular attention to the aleatoric moments that emerge from
it and that have the power to orient it toward unforeseen directions.What we
observe here is a peculiar kind of relationship between material continuity
and conceptual reorientation. Take the example of the early genetic work of
Carl Correns that extended over half a decade between 1894 and 1900.17 Cor-
rens started to cross varieties of corn as well as peas with the explicit idea in
mind to produce a clear instance of xenia—the appearance of characters of the
pollinating variety on the seed and fruit of the mother plant—and then even-
tually elucidating its physiological background. Four years into the process,
his goal was subverted by the observation of a roughly 3:1 ratio between the
characters of the original varieties in the second generation of self-pollinat-
ing pea hybrids—instead of any unambiguous instance of xenia.Thematerial
continuity of his crossing regime together with the careful recording of the
results allowed him to re-read the entire experimental process in terms of
a re-discovery of Mendel’s laws and to focus his attention on their corrobo-
ration in the final round of crossings. What we observe here is the material
16 Canguilhem, Georges, « L’objet de l’histoire des sciences ». In Etudes d’histoire et de
philosophie des sciences, Paris : Vrin, 1968, 9-23, on p. 17, my emphasis.
17 Compare Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg, An Epistemology of the Concrete, Durham and Lon-
don: Duke University Press, 2010, chapter 4.
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continuity of an ongoing experimental process and, at the same time, a com-
plete replacement of the epistemic object followed through the vagaries of
that process.
The examples could be multiplied by widely different variants that can-
not be understood without peculiar attention to the intricacies of the respec-
tive experimental processes.Therefore, suchmicro-histories generally require
that the historian have a laboratory record at his or her disposal which will
allow her or him to zoom into the experimental turning points. In the partic-
ular case of Correns, the laboratory protocols did not only have the function
of memorizing the results of his experiments, they became part and parcel of
the experimental process as it went on. For the historian, they are the surro-
gate for the experimental process, that is, the paper form of the experimental
narrative itself that must serve him or her as a foil for her or his own efforts
to come to terms, in Canguilhem’s sense, with the historicity of the scientific
object at hand.
The vocabulary of a historical epistemology living up to this challenge is
not to be found ready-made in the annals of traditional epistemology. It re-
quires an ongoing effort for those who continue to be interested in such a
micro-history of the “mangles of practice,” to put it in the words of Andrew
Pickering.18 For a deeper understanding of the scientific practices in the dif-
ferent corners and niches of the scientific universe, this approach remains
indispensable. And there is one other thing that needs to be considered here.
If we are to arrive at an understanding of how scientific knowledge and other
cultural forms of knowledge and knowledge production hang together, we
need to approach them frombelow and not from the bird’s view of the theoret-
ical products of selected sciences. Case studies of this kind are the privileged
places of narration of a very particular, metonymic character: The very telling
of such microstories only makes sense if they point beyond themselves. Their
way of generalization has the form of ‘standing for.’ This is, however, in the
nature of microstoria and distinguishes it from just local stories. Microstories
pretend to tell a lesson. In that sense, we could even compare their role for
history with the role experiments play in the sciences. Each and every exper-
iment is a concrete, singular event. But it is only accepted as an experiment
worth of consideration if it can be looked at as an instantiation of a more
18 Pickering, Andrew, The Mangle of Practice, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1995.
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general state of affairs. Otherwise one would not take it to be more than just
fancy.
Different time frames are in need of different objects of historiograph-
ical narration. The story of an experimental system usually does not exceed
the career span of a particular scientist or group of scientists. It amounts to
what George Kubler considers as a project or productivity cycle, or indiction
period, typically more than ten and less than twenty years.19 If we would like
to assess the dynamics of scientific development over a longer period of time,
we need to think about entities other than experimental systems to guide our
narratives. In the context of the history of the empirical sciences, one way of
approaching themeso-range of the next order ofmagnitude, that is, the order
in the range of a century instead of a decade, is to look at what I like to call
experimental cultures.20 Using experimental cultures as an object of narra-
tion, on the one hand, preserves the focus on practice inherent in the micro-
approach.On the other hand, it allows for an understanding of how particular
spaces of scientific activity are being formed that transcend a specific labora-
tory with its more or less unique experimental setup. These areas have taken
different shapes in the history of the modern sciences. Until early into the
twentieth century, they tended to condense into disciplines usually subjected
to more or less stringent social codices. Just to give one example: A latecomer
in the family of biological disciplines at the end of the nineteenth century was
genetics. It rested on an experimental regime that was taken over from the
realm of breeding plants and animals and adapted to the specification of those
units that were thought to be responsible for the expression of certain organ-
ismic characters: the genes. Its two practical prerequisites were the selection
of pure lines, on the one hand, and the capacity of such lines to be crossed
with different ones, so that the behavior of the different characters could be
followed in the progeny. A unique experimental culture resulted. It combined
the living with mathematics: It made experimental use of living organisms,
and the outcome of the experiments lent itself to the mathematical precision
instrument of statistics. The gene as a new epistemic object took shape in
this experimental context. Its characteristics remained formal, however. The
19 Kubler, George, The Shape of Time. Remarks on theHistory of Things, NewHaven: Yale
University Press, 1962, 101-102.
20 Compare Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg, “Cultures of Experimentation.” In Cultures without
Culturalism, edited by K. Chemla and E. Fox Keller, Durham and London: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 2017, 278-295.
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experimental regime of classical genetics presented no handle to follow them
down to the material, molecular level. On the other hand, a new instrument
arose that soon would proliferate into other disciplinary specialties of the life
sciences: the creation of model organisms. They were to accompany the life
sciences as a living instrument over the entire twentieth century.
If we look at the twentieth century, however, we witness the emergence of
spaces that are much less stringently codified and organized than disciplines,
whose boundaries are less rigid, and whose constituency is more ephemeral
than what we associate with the concept of discipline. It is therefore not by
chance that historical epistemologists have, from the early twentieth century
onward, pointed to this phenomenon and tried to find a conceptual frame-
work to describe it. Gaston Bachelard, for instance, used terms such as “can-
ton” or “district” in the image of different quarters of a city.21 A generation
later, Pierre Bourdieu introduced the notion of “field” to characterize relatively
coherent areas of social and cultural activity, including scientific practice.22
In doing so, he simultaneously aimed to make scientific practice comparable
to other forms of practice.
A good example for such an experimental culture is in vitro experimen-
tation. Test tube biology had its origins in what came to be called biochem-
istry at the beginning of the twentieth century. Its aim was to create artificial
environments for partial biological reactions. It turned the “inner milieu” of
Claude Bernard into an outer milieu.23 It also had its place, however, in cell
biology and in microbiology. And in the middle of the twentieth century, it
formed an essential part of emergent molecular biology. We thus see clearly
that we are dealing with a space that is more fine-grained than that of disci-
pline, and above all, one that has a different focus.With his notion of “cultures
of emergence,” Bachelard has pointed to the core of all such different, sub-dis-
ciplinary knowledge spaces: the eventuation of novelty.24 Shifting one’s nar-
rative attention toward the specificities of these experimental environments
and their potential of innovation means to keep practice in the center and,
at the same time, finding a way to de-localize the story that is to be told. It
21 Bachelard, Gaston, Le rationalisme appliqué, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France,
1949.
22 Bourdieu, Pierre, Pascalian Meditations, Palo Alto : Stanford University Press, 2000,
esp. Chapter 3.
23 Bernard, Claude, Leçons sur les phénomènes communs aux animaux et aux végétaux
(1878-1879), Paris : Vrin, 1966, in particular the Second Lecture, section III.
24 Bachelard, Le rationalisme appliqué, 133.
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entails another form of generalization than the one we encountered with ex-
perimental systems as micrological units of narration. Whereas their modus
was metonymic, here the modus is analogical and parallactic.
Finally, what aboutmacro-histories? Underneath experimental systems as
well as cultures of experimentation, we witness a flux of time that obeys yet
another order of duration, sometimes extending over several centuries. The
question is what kinds of entities would be apt to serve as narrative guides
over such extended periods of time? From the perspective of scientific prac-
tice, Foucauldian “discourse” comes to mind as a possible candidate to do the
job. Following Michel Foucault, a discourse consists of an epochal, overarch-
ing set of practices and standards as well as the beliefs embodied in them that
delimit what is conceivable and enunciable within that framework.25 How-
ever, when the focus is on the dynamics of a particular realm of science in
the making, one needs to be more specific.The sciences unfold in the context
of discourses, but they are only spots of condensation within them. Thomas
Kuhn has talked about a “disciplinary matrix” in this respect,26 a structure
into which paradigms are wired. But in either case, the focus is on closure,
on what is excluded. What we are to be looking for here, however, is a narra-
tive guide that would focus on the openings and displacements along a longer-
term trajectory and that would not exclude the unprecedented at this tempo-
ral macro-level.
Again, Canguilhem can be helpful here. He suggested that such long-term
histories might best be written as histories that follow the trajectory of sci-
entific concepts from one realm of inquiry to another and to observe their va-
garies and varying embodiments and instantiations.27 The focus then lies on
broader figures of change. Let us take the example of the concept of heredity
and sketch its trajectory in extremely broad strokes.28 A concept of heredity
was absent from the space of natural history until the late eighteenth cen-
tury. Theories of generation, be they preformationist or epigenetic, were not
in need of such a concept. Around 1800, it entered the realm of the biological
25 Foucault, Michel, The Discourse on Language. Appendix to The Archeology of Knowl-
edge, New York: Pantheon, 1972, 215-237.
26 Kuhn, Thomas, “Second thoughts on paradigms.” In The Essential Tension, Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1977, 293-319.
27 Compare Canguilhem, Georges, La Formation du concept de réflexe auxXVIIe et XVIIIe
siècles, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1955.
28 Müller-Wille, Staffan, and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, A Cultural History of Heredity,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012.
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from the realm of the legal where it had its original place: the idea of material
properties transmitted from one generation to the next. Concomitantly, the
notion of generation completely changed its meaning. Conceptualizing gen-
erational change in terms of such properties—of which organisms acted as
their carriers—took shape over the course of the nineteenth century in dif-
ferent practical and discursive areas such as medicine, agricultural breeding,
anthropology, and evolution. To begin with, it created a scattered epistemic
space, one that only became unified toward the end of the nineteenth century.
Along with this condensation, the epistemic space of heredity became com-
pacted as an epistemic object sui generis: the gene.The gene then permeated
all of twentieth century life sciences, and it inhabited a plethora of experi-
mental systems and cultures of experimentation, thereby creating a number
of successive auras around itself. They can be addressed as so many “images
of knowledge.”29 The first of these images was that of an ‘atom of life.’ But
as such an atom, it remained elusive. The second was that of a material ‘in-
formation carrier.’ Now the atom had materialized as a molecule, but what it
meant to carry information remained elusive. The third image was that of an
element of a ‘map.’ Now it became the node of a network, but the nature of
that network remained to be determined. And the story goes on.
I have restricted myself to this example to characterize the transgressive
power of the epistemic object ‘gene’ in the space of research—the privileged
space of my concern in this paper—and I have neglected the onto-theological
and technological stories that accreted around heredity with all their social,
political, cultural, and medical consequences—those second-order life-world
materializations of powerful images of knowledge from which the sciences
can, of course, not be detached. Narratives at this level would talk, for in-
stance, about the mechanization of the worldview, the geneticization of so-
ciety or, in general terms, the scientification of our world picture. But with
that, we would have reached a level of generalization that borders on what is
being called “grand narratives.” A generation earlier, its label was “ideology.”
This is a level that does not make sense from a perspective that focuses on
the process of research. It is even counter-indicated, as long as one is con-
vinced—of which I remain—that scientific exploration, together with a few
other cultural activities such as art, is endowed with an ongoing and irre-
sistible subversive power. To be subversive means nothing else than to have
the power of resisting totalization.
29 Elkana, Yehuda, Anthropologie der Vernunft, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986.
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Now, a narrative is a narrative only as long as one can imagine that it
might have been otherwise. Narration therefore comes with an intrinsic
quantum of potential plurality, and therefore with an unavoidable amount
of concreteness and circumstantiality. An abstract story—no less than an
abstract experiment—is a contradiction in terms. This elective affinity is the
ground on which experiment as narration and narration as experiment can
come together and on which their paths can cross and inform each other.

The Flower People of Shanidar
Telling a New Tale about our Neanderthal Brothers
Oliver Hochadel
Neanderthals were artists! In February 2018 a publication in Science made
headlines around the world. Using new dating techniques researchers
claimed that simple paintings in three Spanish caves were much older than
previously thought, namely over 60,000 years ago. And since Homo sapiens
only settled much later in the Iberian peninsula they must be the work of
Neanderthals.1 Although met with some skepticism this recent finding may
be understood as yet another step in the “upgrading” of the Neanderthal that
began in the 1950s. Since mid-century the popular image of the Neanderthal
as brutish and essentially subhuman started to give way to a vision of a much
more sympathetic, intelligent and cultured creature. Each revision brought
“them” closer to “us”.
A crucial step in this promotion of the Neanderthal from beast to brother
were the finds in the Shanidar cave in Northern Iraq made between 1951 and
1960. These discoveries reached a larger public through Ralph Solecki’s book
Shanidar.The First Flower People published in 1971. An unusually high amount of
pollen found near a skeleton seemed to indicate the burial of a Neanderthal on
a bed of colorful flowers.This hypothesis had a strong impact on popular cul-
ture. Novels, popular science books, dioramas in museums and a Hollywood
movie exploited the powerful imagery of the deeply moving flower burial.
This paper will analyze the Shanidar case applying the double perspective
of this volume. Firstly, narrating: The narratives that in one way or another
originated from Solecki’s book soon developed their own dynamic.What top-
ics, stories and imageries were spun out of the Shanidar Neanderthals and to
whom were they addressed? Secondly, comparing: Narratives byHomo sapiens
1 Hoffmann, D. L. et al., “U-Th Dating of Carbonate Crusts Reveals Neandertal Origin of
Iberian Cave Art,” Science 359 (6378), 2018: 912–915.
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about Neanderthals are always, sometimes more, sometimes less explicitly
comparative. The contrasting with “us” has been a constant feature of Ne-
anderthal research ever since the first fossils emerged in 1856. How does
the creature with the thick brow ridges, sloping forehead and supposedly
stooped, shuffling gait live up to his supposedlymore evolved sapiens brother?
1. The Neanderthal—from beast to brother
The changing image of the Neanderthal, alternating between ancestor,
brother and distant cousin has been amply documented and commented on
by both historians of science and practicing paleoanthropologists.2 From the
fossil discovery in the Neander Valley in 1856 it took about half a century
for the acceptance of Neanderthal as a distinct species to Homo sapiens.
Shortly afterwards, just before World War I, French prehistorian Marcellin
Boule “expelled” the Neanderthal from the human lineage. His analysis of
the La Chapelle-aux-Saints skeleton created the highly influential notion of a
stooped figure. In popular representations the Neanderthal was also depicted
with thick hair or even fur, and, if male, armed with a club. In the common
imaginary he was brutish and certainly not particularly bright.
It took until the 1950s to revise Boule’s erroneous judgment. The Nean-
derthal walked fully upright and he resembled us in many respects. As Straus
and Cave put it in 1957: “if he could be reincarnated and placed in a New York
subway-provided that he were bathed, shaved, and dressed in modern cloth-
ing-it is doubtful whether he would attract any more attention than some of
its other ,denizens’.”3 This thought-experiment, formulated in an academic
article, proved to be very “catchy” and reverberated strongly in popular cul-
ture, generating cartoon images of Neanderthals wearing suits and sporting
hats.
2 For a concise summary see Sommer, Marianne, “The Neandertals.” In Icons of Evolu-
tion: An Encyclopedia of People, Evidence, and Controversies, edited by B. Regal,West-
port: Greenwood, 2008, 139-166. For accounts by paleoanthropologists see Trinkaus,
Erik, and Pat Shipman, The Neandertals. Changing the Image of Mankind, London:
Jonathan Cape, 1993. Schrenk, Friedemann, and Stephanie Müller, Die Neandertaler,
München: C.H. Beck, 2005.
3 Straus, William L., and A. J. E. Cave, “Pathology and the Posture of Neanderthal Man,”
The Quarterly Review of Biology 32, 1957: 348-363, 359.
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Scholars have repeatedly pointed out that from the earliest publications
and pictorial representations the Neanderthal not only led an academic life
but also a public one. The Neanderthal has been omnipresent in popular cul-
ture for well over one hundred years now, in popular science books, news-
papers, magazines and museum exhibits, but also in comics, novels, movies,
all sorts of gadgets and as a metaphor usually meant as an insult, signifying
someone who is hopelessly backward and out of touch.
In line with the “communicative turn” in history of science4, a neat separa-
tion of “strictly scientific” and “merely popular” representations of the Nean-
derthal seems impossible. These two spheres were and are intertwined, feed-
ing off each other. In fact, the movement “from beast to brother” became it-
self a narrative, that comprises this change in a nutshell. This narrative of
close resemblance can be found in media ranging from newspaper articles to
large exhibitions such as the recent “Néandertal: lui et nous” at the Musée de
l’Homme in Paris in 2018.5 To be sure, thismovement was not linear.The 1980s
saw some setbacks in humanizing the Neanderthal fully. Archaeologists such
as Lewis Binford wondered whether they might not have been completely un-
like us, lacking the capacity to plan ahead.6 Erik Trinkaus emphasized their
fundamental difference to us.7 Others doubted whether Neanderthals were
able to speak at all. After it had been confirmed that they actually were able to
speak it was suspected though that they lacked complex language and sym-
bolic capacities. More recently the difference between “him/her” and us has
narrowed again. A perforated piece of bone found in Slovenia led to the (in
the meantime much questioned) suggestion that Neanderthals played music
on a flute. The remnants of putative Neanderthal art in Spanish caves men-
tioned at the beginning of this article has been the most recent step in this
process of humanizing. Yet clearly themost impacting findwas the analysis of
the Neanderthal genome. In 2010, Svante Pääbo and colleagues showed that
4 Secord, James A., “Knowledge in Transit,” Isis 95 (4), 2004: 654-672.
5 Catalogue of the exhibition: Depaepe, Pascal, and Marylène Patou-Mathis, editors,
Néandertal: lui et nous, Paris: Gallimard, 2018.
6 Binford, Lewis R., “HumanAncestors: Changing Views of Their Behavior,” Journal of An-
thropological Archaeology 4, 1985: 292-327. Binford, Lewis R., “Isolating the Transition
to Cultural Adaptations: An Organizational Approach.” In The Emergence of Modern
Humans, edited by E. Trinkaus, Cambridge: SAR/Cambridge University Press, 1989, 18-
41.
7 Trinkaus and Shipman, The Neandertals, 417.
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non-African humans have between 1,5 and 4 percent Neanderthal DNA.8Most
of us carry them in us so to speak. This discovery also answered the much-
debated question whether Neanderthals and sapiens had common offspring.
The issue of “interbreeding” had been pursued and played out in a host of nov-
els set in prehistory already way back, since the early twentieth century. The
literary realm of paleofiction had become in a sense the “testing ground” for
this research question imagining different kind of scenarios.9
As we shall see in the remainder of this article, the interaction between ar-
chaeological research and popular culture was particularly fruitful in the case
of the Shanidar Neanderthals, creating a whole cosmos of moving narratives
and powerful images.
2. A flower burial and an elderly invalid
The source for this interaction was Shanidar. The First Flower People, published
by the archaeologist Ralph Solecki (1917-2019) of Columbia University in 1971.
For the most part the book is a description of four excavation seasons in
Northern Iraq (1951, 1952/53, 1957, 1959/1960). In the cave of Shanidar in the
Zagros mountains in Kurdistan, about 470 kilometers north of Bagdad, and
close to the borders of Turkey and Iran, the remains of nine Neanderthals
were found, considered to be around 60,000 years old.The cave itself is enor-
mous, the opening is 25 meters broad and 8 meters high and extends up to
50 meters back into the mountain.
Apart from anatomical questions with respect to the variation of Nean-
derthal anatomy the discoveries allowed for inferences on the behavior of that
species. Two of the skeletons unearthed stand out in this respect: Shanidar I
and Shanidar IV. In her analysis of soil samples from the area where Shanidar
IV was found, French paleobotanist Arlette Leroi-Gourhan (1913-2005) could
identify a large number of pollen grains that stemmed from at least 6 differ-
ent plants. This became Solecki’s central argument for the humanity of Ne-
anderthals and in a sense the main selling point of the book: “It is that early
8 Green, Richard E. et al., “A Draft Sequence and Preliminary Analysis of the Neandertal
Genome,” Science 328 (5979), 2010: 710-722.
9 De Paolo, Charles, “Wells, Golding and Auel: Representing the Neanderthal,” Science
Fiction Studies 27, 2000: 418-438. Ruddick, Nicholas, The Fire in the Stone. Prehistoric
Fiction from Charles Darwin to Jean M. Auel, Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University
Press, 2009.
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Stone Age Man had very human feelings; to a very much greater extent than
we have ever suspected. He was buried with flowers.”10
Several of the individuals found were not buried, but rather had been pre-
sumably killed by rock fall from the roof of the cave caused by the frequent
earthquakes in the region. Solecki includes a second case that bolsters his case
for the humanity of the Neanderthals, the male individual known as Shanidar
I—arguably the most famous invalid in prehistory.The number of lesions this
human being had to endure—and survived—in his life-time is breathtaking,
if not heartbreaking. His right arm was withered and mutilated (or even got
partially amputated). At an early age he must have received a strong blow
against the left orbit of his skull which probably left him blind on his left eye.
Deformations in both his feet presumably prevented him from participating
in hunting. Injuries and infections sustained during adolescence but possi-
bly also in part a birth defect might have been the reasons for these severe
handicaps. The fossils show that his lesions had healed and he continued to
live with his disabilities to the age of 40 or more, considered an advanced age
for a Neanderthal. As Solecki suggests, this crippled individual needed pro-
longed assistance from his group: “Although he was born into a savage and
brutal environment, Shanidar I man provides proof that his people were not
lacking in compassion.”11
In the analysis of the Shanidar fossils Solecki relied on renowned an-
thropologist and paleopathologist T. Dale Stewart (1901-1997) and later on
on human paleontologist Erik Trinkaus (*1942) who confirmed and expanded
on Stewart’s hypotheses.12 With these two major discoveries, Shanidar I and
Shanidar IV, Solecki felt confident to claim that Boule must have been wrong
and that Neanderthals were in fact our ancestors.13 That Neanderthals were
fully human is the main message of his book—but not the only one.
10 Solecki, Ralph S., Shanidar. The First Flower People, New York: Knopf, 1971, 3.
11 Solecki, Shanidar, 195, also see 192–193.
12 Trinkaus, Erik and M. R. Zimmerman, “Trauma among the Shanidar Neandertals,”
American Journal of Physical Anthropology 57, 1982: 61–76. In 1983 Trinkaus published
the most comprehensive examination of the Shanidar fossils to date: Trinkaus, Erik,
The Shanidar Neanderthals, New York: Academic Press, 1983.
13 Solecki, Shanidar, 11, 270.
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3. The Iraqi Kurds, a fierce mountain folk
Solecki clearly thought of himself not only as an archaeologist but also as
an anthropologist. The excavation team had recruited quite a number of men
from the local population to do the digging. So Solecki pursued a kind of dou-
ble field work, excavating Neanderthals but also closely observing the Kurds
and their customs. The bibliography of his book bears testimony that Solecki
read widely on the history of the region and its people. Already in 1955, well
before the publication of Shanidar. The First Flower People, Solecki even pub-
lished a record entitled “Kurdish Folk Songs and Dances”.14
In his book, Solecki takes a genuine interest in the Kurds of Northern
Iraq. Yet this does not save him from “orientalizing” them. He describes a
people rich in culture but somehow “stuck” in time. “The history of the Kurds
seems to be one of constant ferment without any real advance or progress.”15
For Solecki the Iraqi Kurds were “a simple and fierce mountain folk” ready to
take up arms if their leaders told them to.16 The Zagros mountains represent
“a cultural backwater of the higher civilizations to the south”—both in the
Paleolithic as well as nowadays.17 Solecki repeatedly alludes to continuities
between the deep past and the present. During the excavations in the 1950s,
there were still local people living in the cave during the winter period seeking
shelter from the elements—just like the Neanderthals and later on prehistoric
Homo sapiens had done.18 Solecki writes: “... the Shirwanis blossomed out with
a kind of slipper or moccasin made of the skin of an animal, hair inside,
which was tied around their ankles by string, in a style which harked back to
prehistoric days.”19
This idea of historic continuity is also present in the stratigraphy of
the cave itself. There are at least 14 meters of sediments representing up
to 100,000 years of settlement (including some discontinuities) with the
14 Kurdish Folk Songs and Dance, recorded by Ralph S. Solecki: Folkways Records 1955;
also see Solecki, Shanidar, 146, 153.
15 Solecki, Shanidar, 80.
16 Solecki, Shanidar, 142, see already 82.
17 Solecki, Shanidar, 163; also see 173, 268.
18 Later on Solecki published an article about them: Solecki, Ralph S., “Contemporary
KurdishWinter-Time Inhabitants of Shanidar Cave, Iraq,” World Archaeology 10, 1979:
318–330.
19 Solecki, Shanidar, 110.
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Neanderthals being at the very bottom (level D) and later populations of
Homo sapiens (level C to A) higher up in the deposit.
Of particular significance, given the title of the book, is the love for flowers
that the Kurds harbor, as Solecki mentions on several occasions.20 And once
he draws a direct parallel between the past and the present: “Among such
flower lovers are the modern Kurds, who are simply following a tradition of
the country dating from about 60,000 years ago.”21
4. The impact of Solecki’s book
Despite its catchy title Shanidar. The First Flower People was apparently not a
commercial success.There was only one edition in the US followed by a British
edition that appeared in 1972 under a different title.22 Only a handful of re-
views appeared23 and only one translation (into Japanese).24 Nevertheless the
book proved to be influential, yet not in a straight-forward way. The title
played an important role in this. As Shanidar. The First Flower People was pub-
lished in 1971 its title clearly alluded to the hippies’ “Flower Power” of the late
1960s. It seems reasonable to suggest that the title was chosen by the publisher
to maximize sales. Maybe it was just an inevitable choice, trying to relate the
main thesis of the book with the present.
Yet the title very much conditioned the way it was understood. Most later
comments on Solecki’s book point to the counter-culture of the 1960s as the
essential historical background. Ruddick for example wrote: “Our hirsute
cousins, it seemed, had been gentle, peace-loving creatures. In an era when
shaggy-locked antiwar protesters waving flowers confronted helmeted, heav-
ily armed militia, it seemed easy to imagine how the Neanderthals’ extinction
might have come about.” And he claimed that this “rehumanization” of the
20 Solecki, Shanidar, 122, 156, 176.
21 Solecki, Shanidar, 269.
22 Solecki, Ralph S., Shanidar: The Humanity of Neanderthal Man, London: Allen
Lane/The Penguin Press, 1972. The pagination of the British edition (fewer pages,more
densely printed) is different, but its content is practically identical.
23 Morrison, Philip, Scientific American 225, 1971: 234–238. John Norris, The Science
Teacher 39, 1972: 64. T. Cuyler Young Jr., The American Historical Review 80, 1975:
375–376.
24 Solecki, Ralph S., Shanidar Dōkutu NoNazo, trans. Yukinari Kōhara andNorikoMatsui,
Tokyo: Sōju Shobō, 1977.
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Neanderthals was “increasingly attuned to the countercultural currents in
the United States during the Vietnam War”.25
Such quotes indicate that Shanidar. The First Flower Peoplewas a bookmuch
cited but actually little read. Except for some of the early reviews nobody com-
mented on the significant anthropological content of the book and the sug-
gested continuity between Neanderthals and present-day Kurds. At the same
time Solecki makes no allusion whatsoever to the flower people in Califor-
nia or the massive student protests at Columbia University in New York in
1968, where he taught at the time. The book does have a political background
but it is an entirely different one: the turmoil of the Near East in the 1950s.
Solecki mentions the Suez Crisis of 1956/57 and the end of the Iraq monarchy
in 1958.26 He could not continue with his research in the 1960s because of the
armed conflict between government forces and the Iraqi Kurds.27 In fact only
a small portion of the sediments within the cave had been excavated and only
very recently archaeologists have returned to find more fossils.28
Shanidar. The First Flower People was clearly meant to be a popular science
book aimed at a general audience. As Solecki himself states in the foreword:
“The human-interest details concerning the findings cannot be properly told
in a severely technical paper.”29 He details the day-to-day of the excavation
under precarious conditions and includes numerous anecdotes about the in-
teractions of the US-American archaeologists with the local population. The
reader learns about near-accidents, including the dramatic event of an earth-
quake during the dig. Solecki uses familiar literary techniques of the adven-
ture-discovery-story: first person narrative, “local context” that adds an exotic
flavor, and the thrill of the unexpected fossil find that supposedly changes fun-
damentally the understanding of our past. I personally found the book well
written and intriguing. Nevertheless, Shanidar. The First Flower People did not
25 Ruddick, The Fire in the Stone, 71. Similar allusions in Shreeve, James, The Neandertal
Enigma. Solving the Mystery of Modern Human Origins, New York: William Morrow,
1995, 53–54. Schrenk and Müller, Die Neandertaler, 60.
26 Solecki, Shanidar, 173.
27 Solecki, Shanidar, 3, also see Leroi-Gourhan, Arlette, “Shanidar et ses fleurs,” Paléorient
24, 1998: 79–88.
28 Pomeroy, Emma et al., “Newly Discovered Neanderthal Remains from Shanidar Cave,
Iraqi Kurdistan, and their Attribution to Shanidar 5,” Journal of Human Evolution 111,
2017: 102–118; Pomeroy, Emma et al., “New Neanderthal Remains Associated with the
‘Flower Burial’ at Shanidar Cave,” Antiquity 94/ 373, 2020: 11–26.
29 Solecki, Shanidar, xi.
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match for example the bestsellers in the field of HOR that would follow a cou-
ple of years later. In 1977, Richard Leakey publishedOrigins and in 1981 Donald
Johanson followed suit with Lucy. The Beginnings of Humankind.30 In this book,
Johanson used a very similar formula to Solecki’s, but in his case he landed an
international bestseller turning the Australopithecus afarensis Lucy into an icon
of HOR.
There is now awide consensus among historians of science and STS schol-
ars that science popularization entails much more than communicating re-
cent findings to a larger public in a palpable way. In their popular works sci-
entists often address their own peers circumventing the formal restrictions
of peer-reviewed articles.31 The format of the popular science book, offering
ample space, is particularly apt for expounding new ideas, including contro-
versial hypotheses.32 The field of HOR lends itself in particular to expand the
academic battle field due to the enormous and persistent interest of the gen-
eral public in “their” origins.33
In Shanidar. The First Flower People Solecki forcefully proposes his thesis
about the flower burial and its significance for revising our view of Nean-
derthals granting these “early men the full range of human feelings and expe-
rience”.34 Creatures who cared somuch about their dead could only be human
beings in the full sense of the word. Solecki’s book was published in 1971, that
is before some of the major scientific articles on the Shanidar Neanderthals.35
30 Leakey, Richard E., and Roger Lewin, Origins. What new Discoveries reveal about the
Emergence of our Species and its possible Future, New York: E.P. Dutton, 1977. Johan-
son, Donald C., and Maitland A. Edey, Lucy. The Beginnings of Humankind, New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1981.
31 Bucchi, Massimiano, “When Scientists Turn to the Public. Alternative Routes in Science
Communication,” Public Understanding of Science 5 (4), 1996: 375–394.
32 Sepkoski, David, “Paleontology at the ‘High Table’? Popularization and Disciplinary
Status in Recent Paleontology,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C:
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 45, 2014:
133–138.
33 Hochadel, Oliver, “Die Knochenjäger. Paläoanthropologen als Sachbuchautoren.” In
Sachbuch und populäres Wissen im 20. Jahrhundert, edited by A. Hahnemann and
D. Oels, Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2008, 29–38; Hochadel, Oliver, “A Boom of Bones
and Books. The ‘Popularization Industry’ of Atapuerca and Human-Origins Research in
Contemporary Spain,” Public Understanding of Science 22 (5), 2013: 530–537.
34 Solecki, Shanidar, 250.
35 Leroi-Gourhan, Arlette, “The Flowers Found with Shanidar IV, a Neanderthal Burial in
Iraq,” Science 190 (4214), 1975: 562–564. Solecki, Ralph S., “Shanidar IV—aNeanderthal
Flower Burial in Northern Iraq,” Science 190 (4217), 1975: 880–881. Solecki, Ralph S.,
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Although the excavations had come to a forced halt in 1960, the scholarly pub-
lications took a long time to come out.36 Solecki and his colleagues published
a couple of articles in the 1960s but the flower burial did not yet figure in
these.37 Then, in 1968 palynologist Arlette Leroi-Gourhan published an article
suggesting that colorful flowers might have been put on top of the dead body
of Shanidar IV.38 In Solecki’s words: Leroi-Gourhan “provided the spark for
writing this book”.39 But the fully-fledged theory of a flower burial and the
implications for our understanding of the Neanderthals were only set forth
in Solecki’s book. Shanidar.The First Flower People provides thus another exam-
ple of how the medium of the popular science book serves to communicate
new findings and potentially controversial interpretations to both, the gen-
eral and the specialist public. Solecki’s book was seriously read by scholars
because they quote directly from it and take issue with some of his claims
therein.40
In 1975, a more detailed analysis of the pollen by Leroi-Gourhan prompted
Solecki to go even further, this time not in a popular science book but in a
peer-reviewed article in Science. It seemed that the Shanidar Neanderthals
attributed medicinal qualities to some of the flowers detected in the burial.
“Onemay speculate that the (individual) was not only a very important man, a
leader, but may have been a kind of medicine man or shaman in his group.”41
As we shall see below, this interpretation increased the potential of the flower
“The Implications of the Shanidar Cave Neanderthal Flower Burial,” Annals of the New
York Academy of Sciences 293, 1977: 114–124. Stewart, T. D., “The Neanderthal Skeletal
Remains from Shanidar Cave, Iraq: A Summary of Findings to Date," Proceedings of the
American Philosophical Society 121 (2), 1977: 121–165.
36 Or were published in the Iraqi journal Sumer and thus not easily accessible to most
scientists, Stewart, “The Neanderthal Skeletal Remains,” 121.
37 Solecki, Ralph S., “Prehistory in Shanidar Valley, Northern Iraq”, Science 139 (3551), 1963:
179–193, is an overview article and does not discuss the Neanderthal finds in any detail
yet.
38 Leroi-Gourhan, Arlette, “Le Néanderthalien IV de Shanidar,” Comptes Rendus de la So-
ciété Préhistorique 65, 1968 : 79–83.
39 Solecki, Shanidar, xii.
40 Gargett, Robert H., “Grave Shortcomings: The Evidence for Neandertal Burial [and
Comments and Reply],” Current Anthropology 30 (2), 1989: 157-190, 176; Pomeroy et
al., “Newly Discovered Neanderthal”, and Pomeroy et al., “NewNeanderthal Remains”.
41 Solecki, “Shanidar IV,” 881. This article refers to Leroi-Gourhan, “The Flowers Found,”
published three weeks earlier in the same journal, Science.
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burial for future adaptations in popular culture. All kinds of stories in differ-
ent media could be spun out of the hypothesis of Solecki and Leroi-Gourhan.
After the publication of Solecki’s book both the stories of Shanidar I and
Shanidar IV in its basic form became staple items in popular science books
on human origins or more specifically on the Neanderthals for the remainder
of the twentieth and well into the twenty-first century.42
George Constable’s short but amply illustrated The Neanderthals, pub-
lished in 1973, was far more influential in spreading the ideas of Solecki and
thus the “new” image of the Neanderthal than the book Shanidar. The First
Flower People itself. Solecki acted as the scientific advisor of Constable’s book
and wrote a brief introduction for it. Unsurprisingly the Shanidar finds, in
particular the flower burial, feature prominently in it.43 The Neanderthals was
part of “The Emergence of Man Series” and had the internationally operating
distribution machinery of the Time Life conglomerate behind it. In the very
same year 1973 the book was translated into German, French and Dutch (1973),
and some years later into Spanish (1975) and Italian (1979). A considerable
numbers of subsequent editions followed until the 1990s.
5. Jean Auel and The Clan of the Cave Bear
Among the most avid readers of the books of both Solecki and Constable was
US author Jean Auel (*1936). 44 Since the 1980s she is possibly the best-known
writer of palaeofiction. Between 1980 and 2011 Auel published the six volumes
42 Pfeiffer, John E., The Emergence of Man, 3rd ed., New York: Harper & Row, 1978, 155.
Pfeiffer, John E., The Creative Explosion: An Inquiry into theOrigins of Art and Religion,
New York: Harper & Row, 1982, 99. Trinkaus and Shipman, The Neandertals, 340–341.
Stringer, Chris and Clive Gamble, In Search of the Neanderthals: Solving the Puzzle of
Human Origins, New York: Thames and Hudson, 1993, 98, 158;.Tattersall, Ian, and Jef-
frey H. Schwartz, Extinct Humans, New York: Westview, 2000, 215–217. With specific
reference to the flower burial: Tattersall, Ian, BecomingHuman. Evolution andHuman
Uniqueness, San Diego/New York/London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1998, 161, 229.
Tattersall, Ian, The Monkey in the Mirror. Essays on Science ofWhat Makes Us Human,
San Diego/New York /London: Harcourt, 2002, 124–125. Schrenk andMüller, Die Nean-
dertaler, 80, 98. Shreeve, The Neandertal Enigma, 53.
43 Constable, George, The Neanderthals, The Emergence of Man, New York: Time Life,
1973. I owe this hint to Chris Stringer.
44 Personal information Jean Auel.
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of her Earth’s Children series. Her novels were translated into over thirty lan-
guages and sold worldwide over 45 million copies.
The importance of the Shanidar Neanderthals for Auel’s first book, The
Clan of the Cave Bear is well known and already tangible in the title. The clan’s
cave resembles the Shanidar cave although Auel put it on the Crimea.45 The
book tells the story of how Ayla, the female hero of the saga, a Homo sapiens,
grows up within a group of Neanderthals. The character of Creb, the disfig-
ured and handicapped shaman of the group and a father figure for Ayla is
modelled on Shanidar I.46 And indeed, Creb is killed by an earthquake, just
like Shanidar I (and not buried).47 Iza is the medicine woman, knowledgeable
about the healing properties of plants, and a mother figure for Ayla. When
she dies at the end ofThe Clan of the Cave Bear, Ayla goes out collecting a large
number of different plants so Iza would have her “tools” in the next world
as well. This way the flower burial appears not as a customary Neanderthal
practice but as an exception, conceived of by a Homo sapiens.
Auel’s Neanderthals are portrayed as human, in the spirit of Solecki, one
might say. But they lack mental mobility and do not evolve. Their ability
to speak is severely limited, reflecting the scientific debate on Neanderthal
speech around 1980.48 Yet, and here Auel introduces an entirely new dimen-
sion,The Clan of the Cave Bear can also be read as a work of feminist fiction. In
the strictly patriarchic Neanderthal clan females are totally subdued. Ayla is
regularly raped by her arch-enemy Broud, the son of the clan leader and gives
birth to a boy. (As mentioned above, one recurring topic in paleofiction is the
intriguing question of “interbreeding” between the two human species.) She
45 There are websites that reconstruct to which Paleolithic sites Auel alludes to in her
novel, see e.g. https://www.donsmaps.com/indexauelfans.html.
46 This has been observed already by numerous authors, e.g., Sommer, The Neandertals,
162. Trinkaus and Shipman, The Neandertals, 341. José María Bermúdez de Castro,
“Próximo Oriente: un agujero negro de la prehistoria,“ Quo, 14.5.2015, http://reflex-
iones-de-un-primate.blogs.quo.es/2015/05/14/proximo-oriente-un-agujero-negro-de-
la-prehistoria. Jean Auel said so in interviews, too: e.g., Ken Ringle, “Jean M. Auel:
The Smashing Saga of the ‘Cave’ Woman,” The Washington Post, 21 February 1986.
“Interview with Jean M. Auel”, Goodreads, published electronically April, 2011, https://
www.goodreads.com/interviews/show/580.Jean_M_Auel.
47 Auel, Jean M., The Clan of the Cave Bear, New York: Crown, 2011 [1980], 489–490.
48 De Paolo, Charles, Human Prehistory in Fiction, Jefferson, N.C./London: McFarland &
Co, 2002, 113–116; Ruddick, The Fire in the Stone, 85.
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is also excluded from using weapons and participating in the hunt. Ayla is
able to overcome these restrictions but is eventually expelled from the clan.49
In the appropriation of Solecki’s ideas in paleofiction the comparison of,
or shall we rather say the contrast between Neanderthals and “us”, repre-
sented by Ayla, is explicit.The narrative acts out these differences. In a double
movement the Neanderthals appear as human, empathetic and solidary crea-
tures, yet at the same time they are kept at bay. With specific reference to pa-
leofiction and Auel’s novels paleoanthropologists Milford Wolpoff and Rachel
Caspari write: Neanderthals “became more like the natives whose roles they
inherited by becoming ‘the other’. … Neandertals provided the clearest pic-
ture of what we were not, and perhaps some insight into how we came to be
successful at their expense.”50
Auel has a reputation of being widely read in prehistory, keeping up with
the latest research. Her novels reflect current scientific debates, for example
as regards the linguistic abilities of the Neanderthals, or the disk-core tech-
nique, i.e. how to knap stone tools.
The collaboration between prehistorians and novelists in producing pale-
ofiction can be traced back until the early twentieth century. Aspiring authors
turned to reputed scholars for advise and asked for public endorsement in
the form of forewords. In the twentieth century, for example, Henry Fairfield
Osborn, the powerful president of the American Museum of Natural History
in New York, hoped to push his scientific ideas but also his political agenda
by supporting writers of paleofiction.51 Instances of this kind of collabora-
tion can be found later well into the twenty-first century. On occasion the
researchers themselves write paleofiction.The best-known example is the pa-
leontologist Björn Kurtén, but also highly regarded paleoanthropologists such
as Juan Luis Arsuaga, François Bordes, Yves Coppens and Donald Johanson
dabbled with this genre.52
49 On Auel’s paleofiction see De Paolo, Human Prehistory, 113–119. Ruddick, The Fire in
the Stone, 84–89, 179ff.
50 Wolpoff,MilfordH., andRachel Caspari, Race andHumanEvolution. A Fatal Attraction,
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, 277.
51 Sommer, Marianne, HistoryWithin. The Science, Culture, and Politics of Bones, Organ-
isms, and Molecules, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016, 112–120.
52 Hochadel, Oliver, “Ursprung und Überwindung. Heldengeschichten aus Atapuerca.” In
Erzählung und Geltung. Wissenschaft zwischen Autorschaft und Autorität, edited by
S. Azzouni, S. Böschen, and C. Reinhardt, Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2015,
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The relationship between the writer of paleofiction and the professional
paleoanthropologist could be described as one of mutual benefit: public visi-
bility in exchange for scientific credibility. In most cases, this relationship is
asymmetrical, i.e. the writers depend on the endorsement of the scientists.
The case of Jean Auelmight be different.Due to her enormous success it seems
that the roles are nearly reversed.That is to say that researchers may need her
more than the other way round. Prehistorians praise her unflagging curiosity
and in-depth knowledge of the subject matter. In their view Auel significantly
helped their own cause by creating a sustained interest in prehistory among
millions of readers worldwide.53
Her economic success with the Earth’s Children series allows Auel to sup-
port Paleolithic research financially, both conferences and excavations, e.g.
in Spain. A photo from a 1986 conference in Santa Fe reunites the crème-de-
la-crème of Neanderthal researchers (Lewis Binford, Jean-Philippe Rigaud,
Chris Stringer, Erik Trinkaus and Milford Wolpoff, among others) and, as the
captions informs, “Jean Auel (a conference sponsor)”.54
When the final volume of Auel’s saga appeared in 2011, first-rate paleoan-
thropologists such as Ian Tattersall or Chris Stringer presentedThe Land of the
Painted Caves to large audiences.55 French prehistorian Jean-Philippe Rigaud
even published a small book on the occasion: Le Monde des Enfants de la Terre,
an up-to-date guide to every-day-life in the Paleolithic documenting Auel’s
in-depth knowledge.56
In their popular science books on Neanderthals paleoanthropologists
comment on what Auel’s paleofiction might contribute to the scientific
debate, e.g. on gender issues.57 Archaeologist John Speth points out that
paleofiction contains answers to questions relevant to his own discipline: Is it
possible to boil liquids, a broth for example, without the use of heated stones?
As Jean Auel “explains” in The Clan of the Cave Bear one may use perishable
materials such as hide to cook. Even if the hide is directly put into the flame
107–132, 127. Hochadel, Oliver, “Spain’s Magical Mountain. Narrating Prehistory at At-
apuerca,” The British Journal for the History of Science 49 (3), 2016: 453–472, 466–467.
53 Ruddick, The Fire in the Stone, 87–88.
54 Stringer and Gamble, In Search of the Neanderthals, 191.
55 Diario de Atapuerca 39 (2011), 10 (Tattersall on Auel).
56 Rigaud, Jean-Philippe, Le monde des enfants de la terre. Comment vivaient les héros
de la saga de Jean M. Auel, Paris : OMNIBUS, 2011.
57 Stringer and Gamble, In Search of the Neanderthals, 33.
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it will not burn as long as there is water in it.58 US archaeologist Lawrence
G. Straus collaborated with Jean Auel for many years, for example arranging
visits to prehistoric sites for her. Straus is convinced that prehistorians may
learn a lot from writers of paleofiction such as Auel or science writers such
as John Pfeiffer providing illuminating syntheses of research.59
6. Imagining the Flower Burial
Hollywood also took note of the enormous success of Auel’s paleofiction. In
1986 the movie The Clan of the Cave Bear directed by Michael Chapman and
starring Daryl Hannah as Ayla was shown on the big screen. The characters
communicate in some rudimentary language made comprehensible through
subtitles. Two key features from the original Solecki narrative in Auel’s adap-
tation reappear: the severely handicapped shaman Crab and the flower burial
of the medicine woman Iza. The flower burial is only a brief scene and unlike
in the novel Ayla is not shown as the one collecting the flowers.60
The movie is considered a failure, doing well neither at the box-office nor
with film critics who thought it predictable and unoriginal. As Roger Ebert
put it: “the actors are asked to play characters who are modern in everything
but dress and language. ... There is no sense of the alien and the unknown,
no sense that these people have ideas and feelings that would be strange to
us.”61 One film critic (in a much later review from 2012) even perceived a racist
or eugenic undertone. Blond and blue-eyed Ayla simply excels in everything
she is doing (Ebert had dubbed her “the first Rhodes Scholar”) while the Ne-
anderthals are portrayed as unable to evolve and thus, we may infer, were
doomed to go extinct.62
58 Speth, John D., “When Did Humans Learn to Boil?,” PaleoAnthropology, 2015: 54–67,
57. This method is common knowledge, as Speth points out, yet only Auel, The Clan,
81, makes the reference to prehistory.
59 Straus helped Pfeiffer gathering material for his book The Creative Explosion.
60 Michael Chapman, “The Clan of the Cave Bear,” (Warner Bros., 1986), 98 minutes. On
the movie see Ruddick, The Fire in the Stone, 91–92.
61 Ebert, Roger, “The Clan of the Cave Bear,” Chicago Sun-Times, 21 February 1986; also see
Maslin, Janet, “Screen: ‘Clan of the Cave Bear’,“ The New York Times, 17 January 1986.




Jean Auel herself hated the adaptation because she felt that the cinematic
adaptation of her first novel was highly inaccurate and too violent. She sued
the producers for 40 million dollars.63 Although initially planned, no second
part was made. Just a few years ago there was a new attempt to turn Auel’s
saga of The Clan of the Cave Bear into a TV series. A pilot was shot but never
screened and the project ended stillborn.64
The crucial importance of the visualization of early humans for both, the
general public but also for the researchers themselves, has been stressed re-
peatedly. Drawings, dioramas and full-body-reconstructions are “influential
documents which play a part in the shaping of archaeological debates”.65 The
strong impact of the flower burial on popular culture is also owed to the nu-
merous visual representations of it. The moving story required a moving im-
age.
Solecki’s book is well illustrated with photos and drawings but none of
these show the flower burial. Constable’s book from 1973 contains the first
visual depiction of the flower burial in the form of a large sketch across two
pages by Herb Steinberg. Origins (1977), the bestseller by Richard Leakey al-
ready mentioned, features another colorful rendering of the flower burial by
US artist Ronald Bowen, also spread over two pages. For Leakey the flower
burial is a fact, supporting his overall argument of the social and cooperative
nature of human beings (including their ancestral species).66
Many of the representations in 2D (books, magazines, video animations)
and 3D (dioramas in museums) accentuate the variety of colors of the flowers
and thus the inherent beauty of the act. What all the images have in common
is the solemnity of the burial, the seriousness of the Neanderthals bidding
farewell to the deceased member of their group. On some of the images the
mourning clan members embrace as each other in search for comfort. The
message is the same: these prehistoric beings are indeed fully human.
63 Ringle, “Jean M. Auel”.
64 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Clan_of_the_Cave_Bear#Film_and_television_ada
ptations (last accessed 5 February 2019) and personal communication by Lawrence G.
Straus and Jean Auel.
65 Moser, Stephanie, “The Visual Language of Archaeology: A Case Study of the Nean-
derthals,” Antiquity 66, 1992: 831–844, 831. Similarly Moser, Stephanie, “The Dilemma
of Didactic Displays. Habitats Dioramas, Life-Groups and Reconstructions of the Past.”
In Making Early Histories in Museums, edited by N. Merriman, London: Cassell, 1999,
95–116, 105.
66 Leakey and Lewin, Origins, 126–127.
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7. Serious doubts about the Flower Burial
“Solecki’s view of Neandertals as human, humane, compassionate, and caring
was accepted widely and with remarkably little demur ... Neandertals were
simply flower children under the skin.The skepticism came later”, wrote Erik
Trinkaus in 1993.67 In the meantime, the theory of the flower burial by Solecki
and Leroi-Gourhan is considered erroneous by most researchers. There has
been a number of alternative explanations for the large number of pollen in
the soil samples.
Thefirst substantial criticismwas published in 1989 in an article that ques-
tioned intentional Neanderthal burial tout court. With respect to the Shanidar
flower burial its author Robert Gargett alleged that wind or animals were the
far more likely agents to have introduced the pollen into the sediments of the
cave, accusing Solecki and Leroi-Gourhan more or less explicitly of wishful
thinking.68
In 1999, Jeffrey Sommer suggested that rodents actually were responsible
for the high concentration of pollen found by Solecki.69 Sommer referred to
the work of Richard Redding who had excavated a number ofMeriones crassus
andMeriones persicus (two species of Persian jirds, related to gerbils) from the
Zagros mountains, the region where also the Shanidar cave is located. These
rodents pack their burrows with flower heads and seeds. This would explain
the high number of pollen found by Leroi-Gourhan.Meriones persicus is known
to burrow down several meters and occupy the areas in front of caves as they
love the softer soil.70
The lack of access to the site until a few years ago made it difficult to
resolve the issue. Yet in recent years, excavations resumed and it was shown
that the sediments of Shanidar cave were indeed full of burrows. In 2015, a
“transect” of surface samples from inside and outside the cave was collected
and screened for pollen. The researchers suggested that bee-carried pollen
and wind-blown vegetation that had been covered up over the last 60,000
years were responsible for Leroi-Gourhan’s findings.71
67 Trinkaus and Shipman, The Neandertals, 341.
68 Gargett, “Grave Shortcomings”, 176.
69 Sommer, Jeffrey D., “The Shanidar IV ‘Flower Burial’: A Re-Evaluation of Neandertal
Burial Ritual,” Cambridge Archaeological Journal 9 (1), 1999: 127–129.
70 I thank Richard Redding for this information.
71 Fiacconi,Marta, and Chris O.Hunt, “Pollen Taphonomy at Shanidar Cave (Kurdish Iraq):
An Initial Evaluation,” Review of Palaeobotany and Palynology 223, 2015: 87–93.
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When confronted with the evidence questioning the flower burial in 2004,
Auel said: “That may be the case. But it’s nevertheless a good story.”72 It nearly
seems that the “good story” of the flower burial needs to be refuted over and
over again, both in the academic and in the public sphere. The Neandertal
Museum in Mettmann (Germany) for example does not display the flower
burial, but tongue-in-cheek shows a photo of Meriones persicus. The caption
of the photo explains that the rodent presumably introduced the pollen into
the grave.73
Nevertheless the flower burial is still on display in a number of muse-
ums such as the Gunma Museum of Natural History in Japan, that opened
in 1996.74 Ian Tattersall acted as scientific advisor for the artist Shuichiro
Narasaki. Nowadays the curators of the Gunma Museum are of course aware
of the fundamental critique of the hypothesis of the flower burial which they
share. In their tours of the exhibit they explain to the visitors that the diorama
does not represent anymore the scientific consensus but for the moment they
will maintain the diorama.75
The persistence of the story of the flower burial and its visual represen-
tation might be attributed to the powerful image it conveys (which makes it
attractive to museum curators.) As far as museum exhibits are concerned, it
also has to do with the inherent conservatism and thus long lives of these
costly exhibits.76
As recently as 2010 a representation of the flower burial was put on display
in the David-H.-Koch-Hall-of-Human-Origins of the Smithsonian National
Museum of Natural History in Washington.77 The diorama was produced by
artist Karen Carr under the scientific supervision of Richard Potts and Briana
Pobiner. The two paleoanthropologists from the Smithsonian maintain that
the hypothesis of Leroi-Gourhan can be defended against the criticism. The
Smithsonian was one of the main sponsors of the excavations in the 1950s,
so in a sense this exhibit on Shanidar documents its success. By the way:
72 Husemann, Dirk, Die Neandertaler. Genies der Eiszeit, Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2005,
20.
73 Personal communication, Bärbel Auffermann, Neandertal MuseumMettmann.
74 The diorama is reprinted in Tattersall and Schwartz, Extinct Humans, 216.
75 Personal communication.
76 Moser, “The Dilemma,” 111.
77 Edwards, Owen, “The Skeletons of Shanidar Cave,“ Smithsonian Magazine, March
2010. http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/the-skeletons-of-shanidar-cave-
7028477/?no-ist=
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The Smithsonian is the only institution outside Iraq that holds some of the
Neanderthal fossils found by Solecki and his team: Shanidar III. This partial
skeleton has a different story to tell: a rib injury caused by a thrown spear.
Thus Shanidar III is on occasion labeled the “first murder”.78 This constitutes
another potential story-line with popular appeal, addressing the issue of in-
terpersonal violence and its long prehistory.79
While the flower burial of Shanidar IV has been by and large discarded the
story of Shanidar I has rather gained momentum in recent years. In a recent
study Trinkaus and Villotte showed that Shanidar I also must have had severe
hearing problemsmaking him evenmore vulnerable (and thus in need of even
more protection from the members of his group).80 The interpretation that
this individual was severely handicapped and could only reach an advanced
age because of the continuous help from member of his group as such has
never been questioned. Rather Shanidar I has become a crucial reference in
showing that early humans already felt and practiced compassion. Compas-
sion and related concepts such as empathy, altruism and social cohesion have
become a “trending topic” in the field of prehistory in recent years.81
In the meantime, other “famous invalids”, individuals with severe bodily
(and also mental) disabilities have joined Shanidar I. Some of these were far
older than the Neanderthal from Shanidar cave. To give but two examples: In
2005, David Lordkipanizde and his team published a paper on a skull found
at the site of Dmanisi in Georgia, dated at around 1.8 million years. The indi-
vidual had only one tooth left and had lived for many years after the loss of his
teeth. The researchers thus proposed that his group must have “prechewed”
his food for him.82
78 Churchill, Steven E. et al., “Shanidar 3 Neandertal Rib PunctureWound and Paleolithic
Weaponry,” Journal of Human Evolution 57 (2), 2009: 163–178.
79 For an earlier period see Sala, Nohemi et al., “Lethal Interpersonal Violence in theMid-
dle Pleistocene,” PLoS ONE 10 (5), 2015: e0126589.
80 Trinkaus, Erik, and Sébastien Villotte, “External Auditory Exostoses and Hearing Loss
in the Shanidar 1 Neandertal,” PLoS ONE 12 (10), 2017: e0186684.
81 For a comprehensive synthesis going well beyond HOR see Spikins, Penny A., How
Compassion Made Us Human. The Evolutionary Origins of Tenderness, Trust and
Morality, Havertown: Pen& Sword Books Ltd, 2015. Critical discussion in Spikins, Penny
et al., “Calculated or Caring? Neanderthal Healthcare in Social Context,”World Archae-
ology 50 (3), 2018: 384-403.
82 Lordkipanidze, David et al., “The Earliest Toothless Hominin Skull,” Nature 434, 2005:
717–718.
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In 2009, the Atapuerca research team published the skull of a young
individual from the Sima de los Huesos in Northern Spain, approximately
400,000 years old.83 It suffered from a rare disorder called craniosynostosis
that causes a premature fusion of one of the sutures of the skull and hence
deformed it in the growth process. Not only was her face disfigured, it is also
most likely that she was developmentally disabled. The researchers argued
that groupmembersmust have cared deeply for the little creature—otherwise
it would have never reached the age of approximately ten years. To make their
interpretation palpable they baptized the individual Benjamina, the “loved
child”. Lead researcher Ana Gracia admitted that there is no way of proving
that the group members actually loved her, or even that the individual was
actually a female.84 As part of the press release of their scientific article,
the Atapuerca research team provided a reconstruction of Benjamina’s pre-
sumed appearance. The intention to tell a moving story of a handicapped but
beloved girl proved highly successful judging from the enormous echo of the
discovery in the Spanish press. The central message of the coverage was that
already back then human beings cared deeply for the members of their social
group.85 In a sense, they were already fully human—an argument very much
in line with Solecki’s Shanidar. The First Fower People.
8. Conclusion
That the field of HOR is characterized by specific narrative structures was
first forcefully suggested by Misia Landau. In her book Narratives of Human
Evolution, she argues that in these narratives human evolution (within a given
variation of possible sequences) is told as the long and arduous but ultimately
successful and heroic journey of “man” becoming “himself”.86 At the center of
Landau’s study are two authors from the first third of the twentieth century,
Arthur Keith and Grafton Elliot Smith. Their interest was primarily of phylo-
83 Gracia, Ana et al., “Craniosynostosis in theMiddle PleistoceneHuman Cranium 14 from
the Sima de los Huesos, Atapuerca, Spain,” Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America 106, 2009: 6573–6578.
84 Corbella, Josep, “Ley de dependencia en Atapuerca,” La Vanguardia, 31 March 2009, 25.
85 Hochadel, “Spain’s Magical Mountain,” 469–470.
86 Landau, Misia, Narratives of Human Evolution, New Haven/London: Yale University
Press, 1991.
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genetic nature. In their (implicitly teleological) schemes of human evolution
“man” is rather a general, an abstract entity.
The narratives of Ralph Solecki (and later on of Donald Johanson andmany
others) in their popular science books are of a different nature. Their protag-
onists are concrete individuals: Shanidar I, Shanidar IV or Lucy. The stories
of these creatures—as they were deciphered by the paleoanthropologists, ar-
chaeologists and palynologists—were written onto their fossilized remains or
found in the pollen around them.
The focus on individuals fundamentally changes the story-telling in HOR.
Taking Solecki’s Shanidar. The First Flower People as point of departure this ar-
ticle has traced the productive interaction between archaeological research
and popular culture. From the flower burial (Shanidar IV) and the severely
handicapped old man (Shanidar I) a rich cosmos of intriguing narratives and
powerful images emerged.These were adapted and transformed to be used in
different media and for different audiences. The paleofiction of Jean Auel, in
particular her first novelThe Clan of the Cave Bear, was key in spreading these
stories. New elements or story-lines were added, for example the gender issue
through the character of the female hero Ayla. More recently the topics com-
passion and empathy have gained prominence both in the academic and the
popular sphere showing once more how closely these two spheres are inter-
connected. Other narratives got lost. In George Constable’s book of 1973, the
Iraqi Kurds are still present through Solecki’s photos that were reproduced.
But in the subsequent adaptations and streamlining of the narrative the sub-
stantial anthropological part of Shanidar. The First Flower People disappeared
completely.
Narratives do not appear out of nothing but are often antitheses to already
existing and thus competing story-lines. In HOR they address fundamental
questions such as human nature. As we have seen, Solecki’s proposal of deeply
humane Neanderthals was meant to reverse the image of a brute and primi-
tive creature that prevailed at the time. In a much more implicit way Solecki
(and later on other researchers such as Richard Leakey in Origins87) also ar-
gued against the idea of man as inherently aggressive and prone to kill. This
notion, very much a child of the immediate post-WWII-era, was forcefully
87 Ruddick, The Fire in the Stone, 85.
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proposed by Raymond Dart in the 1950s, and also strongly reverberated in the
popular sphere, dubbed the killer-ape theory.88
Although phylogenetic questions remain important the research focus in
HORhaswidened considerably since themid-twentieth century.Reconstruct-
ing the behavior, the social world including the natural environment of our
ancestors have become the main focus point of prehistoric research. In order
to answer these new questions HOR became a highly interdisciplinary field,
starting in the 1950s and 1960s.
It was not least these changes in the disciplinary set-up of HOR that al-
lowed for the construction of new stories.The crucial role of palynology in the
genesis of the flower burial story illustrates this very well (but see below). As
mentioned earlier in this article: More recently the analysis of ancient DNA
provides new narratives: the Neanderthal lives now in us.89 These stories are
again quite different to the ones emerging from fossils and pollen.90 In nar-
rative terms this implies a change of the protagonist. These stories are again
more “universal” reconstructing the fates of entire populations or species.
But once more the driving question is to find the differences between Ne-
anderthals and ourselves, i.e. what makes us distinct. The latest attempt in
this respect is the growing of “miniature brains” from Neanderthal DNA in
order to detect significant differences in the brain structure between us and
them.91 The enormous narrative potential of these most recent advances in
paleogenetics for paleofiction is obvious.92
88 See e.g. Weidman, Nadine, “Popularizing the Ancestry of Man: Robert Ardrey and the
Killer Instinct,” Isis 102 (2), 2011: 269–299.
89 Bösl, Elsbeth, Doing Ancient DNA: ZurWissenschaftsgeschichte der aDNA-Forschung,
Bielefeld: transcript, 2017. Dobson Jones, Elizabeth, The search for ancient DNA. In
themedia limelight: A case study of celebrity science, PhD, University College London,
2017.
90 For the narrative potential of these “genetic stories”more broadly, in particular with re-
spect to the field of population genetics see thework of Sommer,Marianne, “History in
the Gene: Negotiations betweenMolecular and Organismal Anthropology,” Journal for
the History of Biology 41 (3), 2008: 473–528, 476, and Sommer, HistoryWithin, chapter
14: “The Genographic Network: Science, Markets, and Genetic Narratives.”
91 Cohen, Jon, “Exclusive: Neanderthal ‘Minibrains’ Grown in Dish,” Science News,
20 June 2018; http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/06/exclusive-neanderthal-mini-
brains-grown-dish.
92 See for example the novel by Cameron, Claire, The Last Neanderthal, New York: Little,
Brown and Company, 2017.
The Flower People of Shanidar 121
In all these story lines the comparison of Neanderthals and Homo sapiens
is key. The quest of Solecki and other researchers to humanize Neanderthals
renders the question in how far we differ from them even more pressing.
The two species can only be understood as a histoire croisée. As paleoanthropo-
logists such as Milford Wolpoff and Rachel Caspari succinctly put it: Nean-
derthals “are at the root of how Western science defines humanity; they are
the ‘other’ to which humanity is compared: they are what a ‘modern human’
is not.”93 Paleofiction as a genre may be particularly apt in this respect, be-
cause it is at complete liberty to “analyze” the differences between both human
species.
Clearly, there aremore stories out there about the Shanidar Neanderthals,
on which this article barely touched upon. One of these stories is an “inter-
nal” one and concerns the status of palynology within the field of HOR. The
discipline of palynology originated in the early twentieth century in order to
analyse the deposition of pollen in specific environments. Yet until the work of
Leroi-Gourhan it had been applied only to “natural environments”, e.g. dried-
out lakes.Her seminal paper on the pollen found in the sediments of Shanidar
IV in 1968 dealt with a “human environment”, the Shanidar cave. The impact
of the paper that led to Solecki’s hypothesis of the flower burial was consid-
erable, also because it raised the status of the palynology as a discipline by
showing its potential in reconstructing the prehistoric world. Arlette Leroi-
Gourhan created her own school at her laboratory at the Musée de l’Homme
in Paris. Yet her approach to analyse the sediments of caves (in Shanidar and
elsewhere) has been severely criticized mostly by Anglo-American scholars.94
Because human agency severely disturbs the sediments containing the pollen
the method may only applied, as before, to natural, i.e. untouched environ-
ments. Yet the jury of what palynology might be able to achieve and what not
is still out there. Among Leroi-Gourhan’s mostly French students the flower
93 Wolpoff and Caspari, Race andHuman Evolution, 270; already quoted byDe Paolo, Hu-
man Prehistory, 144. Many historians of science have made the same point: see Som-
mer, TheNeandertals, 139–140. Schweighöfer, Ellinor, VomNeandertal nachAfrika.Der
Streit um den Ursprung der Menschheit im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen: Wall-
stein, 2018, 119, 130, 140.
94 E.g. Turner, C. and G.E. Hannon, “Vegetational Evidence for Late Quaternary Climatic
Changes in Southwest Europe in Relation to the Influence of theNorth Atlantic Ocean,”
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B 318, 1988: 451–485.
122 Oliver Hochadel
burial is still cited as a towering achievement in articles that were published
years after the fundamental criticisms cited above.95
Another issue this article did not pursue is the appropriation of the finds
among the Kurdish population of the region. Graeme Barker, an archaeolo-
gist of the University of Cambridge, excavating in Shanidar since 2014, said
in an interview: “… in Kurdish society there is general awareness that they
have this incredibly important, very early site with Neanderthals.They’re very
proud of Shanidar. A local society a few years ago put money into making the
site accessible: it has got a Peshmerga guard, car parking, information pan-
els, steps up to the site, and picnic places. When the weather is good in the
spring, on Fridays and Saturdays there are usually large numbers of Kurdish
visitors.”96 A bust of Ralph Solecki outside the cave commemorates the dis-
coverer of Shanidar.
In January 2019, at the University of Cambridge, British and Iraqi re-
searchers met at a symposium entitled “Neanderthal Notions of Death and
its Aftermath: The Contribution of New Data from Shanidar Cave”. Surely,
there are more stories about the Shanidar Neanderthals in store.
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Narrating and Comparing in the Organization of
Research Projects
Rebecca Mertens
Comparisons are ubiquitous in the history of political thought, in the arts and
in the sciences. They seem crucial to our understanding of the cultural and
natural world as well as to the establishment of social norms.1 Doing compar-
ison is here understood as an activity which is always situated within cultural
practices, enforcing certain ways of comparing and suppressing others. At the
same time, these practices lead to the dominance of particular comparisons
over others and may thereby strongly shape social discourses, as the recent
example of public communication in the case of the coronavirus pandemic
shows.2 Studying how doing comparisons influences social life thus means
to gain more information about the processes which are initiated, altered
or stabilized by the use of comparison in particular contexts, e.g. in politi-
cal conflicts, in the development of economic markets, or in the making and
professionalization of art and science. The study of the practices of compari-
son should also allow us to gain further knowledge about the ways in which
1 Epple, Angelika, andWalter Erhart, “DieWelt beobachten. PraktikendesVergleichens.”
In Die Welt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, edited by A. Epple and W. Erhardt,
Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2015, 7f.
2 Apart from daily comparisons between the dimension of the pandemic in different
countries, including infection and mortality rates, the coronavirus pandemic has re-
cently been compared to the 1918 flu pandemic in the German public press. Similar
to former public displays of pandemic prevention in Germany and in the US, this his-
torical comparison has been used to communicate future risks and the necessity of
prevention policies. See i.e. Der Spiegel “Wenn die zweite Welle kommt,” 24.04.2020;
Tagesspiegel, “DieMutter dermodernen Pandemien. Coronavirus und Spanische Grip-
pe im Vergleich,” 20.03.2020. For a detailled analysis of the role of historical compa-
risons and narratives in pandemic prevention discourses, see Rengeling, David, Vom
geduldigen Ausharren zur allumfassenden Prävention. Grippe-Pandemien im Spiegel vonWis-
senschaft, Politik und Öffentlichkeit, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017.
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comparing is related to other social, epistemic or cultural activities like so-
cial networking, the introduction of new cultural and scientific techniques,
as well as categorization and standardization, to name just a few. This pa-
per contributes to the explication and historical reconstruction of practices
of comparison in the mid-20th century by analyzing how doing comparison
has affected the social structure and development of research projects in the
context of the biochemical sciences in the United States. So far, the role of
comparison in scientific project organization is more or less a blind spot in
the history and philosophy of science.
The role of comparison in project organization and development will
be examined by means of a historical case study on collaborative research
projects that were conducted in the 1940s and 50s between the departments
of biology and chemistry at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech).
Throughout the study, it will become clear that the comparisons made in
the realm of project organization were placed within a particular semantic
and narrative context, created in the process of proposal and report writing,
professional correspondence between scientists and research managers and
science popularizing activities. In fact, I will argue that comparisons drawn
between different research areas and their objects of study at Caltech gained
their validation and their persuasive power from project organization narratives.
This case, then, gives us the possibility to locate practices of comparing and
narrating in scientific and science policy discourses in the US during the
Second World War and throughout the Cold War period. What is more,
the case shows that scientific popularization, public relations work and
grant management are in fact closely related practices which provide and
instantiate instruments and narratives for the development of research in
the 20th century.3
3 Recent studies in the philosophy and sociology of scientific practice support the idea
that the success and relevance of cross-disciplinary research projects depend in many
ways on the ability of scientists to perform a variety of activities across different con-
texts and to connect them. These studies focus on the connections of different prac-
tices in the development of scientific projects, programs, disciplines and infrastruc-
tures, studying the dynamics these interrelations of practices invoke on scientific and
social change. For the cognitive and social affordances on interdisciplinary science or-
ganization and change, see e.g., Andersen, Hanne, “Collaboration, interdisciplinarity,
and the epistemology of contemporary science,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Sci-
ence 56, 2016: 1-10, aswell asNersessian, Nancy J., andMcLeod,Miles, “Interdisciplinary
problem-solving: emerging modes in integrative system biology,” European Journal for
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1. Funding strategies and research cooperation in the early
20th century
Philanthropic foundations played a central role in the growth of large-scale
research programs in the US in the first half of the 20th century. Especially
the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) had its share in the development of the ex-
perimental sciences and in the rising popularity of molecular approaches in
biology and biomedicine.4 During the 1920s and early 1930s, the RF re-orga-
nized its “system of patronage,”5 focusing on individual project grants in se-
lected scientific areas rather than on entire institutions. Projects which qual-
ified for support were supposed to contribute “in a basic and important way
to mankind,” they further had to be “sufficiently developed to merit support,
but so imperfectly developed as to need it.”6 By applying these selection cri-
teria, the RF hoped to “play a critical role in producing and stimulating de-
velopment that otherwise would not occur within reasonable time.”7 Another
aspect of the new system was the authority and responsibility of the division
officers over the general program, the choice of research topics, and individ-
ual grantees. This required experience and training in the respective fields
Philosophy of Science 6(3), 2016: 401-418. The role of knowledge implementation in the
expansion and “re-situation” of research projects has recently been elucidated by Me-
unier (See Meunier, Robert, “Project Knowledge and its Re-situation in the Design of
Research Projects,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2018, ISSN: 0039-
3681, accessed May 2020, https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/studies-in-history-
and-philosophy-of-science-part-a/articles-in-press). Ankeny and Leonelli introduced
the term of “research repertoires” to grasp the social and epistemic activities involved
in successful research development and organization in the late 20th century. Such
“repertoires“ can be characterized as ways of making intended research performances
work, including a very diverse set of material as well as conceptual components and
activities, and most importantly the ability of scientists and science managers to suc-
cessfully combine them. See Ankeny, Rachel, and Leonelli, Sabrina, “Repertoires: A
post-Kuhnian perspective on scientific change and collaborative research,” History and
Philosophy of Science 60, 2016: 18-28.
4 Kohler, Robert E., Partners in Science. Foundations and Natural Scientists, 1900-1945,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992, 233-303.
5 Kohler, Partners in Science, 231.
6 Rockefeller Foundation. The Natural andMedical Science Cooperative Program, December
13, 1933, 4, 100 Years: The Rockefeller Foundation, accessed May 4, 2020, https://
rockfound.rockarch.org/digital-library-listing/-/asset_publisher/yYxpQfeI4W8N/
content/the-natural-and-medical-sciences-cooperative-program.
7 Rockefeller Foundation. The Natural and Medical Science, 4f.
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of research as much as the ability to identify potential scientific trends and
communities.8WarrenWeaver, a former mathematician who became head of
the RF’s natural science division in 1932, used these new possibilities to pro-
mote physical and chemical approaches in application to biology.9 Shortly af-
ter Weaver joined the RF as their natural science officer, the division settled a
new program, focusing on the relations between biology and the medical sci-
ences as well as on behavioral biology and psychology. The “Science of Man,”
as Weaver called the new field that ought to be developed by the help of the
Foundation, aimed to unlock the basics of human behavior; “man’s conceiv-
ing, child-bearing, thinking, behaving, growing and finally dying.”10 Key to
this approach was the increasing support of research along the lines of neu-
rophysiology as well as research in chemistry and physics in relation to biolog-
ical problems, including “nutrition, radiation physics, chemical embryology,
genetics, physiology, and biochemistry.”11 In the early and mid-20th century,
Caltech became one of the most attractive scientific institutes for the RF as
part of their funding program in the field of “experimental” and “molecular bi-
ology.”During this time the RF significantly supported research in biology and
chemistry at Caltech, beginning withThomasHuntMorgan’s work in genetics
and Linus Pauling’s research on the physico-chemical structure of proteins.12
Especially in the latter case, the Foundation’s agenda in the advancement of
interdisciplinary research shaped the general scope of research projects car-
ried out under the supervision of Pauling and his collaborators. As for the
implications of these interrelations for the development of molecular biol-
ogy in the United States, there are many informative and profound historical
studies on this episode, including Kay’s canonical study on Caltech’s role in
8 Kohler, Partners in Science, 234f.
9 Kohler, Partners in Science, 265
10 Weaver, Warren. “The Science of Man,” November 29, 1, 100 Years: The Rockefeller
Foundation, accessed May 4, 2020, https://rockfound.rockarch.org/digital-library-lis-
ting/-/asset_publisher/yYxpQfeI4W8N/content/the-science-of-man. Kay identifies the
“genetic control of human behavior” as a dominant theme in the American eugenics
discourse of the 1930s. Kay, Lily E., The Molecular Vision of Life: Caltech, The Rockefeller
Foundation, and the Rise of the New Biology, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1993, 39.
11 Rockefeller Foundation. The Natural and Medical Science, 4.
12 Abir-Am, Pnina, “TheRockefeller Foundation and theRise ofMolecular Biology,”Nature
Reviews—Molecular Cell Biology 3, 2002: 65-70.
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the foundational period of molecular biology,13 as well as Abir-Am’s studies on
the power structure of the RF,14 and Robert Kohler’s work on the development
of philanthropic organizations in the United States.15 The aim of the present
study thus cannot be to re-write these histories of the early beginnings of
molecular biology. Rather, I will take a closer look at the ways in which the
biochemical research program around Linus Pauling at Caltechwas organized
by means of comparison, particularly within the writing of proposals and in
related practices, such as public-relations work and social networking. It will
be shown that the continuing and growing influence of the RF supported a
specific way of research collaboration at Caltech that was driven by the use of
comparison between the domains of protein chemistry, immunology, embry-
ology, and genetics. I will further argue that the successful use of comparison
(between research domains and phenomena) in the context of grant man-
agement depended in many ways on the development of what can be called
project organization narratives and their oscillation between the context of
grant management, public relations and science popularization.16
1.1 Research on the structure of biologically significant
macromolecules
Linus Pauling’s chemistry- and physics-driven research on the structure of bi-
ologically significant substances was continuously supported with RF grants
13 Kay, Lily E., “Molecular Biology and Pauling’s Immunochemistry: A Neglected Dimen-
sion,”History andPhilosophy of the Life Sciences 11(2), 1989: 211-219. See aswell Kay,Molec-
ular Vision.
14 Abir-Am, Pnina, “The Biotheoretical Gathering, transdisciplinary authority and the in-
cipient legitimation of molecular biology in the 1930s. New perspectives on the his-
torical sociology of science,” Journal of the History of Science 25, 03/1987: 1-70. Abir-Am,
Pnina, “Molecular Biology in the context of British, French, and American cultures,” In-
ternational Social Science Journal 168, 2001: 187-199, andAbir-Am, Pnina, “TheRockefeller
Foundation and the Rise.”
15 Kohler, Partners in Science.
16 Approaching the sociology of science popularization from the perspective of discourse
theory, GregMyers definedpopularization as a “continuum” of “differentways of speak-
ing for different rhetorical purposes.” In this understanding, popularizing statements
and narratives are not bound to specific genres. They actually appear in almost any sci-
entific genre, be it grant proposals, scientific journal articles, research reports, or au-
tobiographies. See Myers, Greg, “Discourse studies of scientific popularization: ques-
tioning the boundaries,” Discourse Studies 5(2), 2003: 265-279, on p. 270.
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during the following decades.17 At first, Pauling directed his attention to the
chemical structure of proteins, such as insulin and hemoglobin, in relation to
medical problems.18 In the late 1930s, he began to work on antibodies and on
the mechanism of their formation; this was part of the larger project on pro-
teins of biological and medical relevance. Pauling contributed to the already
nourishing field of immunochemistry with his “template theory” of antibody
formation. It explained the process by which normal globulins were turned
into specific antibodies, that is, into substances that could selectively react
with certain antigens and prevent infection.19 The “template-theory” focused
on the complementary relationship between two immunologically effective
chemical agents, the antigen and the antibody, and aimed to provide an an-
swer as to how the antibody could react in a complementary manner with the
respective antigen in terms of chemical and physical forces. The concept of
complementarity hitherto played an important role in late 19th century stere-
ochemistry and immunology, i.e., in Paul Ehrlich’s side-chain theory of im-
munity.20 In the context of the side-chain theory, however, ideas on comple-
mentarity on the molecular level were embedded in a broader framework of
normal and pathological cellular processes and linked to assumptions about
the origins of antibodies within the living organism. According to this the-
ory, antibodies were formed by receptors formerly involved in normal, that
is, non-pathological, cellular processes and would then link themselves to the
respective antigen and neutralize its harming effects due to their matching
chemical configuration.21 In the 1920s and 30s, Ehrlich’s model of the anti-
body-antigen reaction wasmodified and interpreted in the light of new quan-
titative chemical methods for the study of macromolecules. Amongst others,
Michael Heidelberger, StuartMudd, Friedrich Breinl, and Felix Haurowitz de-
veloped so-called “instructive” theories of antibody-formation, proposing that
antibodies were products of a process of chemical transformation, induced
17 See Kay,Molecular Vision, 143f.
18 See Strasser, Bruno, “Sickle Cell Anemia, a Molecular Disease,” Science 286 (5444), 1999:
1488-1490, on p. 1488.
19 Pauling, Linus, “A theory of the structure and process of antibody formation,” Journal of
the American Chemical Society 62(10), 1940: 2643-2657.
20 See Cambrosio, Alberto, et al., “Arguing with images: Pauling’s Theory of Antibody for-
mation,” Representations 89(1), 2005: 94-130, on p. 108.
21 Ehrlich, Paul, “On Immunity with Special Reference to Cell Life,” Proceedings of the Royal
Society of London 66, 1900: 424-448.
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by the presence of an antigen.22 Pauling developed this idea further and pro-
posed a detailed stereochemical mechanism by which a chain of normal glob-
ulin folded into a structure that was complementary to the antigen; a process
which was initiated by the close physical approximation of the globulin and
the antigen.23
Pauling’s immunochemical research was especially appealing for the RF
and for Caltech’s public image in the 1940s for two reasons: First, it provided
a role model for one of the major goals of the RF with respect to the de-
velopment of the natural sciences in the US, namely, the successful applica-
tion of physical methods and theories to biological problems.24 Secondly, it
was closely related to the possibility and the promise of synthetic antibody
production, which was not only a general concern of human wellbeing and
health but also ultimately connected to war efforts. It is thus not surprising
that the governmental Office of Scientific Research andDevelopment (OSRD),
as well as the RF and other funding organizations with an interest in the ad-
vancement of biomedical research, such as the Foundation for Infantile Paralysis,
strongly supported the expansion of antibody research throughout the early
and mid-1940s.25 Yet, as Kay notes, the focus on antibodies and immuno-
logical problems was in some way a deviation from the RF’s early molecular
biology program in the natural sciences which focused on the application of
physical methods to biology rather than on research with strong medical im-
plications.26
On a more theoretical level, Pauling’s work on antibodies contributed to
the generalization of claims concerning the physico-chemical interpretation
of specific macromolecular interactions active in living organisms. In several
articles and talks, Pauling argued for the general biological importance of
complementarity and complementary template construction.27 For instance,
22 Silverstein, Arthur M., A History of Immunology, Cambridge MA: Academic Press, 1989,
51f.
23 Linus Pauling et al., “The Nature of the Forces between Antigen and Antibody and of
the Precipitation Reaction,” Physiological Reviews 23(3), 1943: 203-219. For an overview
on Pauling’s work in the context of the debate on immunological specificity, see
Mazumdar, Pauline M.H., Species and Specificity. An Interpretation of The History of Im-
munology, Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 330ff.
24 Abir-Am, “Molecular Biology in the context,” 193.
25 Kay,Molecular Vision, 172.
26 Kay,Molecular Vision, 164.
27 See, for instance, Pauling, Linus, and Max Delbrück, “The Nature of Intermolecular
Forces operative in Biological Processes,” Science 92(2378), 1940: 77-79. Pauling, Linus,
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in his 1946 paper on “Molecular architecture and biological processes,” Pauling
pointed to the “very strong evidence that the specificity of the physiological
activity of substances is determined by the size and shape ofmolecules.” 28The
responsible mechanism underlying specific physiological processes was sup-
posedly the same found in the case of antibody formation. Hence, “the size
and shape find expression by determining the extent to which certain surface
regions of two molecules (at least one of which is usually a protein) can be
brought into juxtaposition—that is, the extent to which these regions of the
two molecules are complementary in structure.”29 Two years later, in a talk on
“Molecular Architecture and the Processes of Life” at the Sir Jesse Boot Foun-
dation in Nottingham,30 Pauling once again made a plea for the generality of
molecular surface complementarity, now directly referring to the possibility
of synthetic antibody production.The complementary concept thus may pro-
vide “an automatic method of producing a substance with a specific biological
property, that of combining with the molecules of the antigen.”31 The medi-
cal implications of Pauling’s ideas experienced a boost in popularity with his
research on the molecular causes of sickle cell anemia.32 In 1949, a research
group under Pauling, including the PhD candidate Harvey Itano, introduced
the concept of “molecular diseases,” suggesting that certain hereditary blood
“Molecular Architecture and the process of life,” 21st Sir Jesse Boot Foundation Lecture,
May 28, 1948,Nottingham, England (OSUSpecial Collections). Pauling, Linus, “Molecu-
lar Structure and Intermolecular Forces.” In The Specificity of Serological Reactions, edited
by K. Landsteiner, New York: Dover Publications, 1940, 275-293. For a more detailed
analysis of Pauling’s generalizing strategy, see Mertens, Rebecca, The Construction of
Analogy-Based Research Programs. The Lock-and-Key Analogy in 20th Century Biochemistry,
Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2019, 146-152.
28 Pauling, “Molecular architecture and biological processes,” 1376.
29 Ibid.
30 Pauling “Molecular architecture and the process of life,” 10.
31 Not only did Pauling use the analogy of antibody-antigen complementarity. He also
suggested a very specific mechanism of the general causes of physiological and bio-
logical processes, “one of moulding a plastic material, the coiling chain, into a die or
mould, the surface of the antigen molecule.” According to Pauling, this “same process
of moulding of plastic materials into a configuration complementary to that of an-
othermolecule, which serves as a template, is responsible for all biological specificity.”
Pauling, “Molecular Architecture and the process of life,” 10.
32 Strasser, Bruno, “Linus Pauling’s “Molecular Diseases”: between History and Memory,”
American Journal of Medical Genetics 115(2), 2002: 83-93, on p. 88f.
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diseases were caused by an anomaly of specific, regulatory macromolecules.33
They proposed that patients suffering from sickle cell anemia possessed an al-
tered hemoglobin which differed from normal hemoglobin with respect to its
electrophysical properties. In analogy to the case of antibody formation, the
authors proposed that the electrophysical alteration of sickle cell hemoglobin
was caused by a complementary interrelation between the globulin part of
the hemoglobin and another surface region of the same molecule. Due to this
complementarity, the sickle cell hemoglobin would fold into a different shape
than normal hemoglobin, causing the “sickling” of the blood cells.34 Pauling’s
attempts to generalize the concept of “molecular diseases” were scientifically
controversial but flourishing in post-war science policy and popularization.35
In the context of research organization at Caltech, however, Pauling’s general
claims about the molecular basis of biological and medical processes were
implemented within a large-scale research program, conducted by research
groups in the Biology and Chemistry Division between the early 1940s and
the late 1950s. Let us now take a closer look at how this implementation was
achieved.
2. Implementation of projects by means of comparison
From 1941 to 1944, Pauling intensified the collaboration between his research
group, working on “chemistry in relation to biological problems,”36 and sev-
eral groups in biology, including the geneticists Alfred Sturtevant and Sterling
Emerson, as well as the embryologist Albert Tyler. In November 1944, Frank
Blair Hanson, former president of the RF and then associative director of the
natural science division, encouraged Pauling to explicate the relations of his
planned project on proteins and antibodies to the ongoing projects on im-
munological problems in embryology and serological genetics, conducted by
the geneticists Alfred Sturtevant and Sterling Emerson, as well as the em-
33 Pauling, Linus, et al., “Sickle cell anemia, a molecular disease,” Science 110(2865), 1949:
543-548.
34 Pauling, “Sickle cell,” 546f.
35 Kay,Molecular Vision, 258f.
36 Rockefeller Foundation, The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report 1942, 146.
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bryologist Albert Tyler.37 A couple of months later Pauling responded to Han-
son, pointing to the close connections of the previously mentioned research
projects with respect to “the great problem of the general structure of pro-
teins.”38 The first draft of an expanded, combined proposal was enclosed in a
letter toWeaver in December of 1945, asking for his recommendations prior to
the actual application. In this correspondence, the project was characterized
as “basic research on the great problems of biology,” made possible by “great
cooperation with the present activities carried out at the Institute.”39 This
coop-project, which was planned for the next two decades, aimed to establish
a connection between the fields of organic and biochemistry, immunology,
embryology, and genetics and their objects of study. In relation to Pauling’s
former research on the chemical structure of proteins and his immunochemi-
cal work on antibodies, it provided a unified account on problems of biological
significance.40 Crucial for the collaboration on the proposal level was the the-
oretical and semantic integration of projects involved, such as immunochem-
istry, enzymology, serological and developmental genetics as well as chemical
embryology. The biology department contributed to the larger project with
an integrated proposal for a sub-project in “Serological Genetics and Em-
bryology.”41 This project was sketched as one “of wide scope,” promising “the
possible discovery of concepts of broad biological significance” which should
constitute a new field of research, centered around the presence of “comple-
mentary substances” active in living organisms.42 The proposed studies were
based on several assumptions concerning the feature of biological processes
involved, similar to the ones pointed out by Pauling in the previously men-
tioned articles on the role of specificity and surface complementarity in bio-
logical processes. Claims of similarity between the fields of research involved
37 Letter from Hanson to Pauling, Nov. 24, 1944, OSU Special Collections, Linus Pauling
and the Structure of Proteins, accessedMay 2020, http://scarc.library.oregonstate.edu/
coll/pauling/proteins/corr/sci14.039.2-lp-hanson-19450305-01.html.
38 Letter from Pauling to Hanson, March 5, 1945, OSU Special Collections, accessed
May 2020, http://scarc.library.oregonstate.edu/coll/pauling/proteins/corr/sci14.039.2-
lp-hanson-19450305.html.
39 Letter from Pauling to Weaver, December 4, 1945, OSU Special Collections, accessed
May 2020, http://scarc.library.oregonstate.edu/coll/pauling/proteins/corr/sci14.039.3-
lp-weaver-19451204.html.
40 See KayMolecular Vision, 173.
41 Program Outline on Serological Genetics and Embryology, 1946, Caltech Archives, Bi-
ology Division, Box 62, Folder 13.
42 Ibid., “Introduction,” 1.
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were made on the level of phenomenological similarities in the biological pro-
cesses under study which, according to the proposal, all “involved reactions in
which the components exhibit varying degrees of specificity of interaction.”43
This is especially striking for the depiction of Sterling Emerson’s and Alfred
Sturtevant’s project outline on “genic relationships,” induced by mutations in
themodel organismNeurospora, claiming for a “common structural basis un-
derlying the specificities of genes and antigens.”44According to Tyler and his
group, their research on embryological fertilization in marine eggs involved
“primarily the specific interacting substances of eggs and sperms”which were
further described as “two complementary substances, one on the surface (the
gelatinous coat), the other below the surface of the same cell, that are capable
of interaction.” 45 They continued that the “presence of two such complemen-
tary substances implies that there may very well be more” and that the cell
might be “constructed of a mosaic of substances that are pair-wise or multi-
wise complementary.”46 Common to all outlines of the sub-projects involved
was further the tendency to depict research activities with the terminology of
“antibody-antigen” interrelations.47 As I have shown elsewhere inmore detail,
the understanding of intermolecular interactions as “antibody-antigen-like”
was supported by the increasing influence of the “lock-and-key analogy of en-
zyme-substrate relations” and its application to immunological problems in
the first half of the 20th century.48 The Caltech group, however, explicated the
assumptions formerly only vaguely suggested by the analogy.Thus, at the be-
ginning of the proposal, it was already stated that the planned projects in the
realm of Serological Genetics and Embryology should be developed from the
“general point of view” that “some of the fundamental problems” in this field
“are those characterized by reaction specificities analogous to those exhibited
in the typical antigen-antibody reaction of immunology.”49 The common fea-
ture of the studies involved was thus the characterization of “the underlying
reactions … by a fitting together of the components by complementary sur-
face configurations, as exemplified in the antigen-antibody reaction.”50These
43 Ibid., “Introduction,” 2.
44 Ibid., “chapter B.1.”
45 Program Outline on Serological Genetics and Embryology, 1946, “chapter A.1.”
46 Ibid.
47 Mertens, The construction, 158-165.
48 Ibid., Chapters 3 and 4.
49 Program Outline on Serological Genetics and Embryology, 1946, “Introduction,” 2.
50 Ibid.
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claims of similarity shaped the very organizational structure of the project
outline, as shall be once more exemplified by the following excerpt of the list
of projects and themes involved:
“Outline of projects
• A. Embryological relationships
1. Fertilization […]
2. Cell Structure and development as related to complementary sub-
stances […]
• B. Genic relationships
1. Induction of specific mutations by antibodies (see also E.1.) […]
2. Induction of specific mutations by substrates […]
3. Specific mutation in phage by renaturation on cell surface
• C. Enzymic relationships
1. of specific enzymes as immediate gene products
• D. Competitive reactions
1. As an interpretation of dominant and recessive alleles controlling iden-
tical reactions
2. As related to specificities of adaptive reactions
• E. Gene controlled antigens
1. Erythrocyte antigens and controlled mutation (see B.1.)
2. Studies resembling Irwin’s on dove hybrids
• F. Tissue Specificities
1. Tissue transplants and tumor development and specificity
2. Erythroblast transplantation (related to A.1.e.)
• G. Mechanism of antibody formation
1. Antibody structure as evidenced by univalent antibodies
2. Search for natural anti-globulin at site of antibody synthesis […]
• H. Comparative immunology
1. Antibody formation in invertebrates […]
2. Comparison of the complements of different classes of vertebrates […]
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• J. Population serology
1. Distribution of blood groups […]
2. Phylogenetic relationships in natural antibodies
• K Relations to structure and behavior of chromosomes and genes.
1. Immunological interpretation of synapsis and crossing-over
2. Opportunities for “physiological cytology.”51
The integrative approach was successful; in 1948 Caltech received a seven-year
grant ($700,000) from the RF in order to expand their program in biochem-
istry and molecular biology. In the following years, the conceptual framework
of surface complementarity andmutually complementary substances affected
primarily the research community in immunology and embryology. In the do-
main of genetics and molecular biology, however, the concept was soon chal-
lenged by Watson’s and Crick’s work on nucleic acids and the increasing im-
portance of the concept of genetic information and sequence specificity.52 Yet,
even despite the fact that a large part of the proposed similarities between the
objects of research could not be proven throughout the 1940s, the cooporative
program between the two departments and the established connections be-
tween the fields of organic and physical chemistry, immunology, embryology,
and serological genetics continued to play an important role in the organiza-
tion of research at Caltech.53 In the early 1950s, a new interdisciplinary field
“Chemical Biology,” including “immunochemistry, molecular structure stud-
ies, animal virology, bacterial virology, immunogenetics, animal biochemistry
and neurophysiology,” was institutionalized at Caltech.54 In the vein of Van-
nevar Bush’s popular OSRD report “Science, the endless frontier,”55 Caltech’s
51 Program Outline on Serological Genetics and Embryology, 1946, 2.
52 Strasser, Bruno, “AWorld in oneDimension. Linus Pauling, Francis Crick and the Central
Dogma of Molecular Biology,” History and Philosophy of the Life Science 28(4) , 2006: 491-
512, here 503ff.
53 Kay,Molecular Vision, 238f.
54 Letter from L.A. Du Bridge to Ernest Allen, then head of theDivision of Research Grants
of the National Institutes of Health (Public Health Service), January 15, 1953, Caltech
Archives, Biology Division, Box 22, Folder 19. In this letter, Du Bridge, Caltech’s Pres-
ident from 1946 to 1969, informs Allen about the funds needed for new “medical re-
search facilities” for the construction “of a new laboratory of chemical biology” at Cal-
tech.
55 Bush, Vannevar, “Science—The Endless Frontier: A Report to the President on a Pro-
gram for Postwar Scientific Research,” Washington: National Science Foundation, 1945.
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newly established program in chemical biology was described as “basic re-
search” on macromolecular structures, promising systematic applications for
medical problems in the near future.56 By that time, the idea that all kinds of
phenomena in the living world could be linked by similarities on the macro-
molecular level was dominant and powerful in the American science policy
discourse.57 Caltech’s leadership took this idea to the next level, using Paul-
ing’s research on the molecular mechanism of sickle cell anemia to promote
the importance of research on macromolecular complementarity for medical
and pharmacological innovations.58 In 1951, George W. Gray, the established
science journalist and staff member of the RF, once more drew the atten-
tion to Pauling’s research on sickle cell anemia, pointing to its “far-reaching
implications” for innovations in the context of medical treatment and to the
“remarkably clear evidence … that life is basically an affair of molecules.”59
Strasser explains the enduring success and visibility of Pauling’s research on
sickle cell anemia until the present day by the development of different dis-
covery narratives, contextualizing the concept of molecular diseases for di-
verse scientific and public audiences.60 Throughout the second half of the
20th century, Pauling’s discovery was thus reconstructed by a plethora of sto-
ries which conveyed different narratives of why it was far-reaching in the first
place, pointing to various conditions for successful medical research, i.e., the
For a detailed study on the role of Bush’s report in the development of science pol-
icy in the US, see Strokes, Donald E., Pasteur’s Quadrant. Basic Science and Technological
Innovation, Washington D.C: Brookings, 1997. Schauz and Kaldewey recently pointed to
the integrative role of the concept of “basic research” in the post-war American science
and science policy discourse. Accordingly, the term blurred the former dichotomy of
“pure” and “applied” science, allowing scientists to emphasize the fundamental nature
and unpredictability of their research, while at the same time praising its importance
for social and especially medical progress. See Schauz, Desiree, and David Kaldewey,
“Transforming Pure Science into Basic Research: The language of science policy in the
US.” In Basic and Applied Research. The language of science policy in the 20th century, edited
by D. Schauz and D. Kaldewey, New York: Berghahn Books 2018, 104-142, on p. 123.
56 Lee Du Bridge, Caltech’s president from 1946 to 1969, announced the new program
and the construction plans for the NormanW. Church Laboratory of Chemical Biology
in January 1953. See the News Bureau of the California Institute of Technology, press
release, January 9, 1953, Caltech Archives, Biology Division, Box 22, Folder 19.
57 Abir-Am, Pnina, “The Politics of Macromolecules: Molecular Biologists, Biochemists,
and Rhetoric,” Osiris 7(2), 1992, 164-191.
58 Kay,Molecular Vision, 238f.
59 Gray, George W., “Sickle Cell Anemia,” Scientific American 185(2), 1951, 56-59, on p. 59.
60 Strasser, Bruno, “Linus Pauling’s ’molecular diseases,’” 84.
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financial support of clinical and interdisciplinary research, the “importance
of laboratory research” for medical progress, and the “molecular approach to
disease therapy.”61
3. Project organization narratives
As previously shown, comparing different biological processes and phenom-
ena was a crucial tool in substantiating possible relations between RF funded
projects at Caltech and their objects of research at the proposal level. These
comparisons, however, had to be convincing for the board of trustees involved
in the RF’s grant decision processes. In order to put Caltech’s projects in biol-
ogy and chemistry in the right position for extended support, the leading sci-
entists of the projects and especially the chairmen of the Biology and Chem-
istry Division had to maintain a continuous dialogue with the RF science of-
ficers, with whom they developed a successful grant management strategy.62
Both the RF’s officers and the scientists involved had to create a public im-
age of the respective projects, one that was compatible with current trends of
the Foundation and, most importantly, justifiable to the board of trustees.63
As will be shown, especially the RF annual reports provided a platform for
the Division officers to justify those projects that already had a history of RF
funding and to set the ground work for future support. These reports began
with a review of the Foundation’s president which could focus on scientific
breakthroughs and major investments, or on present social and political con-
texts. The main part of the reports was devoted to the description of projects
and fields of research supported under the respective divisions. At the end
of World War II, this structure provided a specific narrative context for the
depiction and design of post-war science from the Foundation’s perspective.
In 1946, the leading narrative of the President’s Review was one of “lost op-
portunities” and,most importantly, lost research goals. Imagining what could
have been achieved in biology and medicine if the war had not happened,64
the review served as an opener for a post-war program, incidentally mention-
ing those areas of research which were at the core of the following outline in
61 Ibid., 85f.
62 Kohler, Partners in Science, 2.
63 Ibid., 219.
64 Rockefeller Foundation: The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1946, 23f.
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“experimental biology”: lost opportunities therewith became future opportu-
nities.65 Another crucial narrative element was the opposition of war-science
and “basic science,” according to which war-related research lacked scientific
value with respect to epistemic novelty, relevance and openness of research
outcomes.66 The review ended with a plea for unity and collaboration across
cultural and scientific boundaries. “The challenge of the future” was thus “to
make this world one world—a world truly free to engage in common and
constructive intellectual efforts that will serve the welfare of mankind every-
where.”67 As for the specific descriptions of supported projects at Caltech, the
1946 report conveyed a story about scientific collaboration and similarities at
the level of immunochemical, genetic, and embryological phenomena.68 From
1941 to 1945, RF funded projects at Caltech were supported with smaller differ-
ent grants—there were, of course, connections between them, resulting from
the RF’s program in experimental biology, the institutional affiliation at Cal-
tech and their context of application, asmost of the scientists involved carried
out “war-related” research in immunology or serology.69 However, until the
mid-1940s, these projects were described as separate ones in the annual re-
ports of the RF, conducted either under the supervision of Pauling in the Gates
and Crellin Laboratories of Chemistry or under Sturtevant in the Kerckhoff
Laboratories of Biology.70 This changed in 1946, when the projects supported
at Caltech were sketched as a “program of combined research in the fields
of biology and chemistry,” dedicated to “such subjects as immunochemistry,
serological genetics, chemical genetics and X-ray structural chemistry.”71 In
65 Ibid.
66 More specifically,war-related researchwasdescribed as “drawingon the reserves of the
past,” “using up the supply of basic discoveries which an earlier generation has given
them,” and “digging recklessly into the stock pile of existing knowledge.” (Rockefeller
Foundation Annual Report, 1946, 23f.)
67 Ibid., 8.
68 As Kay points out, scientific collaboration has been an important goal of the RF’s pro-
gram in the natural sciences since the early 1930s and has been continuously promoted
since then. See Kay,Molecular Vision, 7.
69 Kay,Molecular Vision, 165.
70 Rockefeller Foundation: The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1945, 146f.
71 The respective passage goes as follows: “Work in immunochemistry has developed in
close relation to researches in serological genetics carried on by Professors A.H. Sturte-
vant, Albert Tyler and Sterling Emerson. Professor George V. Beadle has recently been
appointed head of the Division of Biology, where such studies are under way.Most bio-
logical processes involve reactions in which the components exhibit remarkable speci-
ficity, the best known being the antigen-antibody and enzyme-substrate interactions.
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the following two years, descriptions of the “combined” or “joint” program at
Caltech became a crucial part of the RF’s post-war program. The 1947 report
dedicated almost three pages to the Caltech group, quoting several extended
passages of Pauling’s popularizing talk on “Molecular Architecture and Bio-
logical Reactions.”72 The project description was full of generalizing claims
about the mechanism of surface complementarity, using Pauling’s theory of
the physico-chemical causes of antibody formation as a point of reference for
analogous claims concerning the causes of enzymatic, genetic, bacteriologi-
cal, embryological processes and drug action.73The common theoretical basis
and the possibility that it might reflect universal biological principles justified
a very broad and expensive long-term analysis of macromolecules involved in
various biological processes. Another aspect of the 1947 report worth noticing
was the emphasis on the program’s previous history and on the continuity
of RF support since 1940.74 The reconstruction of previous grants in terms of
Those fundamental problems of genetics and embryology which are characterized by
analogous reaction specificities are being studied under their program in serological
genetics.” (Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1946, 134.).
72 Pauling, Linus, “Molecular Architecture and Biological Reactions,” Biological Science
24(10), 1946, 1375-1377.
73 In the 1947 report, the research process of the Caltech group was reconstructed as fol-
lows: “Experimental work during the past few years has tended to substantiate the
findings of earlier investigators that the specific biological forces between antibodies
and antigens result from complementariness in structure, or the nearly exact fit be-
tween the surface configurations of the antibody molecule and the antigen. […]. It has
been possible to measure the closeness of the surface atoms of antigen and antibody
by several different methods, all of which show that the two surfaces are in contact
to within about one one-hundred millionth of a centimeter. Many other physiological
processes are similarly specific, and it seems likely that their specificity can be given
similar explanations. The action of enzymes, drugs and bactericidal substances, even
the highly specific power of self-reproduction shown by genes, probably have their ori-
gin in forces like those which bring about specificity in serological systems. Studies in
chemical embryology reveal that the processes of fertilization are very largely analo-
gous to those encountered in the field of immunology. For example, the engulfment of
sperm by the egg resembles the phagocytic processes studied by immunologists, and
specific substances obtained from eggs and sperm interact in the manner of antigen
and antibody. Complementariness in surface configuration of molecules is no doubt
involved in the activities of the thousands of genes that carry to us our inheritance
from our ancestors.” (Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1947, 142f.)
74 Rockefeller Foundation: The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1947, 142.
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long-term support played an even bigger role in 1948,75 when Caltech‘s “joint
chemistry-biology program” was provided with a $ 700,000 grant for the next
seven years.76 On the level of research organization and development, the re-
port descriptions increasingly emphasized the integrative nature of the pro-
gram between 1946 and 1948. For instance, in the president’s annual review of
1948, Caltech’s program was characterized in terms of “interrelated efforts of
physical and biological scientists to gain more precise information regarding
the nature and behavior of living matter,” realized by “two closely integrated
groups from theDivision of Biology and the Division of Chemistry and Chem-
ical Engineering.”77 The topic of research collaboration between the groups in
biology and chemistry already played an important role in the 1944 report on
RF supported projects in immunology.78 By 1946, however, cooperation was
repeatedly framed in terms of integration on the level of personnel, shared
goals and research problems.79 In 1948, the president’s review on “Problems
of Modern Society” even dedicated an entire chapter to the topic of “purpose-
ful and conscious collaboration,” distinguishing different national systems by
their collaborative techniques and values.80 A narrative was born according
75 Here, the RF re-called that it has “long given financial aid for these and other natural




78 In this context, Pauling’s and Sturtevant’s approaches were described as follows: “The
groups headed by these twomen are working cooperatively on different aspects of im-
munology. Each is attacking the subject on a broad and somewhat standard front of
research, from which important results are practically sure to come.” (Rockefeller Foun-
dation Annual Report, 1944, 166.)
79 Ibid., 134f.
80 Accordingly, systematic or “purposeful cooperation” depended “upon three broad es-
sentials: 1) Knowledge based on the experience of effective collaboration, involving
techniques ranging from simple group effort, business partnerships, corporate organi-
zation and community associations to local, regional, national and international politi-
cal systems, all interrelated and interdependent, 2) An attitude of tolerance notmerely
of opinion but also of diverse positions and interests which call formoderation in com-
petitive and combative efforts, 3) The will to cooperate, which implies an acceptance
of fundamental values overriding personal and group interests or the exigencies of the
moment''(The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1948, 21f.). The emphasis on cooper-
ation was not new for the RF; on the contrary, concepts of cooperation were developed
in the context of the evolving “political and economic ideology” after WorldWar I (See
Kay, Molecular Vision, 7). However, after World War II and with the increasing role of
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to which systematic integration and communication at the level of research
organization leads to the discovery of fundamental principles in the life sci-
ences. This narrative gained importance and was made visible via success
stories, told in Caltech’s press releases and in popularizing journal articles.
In 1948, after Pauling and his co-workers received the seven-year grant from
the RF, George W. Gray published a story about the Caltech group in Scientific
American, focusing on the encounter of the two leading scientists, Pauling and
GeorgeW.Beadle, the latter of whombecame chairman of the biology division
in 1946, and their respective strategies of research organization and collabora-
tion.81 The article focused on the scientific biographies of both men, the “bi-
ologically minded chemist” and the “chemically-minded geneticist,” leading
over to their “joint program of research on the fundamental problems of biol-
ogy and medicine.”82 In the same year, Scientific American published Weaver’s
essay on “Science and Complexity” which demarcated the complex problems
of 20th century science from those of the 18th and 19th century.83 The paper
further distinguished between problems of organized and disorganized com-
plexity, locating the former in biology, medicine and the social sciences and
the latter in the realm of 20th century physics and those branches that heav-
ily relied on statistical methods. According to Weaver, problems of organized
complexity posed the main challenge for modern science and society. Dealing
with them required novel methods of scientific inquiry and work organiza-
tion, the most important being “new types of electronic computing devices”
and the “mixed-team-approach,”84 both of which were presented as spin-offs
the RF as a player in national and international science policy, the concept of coop-
eration was linked to the idea of “basic science” and the flourishing “linear model of
innovation.” (See Kaldewey, David,Wahrheit und Nützlichkeit, Bielefeld: transcript Ver-
lag, 2013, 360-366.)
81 Gray, George W., “Pauling and Beadle,” Scientific American 180(5), 1949, 16-21.
82 Gray, “Pauling and Beadle,” 19.
83 Weaver, Warren, “Science and Complexity,” Scientific American 36(4), 1948, 536-545. The
essay was re-printed ten years later in the RF annual report 1958 as part ofWeaver’s re-
view “AQuarter Century in theNatural Sciences.” (Rockefeller FoundationAnnual Report,
1958, 7-15.)
84 In 1949, Weaver and the engineer Claude E. Shannon published “The Mathematical
Theory of Communications” at the University of Illinois Press, exploring the semantic
implications of the cybernetic concept of communication, information and coding and
their practical value for the sciences. (For a detailed analysis of this theory, see Kay,
Lily E., “Who wrote the book of life? Information and the Transformation of Molecular
Biology, 1945-55,” Science in Context 8(4), 1995, 609-634, on p. 622f.)
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of the cooperation between scientists and the military duringWorld War II.85
In the whole, the paper conveyed the message that the complex organization
of phenomena in the world could be tackled by a certain organization of re-
search practice—scientific problems were thus re-formulated as “problems of
strategy” that could ideally be solved by teams or “units” with diverse scien-
tific backgrounds.86 Texts like the onesWeaver and Gray published in Scientific
American supported the persuasion of what can be called project organization
narratives, linking a certain way of collaborative research organization to the
discovery of complex phenomena and making it seem self-evident and natu-
ral.
4. Conclusion: Comparison and narration in research
organization practice
Let us return to the question of why Caltech’s program in biology and chem-
istry was successful, especially on the level of grant application. Certainly,
Pauling’s “aggressive promotion of immunology as a joint venture” and more
generally the search for a flagship of America’s scientific advancement in the
context of the Cold War were decisive factors for the funding decisions of the
RF.87 The focus on the role of comparison and narration in research organi-
zation and specifically grant management practice, however, allows us now
to look more closely at the semantic dynamics and power relations involved
85 Weaver, “Science and Complexity,” 6.
86 Weaver used the example of the so-called “operation analysis groups,” initially formed
to solve war-related problems, to further explain the appeal of mixed teams: “The at-
tempt to answer such broad problems of tactics, or even broader problems of strategy,
was the job during the war of certain groups known as the operations analysis groups.
(…) These operations analysis groupswere,moreover,whatmaybe calledmixed teams.
Although mathematicians, physicists, and engineers were essential, the best of the
groups also contained physiologists, biochemists, psychologists, and a variety of rep-
resentatives of other fields of the biochemical and social sciences. Under the pressure
of war, these mixed teams pooled their resources and focused all their different in-
sights on the common problems. It was found, in spite of the modern tendencies to-
ward intense scientific specialization, thatmembers of such diverse groups couldwork
together and could form a unit which wasmuch greater than themere sum of its parts.
It was shown that these groups could tackle certain problems of organized complexity,
and get useful answers” (Weaver, “Science and Complexity,” 8).
87 Kay,Molecular Vision, 168.
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in the respective science policy discourse. From this point of view, one of the
crucial factors for the continuous support of the Caltech group was that the
comparisons drawn in the course of the project’s history in the 1940s worked
and made sense at an organizational level. Put differently: I propose that these
comparisons were considered to be meaningful and evident, even though the
similarities drawn between genetic, embryological, and immunological phe-
nomena in the application of Pauling’s unified “complementariness theory”
lacked an empirical basis throughout the 1940s and 50s. Hence, a question
that follows concerns the activities and processes that led to the validation
and manifestation of comparisons between the respective phenomena. I have
suggested that the answer is to be found in the consideration of the relation-
ship between practices of comparison and narration in the context of project
organization. More specifically, I argued that comparisons drawn between
the domains and objects of research of the bio-chemical program at Caltech
were supported by project organization narratives conveyed in RF reports and
in the realm of science popularization. These narratives created path-depen-
dencies and continuities over time between the projects and people involved.
They further established a connection between the integration of multidisci-
plinary projects at an organizational level and the discovery and explanation
of phenomena in the living world.

Seeing, Comparing, Narrating
Making-of the Middle Ages in the Early History of Art
Joris Corin Heyder
Introductory remarks
In the Routledge encyclopedia of narrative theory, Werner Wolf points out
that “[...] the pictorial medium has problems with narrativity and requires a
‘reader’ who is much more active in (re-)constructing a narrative than would
be necessary in verbal texts.”1 His comment brings up a well-known problem
in the discussion on narrativity: images have long been considered incompat-
ible with narrative devices and storytelling.2 In the same Routledge encyclo-
pedia, Jan Baetens sums up twomain arguments for this: First, the ideological
argument pursuant to which it is easier to achieve visual literacy than verbal;
texts were considered as ‘higher art.’ Second, a mediological argument ac-
cording to which one distinguishes between “the fictional character of story-
telling vs. the non-fictional character of some sorts of images (photographs).”3
1 Wolf, Werner, “Pictorial Narrativity.” In Routledge encyclopedia of narrative theory,
edited by D. Herman, M. Jahn, and M.-L. Ryan, London; New York: Routledge, 2005,
431–435, on p. 435.
2 Baetens, Jan, “Image and Narrative.” In Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory,
edited by D. Herman, M. Jahn, and M.-L. Ryan, London: Routledge, 2005, 236–237, on
p. 236.
3 Baetens, “Image and Narrative,” 236. One of the most astonishing discussions of the
(non-)documentary character of photographs has been presented by Roland Barthes
in his book Camera lucida. Reflections on Photography, where he tackles—at a cer-
tain point—the problem of duration, in both history and photography: “A paradox: the
same century invented History and Photography. But History is a memory fabricated
according to positive formulas, a pure intellectual discourse which abolishes mythic
Time; and the Photograph is a certain but fugitive testimony; so that everything, to-
day, prepares our race for this impotence: to be no longer able to conceive duration,
affectively or symbolically: the age of the Photograph is also the age of revolutions,
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Quite apart from the fact that the second argument is difficult to understand
because the image’s documentary character has long been disputed, and, of
course, many sorts of texts can also be understood as non-fictional,4 it is ob-
vious in both entries on “Pictorial narrativity” and “Image and Narrative” that
their authors describe divergent potentials of narration in texts and images.
This approachwas also followed byMieke Bal in her Routledge entry on “Visual
Narrativity.”5 In the art historical discourse, it was Max Imdahl (1925–1988)
who, prominently, sought to characterize a particular medial quality of im-
ages in his conception of Ikonik6 that also critically reflects their narrative
potentials and limitations. For Imdahl, the visual experience itself had such a
strong evidence (“Anschauungsevidenz”) that he denied a lossless translatabil-
ity from visual representations of an autonomous artwork back to a written
narrative.7 On the contrary, Bal seeks to undermine the distinction main-
tained between the two media of text and image. She differentiates between,
first, appearances of visuality in texts, and, second, narrative aspects of visual
contestations, assassinations, explosions, in short, of impatiences, of everythingwhich
denies ripening.—And no doubt, the astonishment of “that-has-been” will also disap-
pear.”, cf. Barthes, Roland, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography. Translated by
R. Howard. New York: Hill andWang, 1981, 93–94 [italics in original]. For this passage,
cf. also: Bann, Stephen, “History: Myth and Narrative. A Coda for Roland Barthes and
HaydenWhite.” In RefiguringHaydenWhite, edited by F. Ankersmit, E. Domanska, and
H. Hellner, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009, 144–161, on p. 97–98.
4 A clear division between res factae and res fictae is already dissolving in Eighteenth-
century discourse, as Reinhart Koselleck was able to show, cf. Koselleck, Reinhart, “Ter-
ror und Traum.Methodologische Anmerkungen zu Zeiterfahrungen imDritten Reich.”
In Vergangene Zukunft: zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten, Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch
Wissenschaft. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2017[1989], 278–299, on p. 278–284. Cf. also:
Fulda, Daniel, Wissenschaft aus Kunst: die Entstehung der modernen deutschen Ge-
schichtsschreibung; 1760–1860. European cultures: studies in literature and the arts, 7.
Berlin [et al.]: de Gruyter, 1996, 223.
5 Bal, Mieke, “Visual Narrativity.” In Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory, edited
by D. Herman, M. Jahn, and M.-L. Ryan, London: Routledge, 2005, 629–633.
6 “Der ikonischen Betrachtungsweise oder eben der Ikonik wird das Bild zugänglich als
ein Phänomen, in welchem gegenständliches, wiedererkennendes Sehen und forma-
les, sehendes Sehen sich ineinander vermitteln zur Anschauung einer höheren, die
praktische Seherfahrung sowohl einschließenden als auch prinzipiell überbietenden
Ordnung und Sinntotalität”, cf. Imdahl, Max, Giotto. Arenafresken. Ikonographie, Iko-
nologie, Ikonik. Munich: Fink, 1980, 92–93.
7 Imdahl, Max, “Ikonik. Bilder und ihre Anschauung.” In Was ist ein Bild?, edited by G.
Boehm, Munich: Fink, 1994, 300–324, on page 308.
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depiction, and thus critically encircles the famous ut pictura poesis-paradigm:
literally “as is painting so is poetry,” respectively “painting is wordless po-
etry, poetry painting with words.”8 The Simonidian/Horatian aphorism was
taken up again and again, but one of themost popular objections derives from
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781), who discussed the relation of text and
image in his powerful essay on the Laokoon group.9 Hewas particularly inter-
ested in the different experiences of time and space and believed that images
are not able to narrate like a text but rather to catch a “pregnant moment.”10
While Lessing was one of the first who distinguished the arts with respect
to their medial differences,11 Bal’s approach emphasizes the (un-)productive
cross-over, the intermedia-quality of text-image-relations.12
8 A critical overview on the genesis and reception of both, the Simonidian and Horatian
dictum: Springrath, Gabriele K., “Das Dictum des Simonides: Der Vergleich von Dich-
tung und Malerei.” Poetica. Zeitschrift für Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaften 3–4,
2004: 243–280.
9 “Die blendende Antithese des griechischen Voltaire, daß die Mahlerey eine stumme
Poesie, und die Poesie eine redende Mahlerey sey, stand wohl in keinem Lehrbuche
[...],” cf. Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Laokoon, oder über die Grenzen der Mahlerey und
Poesie. Mit beyläufigen Erläuterungen verschiedener Punkte der alten Kunstgeschich-
te. Berlin: Christian Friedrich Voß, 1766, 3 [preface].
10 “Kann der Künstler von der immer veränderlichen Natur nie mehr als einen einzigen
Augenblick, und der Mahler insbesondere diesen einzigen Augenblick auch nur aus
einem einzigen Gesichtspunkte, brauchen; sind aber ihre Werke gemacht, nicht bloß
erblickt, sondern betrachtet zu werden, lange und wiederhohlter maassen betrachtet
zu werden: so ist es gewiß daß jener einzige Augenblick und einzige Gesichtspunkt
dieses einzigen Augenblickes, nicht fruchtbar genug gewählet werden kann.”, cf. Lessing
1766, 24 [my italics].
11 “Lessings Laokoon ist die erste konsequente Ausarbeitung der Medienästhetik, die in
der Natur des Mediums die Natur der Kunst begründet sein läßt. So wird hier, was bis-
her nur eine technische Voraussetzung zu sein schien, zu einem Moment der Kunst
selbst,” cf. Stierle, Karlheinz. “Das bequeme Verhältnis. Lessings Laokoon und die Ent-
deckung des ästhetischen Mediums.” In Das Laokoon-Projekt. Pläne einer semioti-
schen Ästhetik, edited by G. Gebauer, Studien zur allgemeinen und vergleichenden
Literaturwissenschaft 25, Stuttgart: Metzler, 1984, 23–58, on p. 38. See. also: Schneider,
Sabine. “Die Laokoon-Debatte: Kunstreflexion undMedienkonkurrenz im 18. Jahrhun-
dert.” In Handbuch Literatur & Visuelle Kultur, edited by C. Benthien and B. Weingart,
Boston: de Gruyter, 2014, 68–85, on p. 72.
12 As it is hardly possible to summarize the rampant,more than two-hundred-year lasting
debate on the relationship between text and image, I decided to refer to Bal’s position
as a pars pro toto for a poststructuralist and culturalist perspective that works anew
towards a dissolution of the medial boundaries.
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Putting all this together, it becomes clear that it can neither be the task
of this paper to sum up the different levels of visual and pictorial narrativity
nor to generally discuss the possible entanglement of images in narration.
Instead, I am interested in a concrete historiographical example. It might
bring to the fore why I believe that the narrative potential and/or resistance
of images in the discussion on narrativism in history in the course of Hayden
White, Frank Ankersmit, and many others is still a blind spot worth being
analysed in greater detail. To be more precise: The problem discussed in this
paper is a second-order problem, here understood as a distinction between
“a sequence of actions or events” and their “discursive presentation or narra-
tion.”13 It is assumed that every classification of an era already presents a nar-
rative structure and that—from a historiographical perspective—the above
questioned narrative potentials of texts and images can be seen as distinc-
tive, maybe even opposed stimuli in the conception of historical periods.
My starting point is the period narrative of the so-called Middle Ages.The
period in question is still today associatedwith darkness and decline by a large
majority of people; whether in films, novels or computer games, popular cul-
ture generally paints the image of an era in dirt,waste, stench, and—strangely
enough—authenticity.14 In the professional art historical discourse, it is still
not uncommon to understand the Medium aevum quite literally as a period
between two peaks—classical Antiquity and its so-called Renaissance. I will
not discuss the surprisingly well-established and everlasting narrative as such
but the medial process of its conceptualization, particularly in one prominent
example of the early history of art. Contrary to history as a discipline, the
most important sources for art historians were and still are neither texts nor
archival material but visual artifacts. In one longer and two briefer parts of
this paper, the guiding question will be whether practices of comparing such
artifacts in early ‘histories’ on Medieval art visually thwarts the narrative, de-
scribed above, or not.Moreover, I will ask whether comparing images perhaps
establishes a hidden, non-verbalized narrative in most of the discussed cases.
13 Kemp, Wolfgang, “Narrative.” In Critical terms for art history, edited by R. S. Nelson,
transl. by D. Britt, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996, 58–69, on p. 67.
14 Simmons, Clare A., “Introduction.” In Medievalism and the Quest for the “Real” Middle
Ages, edited by C. A. Simmons, New York: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2001, 1–29.
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1. Seeing
The abbot Jean-Baptiste Dubos (1670–1742) was one of the first who devel-
oped a genuine aesthetic of impact (‘Wirkungsästhetik’) by bringing forward
a semiotic argument, in which he reflects the different levels of perception
between text and image:
Les mots doivent d’abord reveiller les idées dont ils ne sont que des signes
arbitraires. Il faut en suite que ces idées s’arrangent dans l’imagination, &
qu’elles y forment ces Tableaux qui nous touchent & ces peintures qui nous
interessent.15
What Dubos presents as the central advantage of a visual representation is
something that is already inherent in Lessing’s conception of the ‘pregnant
moment.’ In the best case this specific moment draws together past, present,
and future in only one crucial scene. Texts, however, have to be read sequen-
tially, and, therefore, it stands to reason that it is easier to grasp, for example,
the content of four prints with a sequence from the Passion of Christ than
reading a corresponding chapter in the Gospels. But how do we recognize
the narrative? One has to look for an organized sequence of events present in
different kinds of media such as literature, artworks, music, videos etc.
The single events have to be temporarily structured, and there can be no
doubt that a biblical text excerpt with St. John’s description of the Passion (fig.
1a) meets this criterion just as well as its visual counterpart: for instance, four
engravings by Hendrik Goltzius (1558–1616/17) with the Carrying of the cross,
the Crucifixion, the Entombment and the Resurrection (fig. 1b) placed next to
each other and ordered in a reasonable spatial and temporal sequence of the
story. For anyone who is familiar with the biblical Passion, it should be easy
to immediately identify the Crucifixion scene. It serves as a formal marker
that would make it even possible to “read” the other three sequences in a very
short span of time of—let’s say—in only five seconds. At this point, one may
feel reminded of Ludwik Fleck’s prominent formula: “To see, one has first to
15 Dubos, Jean-Baptiste, Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture. 1 of 2 vol.
Paris, 1719, 377. Cf. also: Schneider 2014, 74. The formation of the art in the imagination
of the artist, is, however, a concept that had already been developed by Giorgio Vasari
(1511–1574), cf. Vasari, Giorgio. Einführung in die Künste der Architektur, Bildhauerei
und Malerei. Die künstlerischen Techniken der Renaissance als Medien des disegno,
edited by M. Burioni. Transl. by V. Lorini. Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 2006, chap.
15, 98–99.
150 Joris Corin Heyder
Figure 1a: The Holy Bible, conteyning the Old Testament,
and the New. Imprinted at London: By Robert Barker [...],
1611, The University of Pennsylvania Libraries, Annenberg,
Rare Book and Manuscript Library, BS185 1611. L65, Begin-
ning of St. John, Chap. 19.
Fig. 1a Schoenberg Center for Electronic Text & Image.
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to acquire a directed readiness to see.”16 It is a thought that can be retrieved
again in Bal’s understanding of seeing an image through a “cultural frame”
which, according to this semiotic approach, creates readability of an image
in the first place.17
With regard to the here selected beginning of chapter nineteen from the
Gospels of St. John in a 1611 print of the King James version (fig. 1a), on the
other hand, the experience is different because even if certain narrative struc-
tures might be conceivable,18 we will hardly be able to grasp the entire plot in
only five seconds. This is also true because: “reading itself requires constant
visualisation.”19 Is it, thus, easier to grasp a narrative in one single moment
in a picture series rather than in a text document? While the text becomes
blurry if read in a rush, the images keep a certain clarity even in a blink of an
eye. However, in images, we do not truly “read” the story but perceive distinct
and recognizable forms, or let’s say signifiers (for instance, the crucifix or the
body of Christ) and perhaps even a multiphase action (crucifix in different
positions, as, for instance, on the shoulder of Christ or erected on the hill
of Golgotha); both are strong markers for a changing event. Hypothetically,
one could object that, for example, a list of catchwords like “Crucifixion,” “Be-
16 Fleck, Ludwik. Cognition and Fact: Materials on Ludwik Fleck, edited by R. S. Cohen and
T. Schnelle, Dordrecht [et al.]: Springer Science & Business Media, 1986, 134.
17 The frame is thought as an “[...] activité sémiotique permanente, sans laquelle aucune
vie culturelle ne saurait fonctionner,” Bal, Mieke. “Lire l’art?” In Penser l’image. Com-
ment lire les images?, edited by E. Alloa, transl. by M. Boidy, Dijon : Presses du réel,
2017, 43–74, onp. 59. Cf. also :Michalet, Judith. “Sémiotique versus iconique?Recension
à propos de : Emmanuel Alloa (dir.), Penser l’image III—Comment lire les images?, Les
presses du reel,” 2017. http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Semiotique-versus-iconique.html
[last access : 13.1.2019].
18 This could be, for instance, the use of two proposition following each other, or the per-
ception of a particular time structure within the language, as, for example, the use of
past tense in the conjugated verb “tooke” in the first paragraph of chap. 19 in theGospel
of St. John (cf. fig. 1a).
19 Bal, here, is in line with Gérard Genette, cf. Bal 2005, 632. Cf. also: Cooke, Peter, and
Nina Lübbren. “Introduction: Narrativity and (French) Painting.” In Painting and Nar-
rative in France, from Poussin to Gauguin, edited by P. Cooke and N. Lübbren, Lon-
don/New York: Ashgate, 2016, 1–21, on p. 9. For Genette’s anti-Lessingian conception
of the text-based arts not as temporal, but spatial, cf. Genette, Gérard. Narrative Dis-
course: An Essay in Method. Transl. by J. E. Lewin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1980, 34.
know, and then to know how, and to forget part of the knowledge. One has
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trayal,” and so forth might equally be used as markers for a narrative.20 This
is true but only for those readers who are culturally pre-formed; for all others,
it makes no difference whether or not the list also contains notions that form
no genuine part of the Passion narrative, as, for instance, the “Visitation.” On
the contrary, for the series of four images, it is potentially possible to realize
that there is a connection between the prints with respect to their main char-
acters (Christ), specific objects (cross), and recurring places (Golgotha), even
if I do not know what exactly is going on. Furthermore, the number of addi-
tional information that are perceivable in images at first glance—whether the
Carrying of the cross is crowded or not, whether it is day or night, etc.—are not
available by looking at a list of catchwords.
In the Western context, the beholder is used to ‘read’ pictures from left
to right and this reliable reading direction supports causal understanding as
well. In the chosen example of an album page (fig. 1b) assembled by the fa-
mous French connoisseur Michel de Marolles (1600–1681), the ‘reading’ direc-
tion is a rather negligible factor, while, for example, the spatial juxtaposition
between the single motifs is muchmore relevant.The spatial intervals index a
temporal sequence and enormously simplify the ‘readability.’ It does not mat-
ter howmany intervals have been set between the single represented events to
comprehend a commonly known ‘story’ that has a beginning, a middle, and
an end. For my purposes, it is also important to highlight that every inter-
val already stands for a comparison that is performed by the beholder. With
Arthur Danto, one could describe events as the raw material of history that
produce a difference through time in time; in other words, events create a
meaning for an event by relating it to some later or earlier event.21 It is pos-
20 Accordingly, the chapter headings “Barabbas preferred. // S. Iohn. // Christ crucified.”
in the King James version (fig. 1a) fulfill a comparable task: They give the reader a first
orientation in regard to the subject of every page. Typography can be understood as
a bridge between text and image that, at least to a certain extent, helps to burst the
unison of letters by visually setting accents, gaps, discriminations, and so on.
21 Danto has stressed the analogy between his “model that is representing the structure
of a narrative explanation: (1) x is F at t-1, (2) H happens to x at t-2, and (3) x is G at
t-3” and causal explanations as such. Moreover, he refers to the Hegelian dialectical
pattern: (1) thesis, (2) antithesis, and (3) synthesis, which he understands as well as a
narrative structure, cf. Danto, Arthur Coleman, Analytical philosophy of history. Cam-
bridge: University Press, 1968, 233–237. Cf. also: Kemp,Wolfgang, “Ellipsen, Analepsen,
Gleichzeitigkeiten. Schwierige Aufgaben für die Bilderzählung.” In Der Text des Bildes:
Möglichkeiten und Mittel eigenständiger Bilderzählung, edited by W. Kemp, Munich:
Edition Text und Kritik, 1989, 62–88, on p. 69–70.
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Figure 1b: Hendrik Goltzius, Marolles album, Paris, Bib-
liothèques nationales, Estampes et photographie, Reserve
EC-37-BOITE Fol 1, vol. 1 (of 2), 19.
Fig. 1b Author’s photograph.
sible to find the relation between two phenomena and one changing event
not only in textual narratives, but also in a picture series and even in a single
monophase picture. Narrative techniques such as unfolding, tightening, or
tension, brief: the narrative rhythm is able to structure every single picture.
It has only to be guaranteed that one character or coherence-creating element
like body language, colour, etc. yields causality and chronology.22
22 Kemp, “Ellipse, Analepsen, Gleichzeitigkeiten,“ 62.
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Figure 2a : Jean-Baptiste Séroux d’Agincourt, Histoire de l’art par les
monumens, depuis sa décadence au IVe siècle jusqu’à son renouvelle-
ment au XVIe, vol. 5, Paris 1823, plate XI, detail of a female saint.
Fig. 2a https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/seroux1823bd6 [last
access: 13.2.2019].
But what if an image shows no more than a detail taken out of its original
context (fig. 2a)? Does it still have any narrative features? In the chosen exam-
ple one could say that—after all probability and with a view to the presented
veil—we see the head of a woman. Her eyes and mouth are modulated down-
wards, which may stipulate an emotional reaction in the beholder: this seems
to be a rather sad than a happy face, or at least a thoughtful one. The lines
in the background could be no more than some ornament, but on the basis
of the knowledge of religious Western art these lines form a full circle and
thus represent a halo. The description, a text genre which, in my opinion,
was erroneously differentiated from narration in the structuralist narratol-
ogy,23 maintains narrative potential from the moment when we contextualize
it with certain knowledge, in this case the knowledge about veils, halos or
23 Saupe, Achim, and Felix Wiedemann, “Narration und Narratologie. Erzähltheorien in
der Geschichtswissenschaft, Version: 1.0”. Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte. Begriffe, Metho-
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Figure 2b : Jean-Baptiste Séroux d’Agincourt, Histoire de l’art par les
monumens, depuis sa décadence au IVe siècle jusqu’à son renouvelle-
ment au XVIe, vol. 5, Paris 1823, plate XI.
Fig. 2b https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/seroux1823bd5 [last
access: 13.2.2019].
den und Debatten der zeithistorischen Forschung, 2015. http://docupedia.de/zg/sau
pe_wiedemann_narration_v1_de_2015 [last access: 13.2.2019].
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Figure 2c : Jean-Baptiste Séroux d’Agincourt,Histoire de l’art par
les monumens, depuis sa décadence au IVe siècle jusqu’à son
renouvellement au XVIe, vol. 3, Paris 1823, section “Peintures”, 8.
Fig. 2c https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/seroux1823bd3 [last
access: 13.2.2019].
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emotional expressions. Nonetheless, the beholder could only establish some
hypothetical narratives, because the detail itself does not show a meaning-
ful change of a situation.24 The picture’s meaning remains obscure as long as
it is impossible to connect the detail with a narrative outside itself. As said
by Wolf, “a single picture can never actually represent a narrative but at best
metonymically point to a story.”25 According to Danto’s equation, this would
only be true when the picture cannot offer any indication for a change. If so,
and the woman’s head (fig. 2a) appears to be a possible example for this, the
narrative feature is only achieved by pointing-at something (for example, the
knowledge about halos). On the contrary, synchronically ordered representa-
tions like those in the Six-century Vienna Genesis are unquestionably able to
embody a narrative, at least with reference to Danto’s analytical pattern of a
phenomenon in time (t1) that altered in time (t3) subsequently to a changing
event (E) in time (t2).
In one of the miniatures of the Vienna Genesis (fig. 3), Noah is first shown
while leaving the Ark together with his family and all the animals, and there-
after only him offering a sacrifice to God. Both scenes are united in an unsep-
arated visual space.26 In another contribution, Wolf has characterized such
cases as (1) multiphase pictures, as distinguished from a group of pictures
that, like the four prints by Goltzius described above, forms (2) serial pictures.
The detail of the head of a woman (fig. 2a), however, represents in his diction a
(3) monophase picture, which—only under certain circumstances—may rep-
resent a ‘pregnant moment.’27 His ordering principle is not the only possible
way to describe narrative potentials in visual art: already in the late Nine-
teenth-century, Franz Wickhoff (1853–1909) developed a “general classifica-
tory scheme for visual narration, proposing three principle modes [...]: kom-
plettierend, kontinuierend and distinguierend [...].”28 This comprises representa-
tions in which in one scene different events are shown in parallel without de-
picting figures multiple times—an idea of depiction that can be found on Six-
24 Wolf, “Pictorial Narrativity,” 432.
25 Ibid., 433 [italics in the original].
26 Vienna, Austrian National Library, Cod. theol. gr. 31, fol. 2v, cf. http://www.bildar-
chivaustria.at/Pages/ImageDetail.aspx?p_iBildID=11470124 [last access: 13.1.2019].
27 Wolf,Werner, “Narrative andNarrativity: A Narratological Reconceptualization and Its
Applicability to the Visual Arts.” Word & Image 19 (3), 2003: 180–197, on p. 189–192.
28 Cooke, Lübbren, “Introduction: Narrativity and (French) Painting,” 4 [italics in the orig-
inal].
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Figure 3: Noah and his family departing the ark and Noah’s
sacrifice, Vienna, Austrian National Library, Cod. theol. gr.
31, fol. 2v.
Fig. 3 Mazal, Otto. Wiener Genesis: Purpurpergamenthand-
schrift aus dem 6. Jahrhundert; vollständiges Faksimile des
Codex Theol. Gr. 31 der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek
in Wien mit Kommentarband. Frankfurt a. M.: Insel-Verl.,
1980, fol. 2.
century BC black-figure vase paintings and that maybe had its most impor-
tant renaissance in the futuristic movement of the 1910s.Wickhoff ’s approach
is so inspiring because with the complementary-mode he already implements
the reception process in his model, which has not only been promoted by
Wolfgang Kemp in the late 1980s, but also by Peter Cooke and Nina Lübbren
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in their shrewd and recently published paper on “Narrativity and (French)
Painting”:
Contrary to Wolf’s ideas [...] reception is crucial to constructing narrative
meaning [...] if the narrative is in textual format, readers will retell the sym-
bolic letter-signs in verbal form; if the narrative is in pictorial format, viewers
will retell iconic signs, also in verbal from [...] the customary opposition of
‘word versus image’ may be recast as a dialogic circuit in which both words
and images operate to similar story-generating ends.29
This proposition could still go much further by rather looking for narrative
relations instead of asking an object (a text, an artwork) to be narrative.Theo-
retical framings like Actor-Network-Theory (ANT)30 or Practice Theory31 could
inspire the discussion on the narrative potentials of text and image beyond
their medial differentiation. A narrative network32 could be one idea that does
not weigh between the different actants, understood here as human and non-
human actors, but which allows us to imagine a rhizome-like33 organized, non-
hierarchical interplay of actants and their narrative potentials. In such a re-
ductionist/relativist conception, the acting/practicing itself would come to
the fore, the seeing or reading, the comparing, and, of course, the narrating.
Then, the question would no longer be: ‘What are the characteristics of nar-
ration?’, but, for instance, ‘How can we describe the knowing-how to retrieve
narrative potentials?’ and ‘Is a narrative potential contingent on processes of
routinization?’ As for the last question, we could alternatively ask whether or
29 Ibid., 10.
30 The relevance of ANT for the analysis of art object-beholder-relations becomes par-
ticularly apparent in: Latour, Bruno, Wir sind nie modern gewesen, Frankfurt a. M.:
Suhrkamp, 2008.
31 For the intersection of cultural/media theories and practice theory, cf. Reckwitz, An-
dreas. “Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theoriz-
ing,” European Journal of Social Theory 5(2), 2002: 243–263. https://doi.org/10.1177/
13684310222225432 [last access: 12.2.2019].
32 Starting from ANT and the adaptive structuration theory (AST), Brian Pentland and
Martha Feldman already tried to conceptualize a “narrative network,” which they un-
derstand as a device for representing patterns of technology-in-use, cf. Pentland,
Brian T., and Martha S. Feldman, “Narrative Networks: Patterns of technology and or-
ganization,” http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.579.7792&rep=
rep1&type=pdf [last access: 12.2.2019].
33 SeeDeleuze, Gilles, and FélixGuattari, Rhizom. InternationalemarxistischeDiskussion
67, Berlin: Merve-Verlag, 1977.
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not a narrative potential in an image only comes to light when the beholder
has already developed a certain ‘tacit knowledge’ of seeing.34This would mean
that the act of seeing is rehearsed to complete loose ends or to look for certain
narrative markers.
By returning to the detail of the woman’s head (fig. 2a), obviously some
of its narrative potentials have already been described above.These are forms
which represent a halo, a veil, and so on. Yet, their status remains indetermi-
nate as long as, say, the beholder has no practice in reckoning such forms.
With reference to reception aesthetics, spaces of indetermination (“Leerstelle”
or “Unbestimmtheitsstelle”) have been produced by de-contextualizing the
woman’s head from its original context.35 However, the indeterminacy does
not just end by re-contextualizing the detail, but, in fact, the rhizomatic struc-
ture of potential narratives even multiplies. Seeing the detail of the woman’s
head in its genuine context (fig. 2b), it is tantamount to compare it with a
group of other images of much smaller size, which forms part of one and the
same visual object. It is neither possible to ad-hoc determine the subjects of
all the smaller images, nor to recognize a narrative structure at first glance.
The relative tininess of the illustrations is one problem, the mode of period
style is another, and a third difficulty is how the plate is organized. The indi-
vidual images appear to reproduce artworks in different sizes and different
states of conversation. Flat, linear illustrations are as present as three-dimen-
sional representations and even architectural settings.The plate demonstrates
a back and forth between completeness and fragmentation.36 It forms part of
Jean-Baptiste Séroux d’Agincourt’s (1730–1814)Histoire de l’Art par les monumens,
depuis sa décadence au IVe siècle jusqu’à son renouvellement au XVIe posthumously
published between 1810–1823.37 The six-volume book project can be labeled
34 For the interrelation between body—particularly the practice of seeing—knowledge,
and artifacts, see Prinz, Sophia. Die Praxis des Sehens: über das Zusammenspiel von
Körpern, Artefakten und visueller Ordnung. Sozialtheorie. Bielefeld: transcript, 2014.
35 See Kemp, “Ellipse, Analepsen, Gleichzeitigkeiten,“ 67–79.
36 In the context of the annual congress of the Nineteenth Century Studies Associa-
tion (NCSA) held in Philadelphia in 2018, I sought to conceptualize these notions
in my paper “The Connoisseurial Vista. Shifting between Completeness and Frag-
mentation” as central epistemological practices in 18th-century art connoisseur-
ship, cf. https://www.academia.edu/36237511/The_Connoisseurial_Vista._Shifting_be-
tween_Completeness_and_Fragmentation?source=swp_share [last access: 12.7.2019].
37 Séroux d’Agincourt, Jean Baptiste, Histoire de l’art par les monumens, depuis sa déca-
dence au IVe siècle jusqu’à son renouvellement au XVIe [...], 6 vol., Paris : Treuttel et
Würtz, 1810–1823. For a meticulously discussion of theses volumes, see Mondini, Da-
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as one of the earliest attempts to programmatically shift the interest from a
literary to an illustrative art historical approach.38 It is remarkable, how pow-
erful Séroux d’Agincourt, on the one hand, acknowledges the faculty of seeing
and of visual experiences, while, on the other hand, he denies the capability
of literature to describe visual phenomena:
Les productions des Arts fils du dessin, l’Architecture, la Sculpture et la Pein-
ture, consistent en objets sensibles à la vue, sous des formes propres à cha-
cun d’eux, et dont l’effet n’arrive à l’ame que par cet organe; d’où il résulte
qu’on ne doit en écrire ou en étudier l’histoire, qu’en ayant leurs diverses pro-
ductions sous les yeux […]. Cependant, parmi les écrivains qui ont essayé de
nous faire connaître le sort des Beaux-arts, il en est peu qui aient pris le parti
d’en présenter les monumens, et de les laisser parler eux-mêmes aux yeux,
en ne les aidant que d’explications succinctes.39
Of course, Séroux d’Agincourt, too, does not simply let the images speak for
themselves—and it is remarkable how explicitly he suggests that images de-
velop their own language (“laisser parler eux-mêmes aux yeux”). On the con-
trary, he is not only entitling the plates, like in (fig. 2b): “Paintings fromdiverse
catacombs in Rome and San Gennaro in Naples; 9th, 10th and 11th centuries”40
and numbering every single image but also trying to contextualize the num-
bered images in a separate description (fig. 2c). The reference to the women’s
head (fig. 2a) reads as follows : “Tète, calquée sur l’original, de la figure de
sainte gravée en petit sous le numéro suivant, au côté droit de la vierge; in-
niela, Mittelalter im Bild: Séroux d’Agincourt und die Kunsthistoriographie um 1800.
Zürcher Schriften zur Kunst-, Architektur- und Kulturgeschichte, Zurich: Zurich Inter-
Publishers, 2005.
38 Lena Bader and Johannes Grave outlined the relation between illustration and text
in early art historical publications and stressed the fact that “Kunstgeschichte ad ocu-
lus” was not necessarily understood as a contradiction between image and word, but
as something complementary, see Bader, Lena, and Johannes Grave. “Sprechen über
Bilder – Sprechen in Bildern: Einleitende Überlegungen.” In Sprechen über Bilder –
Sprechen in Bildern: Studien zum Wechselverhältnis von Bild und Sprache, edited by
L. Bader and J. Grave, Passagen; 46, Berlin: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 2014, 1–30, on p.
8–12.
39 Séroux d’Agincourt, Histoire de l’art par les monumens, 1810–1823, vol. 1, 1.
40 “Peintures de diverses catacombes de Rome et de St. Janvier à Naples. IX.e, X.e, et XI.e
Siécles.” cf. Séroux d’Agincourt, Histoire de l’art par les monumens, 1810–1823, vol. 5,
plate XI (at the bottom of the page).
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édite.”41 Apparently, the context of the head-detail now becomes clearer, and
even more so the way in which the illustration was made: “calquée” means
that the author or someone who accompanied him traced the reproduced fig-
ure from the original. In Séroux d’Agincourt’s logic, the traced part is shown
much bigger than the rest of the images to simulate life-size, and, most im-
portantly, in its facsimileing quality it serves to mirror historical ‘factuality.’
The same high standard is evident in the second reference that is worth being
cited in total:
Peinture à fresque découverte enma présence, en 1780, au fond d’une chapelle
des catacombes de St Laurent hors des murs; elle représente la Vierge en
prière, Ste Agathe, et une autre sainte dont la tête, calquée sur l’original, se
voit au numéro précédent.42
By stressing to have discovered the painting himself, Séroux d’Agincourt ex-
presses not only pride but also his being an eyewitness in a then already ‘his-
toricized’ past event. The year of the discovery as well as the precise descrip-
tion of the place are two additional factors that show his documentary inter-
est. His efforts appear to stand crosswise to his programmatic intention to
narrate a history of art from the “period of its decadence to its renovation,”
not in the sense that he is doing something else, but by reflecting the negative
aftertaste of the project’s title. The greatest part of Séroux d’Agincourt’s work
is dedicated to exactly this kind of supposedly ‘lower’ Medieval art attentively
observed by him and reproduced in a preferably verist, antiquarian manner.
Other than in his text corpus, where he follows a Vasarian narrative of decline
and renovation, in his illustrations as well as in the paratextual elements, the
author seems to forget all his reservations in light of seeing and comparing
the originals.
2. Comparing
In a connoisseurial manner, Séroux d’Agincourt not only visited and docu-
mented Medieval art but also sought to synthesize art historical relations in
plates like the one with two images from the Ghent altarpiece executed by the
41 Séroux d’Agincourt, Histoire de l’art par lesmonumens, 1810–1823, vol. 3, section “Pein-
tures,” 8.
42 Ibid., 8 [my italics].
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van Eyck brothers and another image that shows a Dead Christ Supported by
Angels painted by Antonello da Messina (1429/30–1479) (fig. 4a). By arranging
these three images next to each other, he already implements a certain valu-
ating relationship. For example, the numbering of the sequence from one to
three could mean a temporal succession or also artistic progress. The caption
specifies that the plate’s subject is the “invention and practice of oil painting
by John of Bruges (i.e. Jan van Eyck) and Antonello da Messina.”43 As a matter
of fact, the engraver was not able to particularly illustrate the material quality
of oil painting. Without the paratext, however, the meaning of the compari-
son would have remained puzzling.
Figure 4a : Jean-Baptiste Séroux d’Agincourt,Histoire de l’art par
les monumens, depuis sa décadence au IVe siècle jusqu’à son
renouvellement au XVIe, vol. 6, plate CLXXII.
Fig. 4a https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/seroux1823bd6 [last
access: 13.2.2019].
What makes things challenging is the fact that it is not the same to anal-
yse ‘intended’ comparisons in images or texts. The constitutional elements of
a comparison are at least two comparata which are assumed to be compara-
ble (assumption of comparability or “Gleichartigkeitsannahme”) according to
43 “Invention et pratique de la Peinture à l’huile, par Jean de Bruges et Antonello de Mes-
sine. XV.e Siècle.” cf. Séroux d’Agincourt, Histoire de l’art par lesmonumens, 1810–1823,
vol. 6, plate CLXXII (at the head of the page).
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Figure 4b : Jean-Baptiste Séroux d’Agincourt,Histoire de l’art par
les monumens, depuis sa décadence au IVe siècle jusqu’à son
renouvellement au XVIe, vol. 6, Paris 1823, plate CLXIV.
Fig. 4b https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/seroux1823bd6 [last
access: 13.2.2019].
Seeing, Comparing, Narrating 165
one or more respects, the tertium comparationis. In texts, the tertium is often
(but, of course, not always) obvious. Images, however, lack the ability to con-
cretize their tertia. I could say, for instance, that the reproduction prints one
and two of fig. 4a are reproduced details, while number three shows a com-
plete artwork. In this case, the category ‘reproduction-print’ defines the three
comparata, while the choice of the picture section of each print is the tertium.
However, without a guiding text the three images offer a broad range of other
possible respects of comparison: Hence, depending on which criterion one fo-
cuses on, the comparative arrangement might emphasize drapery or artistic
styles as well as thoughts about nakedness in Fifteenth-century art works. It is
quite striking to discover the almost endless possibilities of identifying tertia
in images.
An extreme example for a complex comparison with multiple perspec-
tives is present in another example of Séroux d’Agincourt’s Histoire de l’Art par
les monumens, in which artworks are placed next to each other in stamp-size
reproductions (fig. 4b): Neither the topics, the chronological order, the orig-
inal sizes, nor the direction of reading appear to be the central criterion for
the choice and the positioning of the images.The author presents us a colour-
ful tableau of Northern alpine, ultramontane art from the Tenth to the Six-
teenth centuries44 that might express a narrative of artistic progress but fails
to do so because of the surplus of possible meanings. In the accompanying
plate description,45 the order principle becomes at least clearer, although in
an implicit, not an explicit way: The images are presented referring to na-
tions, i.e., it starts with German art and art of the Low Countries, continues
with Scandinavian and English art, and finally French art. Once realized, the
beholder might be able to compare, for instance, the art of portraiture from
England (No. 20: Portrait of King Henry VIII by Hans Holbein the Younger
(1497/1498–1543)) with the one from the Southern Netherlands (No. 6: Por-
trait of Jan de Leeuw by Jan van Eyck (c. 1390–1441)). Even though the tem-
poral distance between these two pictures amount to almost one hundred
years, it is not possible to deduce one particular narrative from this com-
parison, for example, that the later picture is more ‘developed’ than the ear-
44 “Suites chronologiques des productions des Ecoles ultramontaines. XII.e–XIV.e Siècles.”
cf. Séroux d’Agincourt, Histoire de l’art par les monumens, 1810–1823, vol. 6, plate
CLXIV (at the bottom of the page).
45 Every image was described and contextualized by the author, see Séroux d’Agincourt,
Histoire de l’art par les monumens, 1810–1823, vol. 3, section “Peintures,” 154–158.
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lier one. But—pursuant to the choice of n-fold tertia comparationis—the doing
of comparison helps to rescue narrative potentials. Remarkable is the fact,
that—from an analytical perspective—one-dimensional or simple compar-
isons can be described as follows: the comparata (A) and (B) are compared to
one another in regard to a single tertium comparationis (T) with the result (R).46
Surely, the typology of comparisons is far more extensive, as Hartmut von
Sass and Kirill Postoutenko demonstrated,47 but this essential structure has
an interesting overlapping with Danto’s structure of narrative explanations:
like Danto’s phenomena in time (t1), the comparata (A) and (B) in time (t1) face
an event in time (t2), i.e., the comparison according to a tertium (T), with
the result that the comparata have changed to (A)’ and (B)’ in time (t3). If this
analogy is right, then every one-dimensional comparison bears a narrative
potential and, therefore, comparative arrangements of visual artifacts offer
many starting points for narratives as such, as shown in (fig. 4b).48
3. Narrating
Conversely, in another plate (fig. 5a) Séroux d’Agincourt successfully insin-
uates a ‘Re-naissance’ of the ‘antiquity’ by comparing Raphael’s (1483–1520)
drawingswith some antique fragments.The author offers an imaginative view
that lay bare the underlying Vasarian concept of the rise and decline of art.
46 I follow here the analytical description by Sass, Hartmut von, “Comparisons. A Typol-
ogy,” 1–15. https://www.academia.edu/37901487/von_Sass_Comparisons._A_Typology
[last access: 16.2.2019].
47 See Sass, “Comparisons. A Typology,” 1–15, on p. 3, and Postoutenko, Kirill, “Preliminary
Typology of Comparative Utterances: A Tree and Some Binaries.” In Practices of Com-
paring. Towards a New Understanding of a Fundamental Human Practice, edited by A.
Epple, W. Erhart, and J. Grave, Bielefeld: Bielefeld University Press, 2020, 39–86.
48 I first developed the idea of a structural analogy between practices of comparing and
narrating in this paper; however, in the meanwhile, a project group within the frame-
work of the Collaborative Research Centre 1288 “Practices of Comparing. Changing and
Ordering the World,” Bielefeld University, Germany, has expanded this consideration
further. We not only underlined the structural equivalence, but also emphasized the
entanglement of ‘comparing’ and ‘narrating’ as crucial cultural techniques, see Kramer,
Kirsten, Carrier, Martin, Heyder, Joris Corin, and Hochkirchen, Britta, “Vergleichen und
Erzählen. Zur Verflechtung zweier Kulturtechniken”, Doi: 10.4119/unibi/2942925, Biele-
feld 2020 [last access: 29.7.2020].
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Figure 5a : Jean-Baptiste Séroux d’Agincourt,Histoire de l’art par
les monumens, depuis sa décadence au IVe siècle jusqu’à son
renouvellement au XVIe, vol. 6, Paris 1823, plate CLXXXIII.
Fig. 5a https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/seroux1823bd6 [last
access: 13.2.2019].
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Figure 5b : Jean-Baptiste Séroux d’Agincourt,Histoire de l’art par
les monumens, depuis sa décadence au IVe siècle jusqu’à son
renouvellement au XVIe, vol. 6, Paris 1823, plate CLXXXI.
Fig. 5b https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/seroux1823bd6 [last
access: 13.2.2019].
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The illustration exemplifies Kemp’s idea of “narrative energy” that may partic-
ularly arise from a space of indetermination (“Leerstelle”), a gap or a break. In
the mentioned example, this gap consists of the long period between the so-
called decadence and the renovation. By comparing Raphael’s drawings with
antique fragments, the narrative energy is unfolded by the implemented his-
torical change that in its result returns to something very similar. Therefore,
the plate could be read as an annihilation of the entire book project—that
is dedicated to the time in-between (the Middle Ages)—, and this is also true
for the one that shows a double portrait of Raphael and his teacher Pietro
Perugino (1446/1452–1523). The portrait is entitled with the following verse
written in capitals: “ENFIN RAPHAEL VINT” (fig. 5b). However, subsequent
plates tell a different story that not only stresses the organic entanglement
of both Medieval and Renaissance art, but also—for example—a great open-
ness for the affective qualities of medieval artworks. We can perhaps say that
every single plate in Séroux d’Agincourt’s volumes that is based on compar-
ative dispositions has the potential to disclose its own narrative. This might
be a very unsatisfactory result for every approach that is looking for a more
general argument towards a pictorial narrativism in historiography. Never-
theless, Séroux d’Agincourt’s case shows the weakness of any approach that is
only dedicated to texts, as, for instance, White’s concept of a meta-narratol-
ogy,49 or Ankersmit’s metaphorical conceptualization of history as a compar-
ison of:
[...] one book with another[...]. We do not ‘see’ the past as it is, as we see a
tree, a machine or a landscape as it is. We see the past only through a mas-
querade of narrative structures (while behind thismasquerade there is noth-
ing that has a narrative structure).50
I would, instead, propose that images are in parallel able to both offer and to
contradict narratives, particularly in cases of non-subsequent picture series.
This might also include seeing the past mediated through images, although
these images will never be facts, unless in a relativist Wittgensteinian sense,
referring to which every fact is contingent.51
49 White, Hayden, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Eu-
rope, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
50 Ankersmit, Frank,Narrative Logic. A Semantic Analysis of theHistorian’s Language, The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983, 91–92.
51 Mulligan, Kevin, and Fabrice Correia, “Facts.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phie, 2017. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/facts/ [last access:
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4. Conclusion
It should be a common practice to discuss the narrative potentials of images
in a historiographical approach on early art history, but there have only been
sporadic propositions in this direction, for example, by Daniela Bleichmar,52
Daniela Mondini53 or Bernd Carqué.54 Meghan C. Doherty took a major step
forward in this respect, by analyzing the individual existence of an illustrative
discourse in two late Seventeenth-century journals, the Philosophical Transac-
tions and the Journal des Sçavans.55Themain interest, however, is still dedicated
to text oriented narratives. Consequently, in a broader historiographical ap-
proach it does not come as a surprise that images still play only a minor role
in research on the complexity of narrative colligations. Given that not only
comparisons in texts but also in images are capable of establishing a narra-
tive, we have to ask in a next step, what kind of implications and limitations
are related with comparative viewing? In line with Imdahl, for example, is it
possible to say that the life-size proportions and the material quality of the
original is undermined by reproduction prints anyway and that it is simply
impossible to fully experience the iconic evidence of an artwork on the basis
of illustrations?56
Later conceptualizations of Medieval art, as, for example, in the famous
essay Das Nachleben der Antike imMittelalter by the art historian Anton Springer
(1825–1891) from 1867, went into another direction as Séroux d’Agincourt’s
image-oriented approach. The images were often used with a quite differ-
ent goal in mind. Springer gave crucial clues by comparing a tiny bronze
12.2.2019]. The relation between contingency and narration has already been empha-
sized by different authors, for instance, seeMeuter, Norbert, “Narration in Various Dis-
ciplines.” In Handbook of Narratology, edited by P. Hühn, J. C. Meister, J. Pier, and W.
Schmid, Berlin, Boston: de Gruyter, 2014, 242–262, on p. 257.
52 Bleichmar, Daniela, “Learning to Look: Visual Expertise across Art and Science in
Eighteenth-Century France,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 46(1), 2012: 85–111. https://
doi.org/10.1353/ecs.2012.0084 [last access: 12.2.2019].
53 Mondini, Mittelalter im Bild.
54 Carqué, Bernd, “Epistemische Dinge: zur bildlichen Aneignung mittelalterlicher Arte-
fakte in derModerne.” In Bilder gedeuteter Geschichte, edited byB. Carqué, O. G. Oexle,
Á. Petneki, and L. Zygner, Göttinger Gespräche zur Geschichtswissenschaft 23, Göttin-
gen: Wallstein Verlag, 2004: 55–162.
55 Doherty, Meghan C., “Giving Light to Narrative: The Use of Images in Early Modern
Learned Journals,” Nuncius 30 (3), 2015: 543–569.
56 Imdahl, “Ikonik. Bilder und ihre Anschauung,” 320.
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Figure 6a: Anton Springer, Das Nachleben der Antike im Mittelalter,
In Bilder aus der neueren Kunstgeschichte, ed. by Anton Springer,
Bonn 1867, 14–15.
Fig. 6a Springer, Das Nachleben, 14–15.
from a Twelfth centuryMagdeburgian tomb slab57 to the antique Capitolinean
Spinario (fig. 6a).58 He followed an understanding of Medieval art according
to which antiquity lived on in Medieval art.This new narrative was a veritable
shift of paradigm. The comparison is explicitly addressed by the author:
DieAusführung ist, wie derVergeichmit demantikenWerke darthut, von kin-
discher Rohheit. Die Thatsache aber, daß inDeutschland im frühenMittelal-
ter eine antike Skulptur die Phantasie eines Künstlers erfüllt, wird dadurch
nicht aufgehoben.59
57 Magdeburg,Dome, Tombof Frederic I ofWettin, detail of the ‘boywith thorn’, bronze, c.
1152, cf. http://www.rdklabor.de/wiki/Datei:04-0291-2.jpg#/media/File:04-0291-2.jpg
[last access: 12.2.2019].
58 Rome, Conservators’s Palace, Sala dei Trionfi, ‘boy with thorn’, bronze, 5th/1st-cen-
tury BC, cf. http://www.rdklabor.de/wiki/Datei:04-0291-1.jpg#/media/File:04-0291-1.
jpg [last access: 12.2.2019].
59 Springer, Anton, “Das Nachleben der Antike im Mittelalter.” In Bilder aus der neueren
Kunstgeschichte, Bonn: A. Marcus, 1867, 1–28, on p. 15 [my italics].
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Figure 6b: Wilhelm Vöge, “Die Bahnbrecher des Naturstudiums um
1200”, In Zeitschrift für bildende Kunst, N.F. 25, H. 8 (1914), 216.
Fig. 6b Vöge, “Die Bahnbrecher”, 216.
With topoi like “childish rawness,” Springer certainly applies older patterns
of explanation, while in his illustrative apparatus both artworks encounter
each other by means of the specific typographical design of the page, thereby
entirely ignoring their actual sizes, which were in fact very different. (fig. 6b)
There ismuch to say about the consequences of the development of new repro-
duction techniques like photography, but I will close this paper with a final ex-
ample. In 1914, the art historical medievalist Wilhelm Vöge (1868–1952)—one
of the first academic professors who had this specialization—published an
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article entitled Die Bahnbrecher des Naturstudiums um 1200.60 From a histo-
riographical position, this article is interesting in several respects, but par-
ticularly the use of images is worth studying since they are arranged like a
‘second order narrative’. The article finishes not only with a textual compari-
son of two pieces of art but with a rhetorical ellipse:61 “Noch trügerischer aber
ist das Reich der Masken. Ich begnüge mich, eine von ihnen zu zeigen [...].”62
The author entangles the reader in a narrative network, and, in the end, ex-
poses him or her to the veristically portrayed head of an old man, while Vöge
no longer felt the need to accompany this final image with any words.
60 Vöge, Wilhelm.,“Die Bahnbrecher des Naturstudiums um 1200,” Zeitschrift für bilden-
de Kunst 49 (N. F. 25), 1914: 193–216. See also: Heyder, Joris Corin. “Same, Similar, Sem-
blable: Languages of Connoisseurship,” Journal of Art Historiography 16, 2017: 1–15.
61 In this case, the ellipse is not understood typographically butwith regard to the literary
content.
62 Vöge, “Die Bahnbrecher des Naturstudiums um 1200,” 216.

Narrating Art History
Practices of Comparing in Exhibitions and Written
Surveys with regard to documenta I
Britta Hochkirchen
1. Narrating and comparing: a conjunction to achieve
temporal organization
The crucial role of narration concerning the construction and understanding
of history has been the subject matter of many theoretical surveys and case
studies.1 Narration is not supplementary to history but essential to its con-
struction within the historiographic discourse. Research on this decisive role
of narration in the history of historiography is most of the time focused on
written texts. This is also the case in the historiography of art history which
is mostly concerned with written concepts of the history of the art. In this
context, the history of modern art was the subject of many volumes of the
late 1940s and 1950s: one famous survey is Werner Haftmann’s Malerei im 20.
Jahrhundert (Painting in the Twentieth Century), which was published in 1954. At
that time Arnold Bode, the chief curator of documenta, asked him to be part
of the organizational team of the exhibition.2 Within the Nazi regime the art
1 White, Hayden, Auch Klio dichtet oder die Fiktion des Faktischen. Studien zur Tropologie des
historischenDiskurses, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986. Danto, Arthur C.,Narration andKnow-
ledge, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.
2 Haftmann was later also in charge of documenta II (1959) and III (1964). He became
the first director of the Neue Nationalgalerie in Berlin in 1967. Cf. for Haftmann and
his role concerning documenta: Tietenberg, Annette, “Eine imaginäre Documenta oder
Der Kunsthistoriker Werner Haftmann als Bildproduzent.” In documenta 1955. Ein wis-
senschaftliches Lesebuch, edited by S. Großpietsch and K.-U. Hemken, Kassel: University
Press, 2018, 266–275. Hennecke, Desirée, “Werner Haftmann und die documenta: ei-
ne Annäherung.” In documenta 1955. Ein wissenschaftliches Lesebuch, edited by S. Groß-
pietsch and K.-U. Hemken, Kassel: University Press, 2018, 276–278.
176 Britta Hochkirchen
historian Werner Haftmann was—this has been investigated lately—involved
as member of NSDAP.3 Hence, his narration of modern art, as told in Paint-
ing in the Twentieth Century and still known until today, is striking: Haftmann
composes a continuous story of modern art as a “European project” that has
“survived” the destruction by the National Socialists and even developed after
the Second World War. To narrate this story, which is characterized by the
continuity and progress of abstract art, Haftmann makes use of practices of
comparing as a discursive strategy to (temporally) connect German art with
the abstract tendencies of modern art in Europe and to (temporally) discon-
nect it from figurative, mimetic modes of former periods of art history, on
the one side, and from contemporary Socialist Realism in the GDR, on the
other. Against this background, this paper focuses on practices of compar-
ing within the historiography of modern art. It will be shown that the history
of the abstract, non-figurative artwork becomes a teleological narration of
progress by means of comparing. Practices of comparing are—that is one of
the central theses of this essay—essential for the temporal structure of the
narration.4 This temporal structure is highly important concerning historio-
graphical narrations. As Lucian Hölscher once put it: “No historical narrative
can do without temporal structures and concepts, which predetermine the
general outline of the story.”5 Hence, the temporal structure needs a more
precise analysis concerning its production.
Very rarely are other media than texts analyzed with regard to their nar-
rative quality. Hence, Mieke Bal has claimed in her essential survey Narra-
tology: “Narratology is the ensemble of theories of narratives, narrative texts,
images, spectacles, events; cultural artefacts that ‘tell a story’.”6 Therefore, I
3 Cf. Trinks, Stefan, “Braun, abstrakt.” In Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (02.03.2020),
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/kunsthistoriker-documenta-berater-und-lan
gjaehrige-direktor-der-berliner-nationalgalerie-werner-haftmann-in-nationalsozi-
alismus-verstrickt-16615552.html (last access 03.05.2020). Rauterberg, Hanno, “Hüter
des falschen Friedens.” In Die Zeit (06.02.2020): 54.
4 See for the importance of the temporal structure of the represented story: Fludernik,
Monika, Erzähltheorie. Eine Einführung, 3rd ed., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesell-
schaft, 2010, 44.
5 Hölscher, Lucian, “TimeGardens: historical concepts inmodern historiography,”History
and Theory 53, 4/2014: 577–591, on p. 577.
6 Bal, Mieke, Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative, 3rd ed., Toronto/Buf-
falo/London: University of Tronto Press, 2009, 3. Examples for research about a con-
cept of narration which refers also to other media than texts are: Bal, Mieke, “Telling,
Showing, Showing Off.” In AMieke Bal Reader, edited byM. Bal, Chicago: The University
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will—in a next step—analyze how this narration has been dealt with in an-
other medium: the art exhibition. Although it has been often indicated that
art exhibitions construct art history as well as written texts (if not even with
more evidentia),7 there are only few surveys analyzing case studies concerning
the making of the historiographic narrative.8 With regard to exhibitions in
the Natural History Museum and the Museum of Modern Art in New York,
Mieke Bal argued in her essay Telling, Showing, Showing Off that it is the act of
showing within an exhibition that can be compared to the speech act and its
power to produce “truth”: “This exposition, both in the broader, general sense
of ‘exposing an idea’ and in the specific sense of exhibition, points at objects,
and in that gesture makes a statement.”9 On these grounds I will focus on the
parallels and differences between the narration within a text and within an
art exhibition.This is possible with regard to the project of documenta I which
was supervised by Arnold Bode. He was supported by Werner Haftmann who
of Chicago Press, 2006, 169–208. Koschorke, Albrecht,Wahrheit und Erfindung.Grundzü-
ge einer Allgemeinen Erzähltheorie, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 2012. Cf. with special regard
to the narrationwithin exhibitions: Buschmann, Heike, “Geschichten imRaum. Erzähl-
theorie alsMuseumsanalyse.” InMuseumsanalyse.MethodenundKonturen eines neuen For-
schungsfeldes, edited by J. Baur, Bielefeld: transcript, 2010, 149–170. See for the aspect
of narration and pictures: Kemp, Wolfgang, “Ellipsen, Analepsen, Gleichzeitigkeiten.
Schwierige Aufgaben für die Bilderzählung.” In Der Text des Bildes. Möglichkeiten und
Mittel eigenständiger Bilderzählung, edited by W. Kemp, Munich: edition text + kritik,
1989, 62–88.
7 With regard to documenta I these constitutive surveys towards the question of art-
historiography shall be mentioned: Grasskamp, Walter, “Modell documenta oder wie
wird Kunstgeschichte gemacht?,” Kunstforum International 49, 04-05/1982: 15–22. Fos-
ter, Hal, “Museum Tales of Twentieth-Century Art,” Studies of Art 74, 2009: 253–375. Von
Bismarck, Beatrice, “Der Teufel trägt Geschichtlichkeit oder Im Look der Provokation:
When Attitudes become Form – Bern 1969/Venice 2013.” In Kunstgeschichtlichkeit.Histo-
rizität und Anachronie in der Gegenwartskunst, edited by E. Kernbauer, Munich: Wilhelm
Fink, 2015, 233–248, esp. 234. Locher, Hubert, “Die Kunst des Ausstellens. Anmerkun-
gen zu einem unübersichtlichen Diskurs.” In Kritische Szenografie. Die Kunstausstellung
im 21. Jahrhundert, edited by K.-U. Hemken, Bielefeld: transcript, 2015, 41–62, esp. 45.
8 See, for example, Hoffmann, Katja, Ausstellungen als Wissensordnung. Zur Transforma-
tion des Kunstbegriffs auf der Documenta 11, Bielefeld: transcript, 2013. And recently with
regard to the historiography of the Nazi regime and its connection to modernism:
Tymkiw,Michael,Nazi ExhibitionDesign andModernism, Minneapolis: University ofMin-
nesota Press, 2018.
9 Bal, “Telling, Showing, Showing Off,” on p. 171.
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was in charge of the art historical basis and of choosing the works of art that
were to be presented.10
The destroyed Fridericianumwas the venue for this exhibition which took
place in 1955, ten years after the end of the Second World War and the Nazi
regime.The exhibition was conceived to present the current state of art of the
twentieth century. The choice of the location and venue in Kassel was a polit-
ical statement that was in a dilemma with regard to a narration of postwar
art history in Germany: On the one hand, the objective was to show that Ger-
man postwar art could keep up with international, western modernism, de-
spite the degradation of modern, abstract art to “degenerated art” (“Entartete
Kunst”) by the Nazis.11 The similarities between European modern art and
German postwar art were to be shown to emphasize a continuity of western
modernism. On the other hand, the goal was to mark a discontinuity towards
the Socialist Realism of the GDR—the border of which was close to Kassel.12
Both aims are a common place within the research on documenta I and the
history of this exhibition, which still takes place every five years in Germany.
However, there are hardly any analyses of how these narratives were actually
brought into the time-space-constellation of the exhibition room. Which cu-
ratorial practices mediated this narrative of continuity and discontinuity at
the same time?
From the beginning, the documenta was understood as a project to show
the state of art after the GreatWar and the Nazi regime in western Germany.13
It therefore stood in close connection to Haftmann’s treatise about painting
in the twentieth century, which was published before (volume 1) and during
(volume 2) the time of the exhibition’s preparation. Haftmann was not only in
10 The exhibition took place from July 15 until September 18, 1955. Confer for the first do-
cumenta: Kimpel, Harald, Documenta. Mythos und Wirklichkeit, Cologne: DuMont, 1997,
esp. 248–256. Grasskamp, Walter, “documenta – kunst des XX. jahrhunderts. interna-
tionale ausstellung immuseum fridericianum inKassel. 15. Juli bis 18. September 1955.”
In documenta 1955. Ein wissenschaftliches Lesebuch, edited by S. Großpietsch and K.-U.
Hemken, Kassel: University Press, 2018, 18–25, 19.
11 This is themain thesis of the chapter “Coming to termswith the past.” InHaraldKimpel,
documenta.Die Überschau. Fünf JahrzehnteWeltkunstausstellung in Stichwörtern, Cologne:
DuMont, 2002, 11–26. Winkler, Kurt, “II. documenta 59 – Kunst nach 1945,” In Stationen
derModerne.Die bedeutenden Kunstausstellungen des 20. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland (exh.
cat. Berlin, BerlinischeGalerieMuseum fürmoderne Kunst), 3rd ed., edited by K.Wink-
ler, Berlin: Nicolai Publishing & Intelligence GmbH, 1988, 426–473, 427.
12 Cf. Kimpel, documenta. Die Überschau, 11–26 .
13 Cf. Grasskamp, „Modell documenta oder wie wird Kunstgeschichte gemacht?“.
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charge of choosing the works of art that were to be presented at the documenta
I, he also wrote the introduction to the documenta catalogue. Here the narra-
tion of German postwar art as a narration of modernism, which is central to
his survey Painting in the Twentieth Century, is repeated and emphasized. In the
following in a first step, Haftmann’s use of practices of comparing concerning
the time structure of the textual narration of art history will be analyzed. In
a second step, the focus will be on how narration was transferred to the spa-
tial organization of works of art within the exhibition room. Because of the
different materiality and mediality of the narration within a text and an exhi-
bition, it is worth looking at what changes can be registered—especially with
regard to the practices of comparing and their qualities of structuring time
within the narration. The question therefore is how narration and the prac-
tices of comparing change with regard to the medium of narration—written
texts and exhibition. Is there a connection between narrating and comparing?
2. Narrating and comparing within written art history: Werner
Haftmann’s Painting in the Twentieth Century and his
introduction of the documenta-catalogue
In 1954, one year before the opening of the documenta,Werner Haftmann pub-
lished his survey Painting in the Twentieth Century. This textbook was accompa-
nied in 1955 by a volume of plates.14 As the title says, the book focuses on
painting and on a special time: the twentieth century. With regard to the or-
der of time within Haftmann’s textual narration of the history of modern art,
he emphasizes in his introduction that the point of view fromwhich the story
will be told is the present: It is the contemporary state of the art that he wants
to examine. But with that aim in mind, Haftmann describes the problem of
defining the so-called present state of the art: “Because of the overlapping of
generations and the modes of expression they embody, the so-called ‘present’
is a phenomenon of great complexty.” (“‘Gegenwart’ wird durch die Überla-
gerung von Generationen und der von ihnen getragenen Ausdrucksweisen zu
14 Haftmann,Werner,Malerei im 20. Jahrhundert, Vol. 2, Munich: Prestel-Verlag, 1955. Tie-
tenberg, „Eine imaginäre documenta,“ 271-272.
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einem sehr komplexen Phänomen.”)15 Haftmann points out that the present is
a complex phenomenon because of the multilayering of generations and their
respective stylistic qualities.16 The art historian Wilhelm Pinder had already
declared in 1926 that there is a multiple temporality within art history when
one considers all the different generationsworking at the same time.17 But fol-
lowing Haftmann’s argumentation, these different layers of generations com-
plicate an historical understanding of the present.18 Haftmann’s argument is
based on an understanding of art history as a linear progress19—but with dif-
ferent lines at the same time. Therefore, he explains in his introduction the
methodological assumption to “narrate” the history of modern, abstract art
15 Haftmann, Werner, Painting in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 1, London: Lund Humphries,
1976, 11. Haftmann,Werner,Malerei im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Entwicklungsgeschichte, Vol.
1, Munich: Prestel-Verlag, 1954, 10.
16 Haftmann refers to Picasso and Matisse who still influence present art. Haftmann,
Malerei im 20. Jahrhundert, Vol. 1, 10. 50 years later, the historian Reinhart Koselleck
defined this quality of layers of time as “simultaneity of the non-simultaneous.” Kosel-
leck, Reinhart, “Einleitung.” In Zeitschichten. Studien zur Historik. Mit einem Beitrag von
Hans-Georg Gadamer, 4th ed., edited by R. Koselleck, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2015,
9–18, 9.
17 Pinder,Wilhelm,Das ProblemderGeneration in der Kunstgeschichte Europas, Berlin: Frank-
furter Verlags-Anstalt, 1926. Confer for Haftmann’s references to Pinder’s theory: Fas-
tert, Sabine, “‘Ich habe als europäischerHistoriker geschrieben über europäischeMale-
rei‘.WernerHaftmanns Prinzipien der Kunstbetrachtung,“ in:Kunst–Geschichte–Wahr-
nehmung. Strukturen und Mechanismen vonWahrnehmungsstrategien, edited by Stephan
Albrecht, Michaela Braesel, Sabine Fastert et al., Munich/Berlin: Deutscher Kunstver-
lag, 2008, 311-326, esp. 311. Moser, Thomas, “‘Kunst [ist das], was bedeutende Künstler
machen‘. ZurDifferenzierung zwischenTraditionund Innovation inWernerHaftmanns
Schaffen der 50er und 60er Jahre,“ Helikon. A Multidisziplinary Online Journal, 3 (2014):
35–53, esp. 37. See for other concepts of temporality within the historiography of art:
Karlholm, Dan, “Is History to Be Closed, Saved, or Restarted? Considering Efficient Art
History.” In Time in the History of Art. Temporality, Chronology and Anachrony, edited by D.
Karlholm and K. Moxey, New York/London: Routledge, 2018, 13–25.
18 “It is only by adhering to definite methodological principles that it is possible to find
‘historical’ trends in so complex a situation.” Haftmann, Painting in the Twentieth Centu-
ry, Vol. 1, 11. “In dieser Vielschichtigkeit nun dennoch ‘Ge-schichte’ zu erkennen, setzt
einen bestimmten methodischen Ansatz voraus.” Haftmann, Malerei im 20. Jahrhun-
dert, Vol. 1, 11.
19 Cf. Hoffmann, Ausstellungen alsWissensordnungen, 95. Hemken, Kai-Uwe, “Kuratorische
Steuerung kultureller Diskurse: documenta 1955.” In documenta 1955. Ein wissenschaft-
liches Lesebuch, edited by S. Großpietsch and K.-U. Hemken, Kassel: University Press,
2018, 127–167, 131.
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as a progress: “These fundamental conceptions or basic purposes provide the
plan according to which the historian constructs ‘history’ out of the complex
data he finds in reality; only in this way can he describe the process of tempo-
ral growth while dealing with simultaneous phenomena […].” (“Diese Grund-
einsätze und Grundentwürfe nun sind die eigentlichen Bausteine, mit denen
es dem Geschichtsschreiber gelingt, aus dem Vielschichtigen das ‘Geschich-
te’ aufzubauen und eben als Geschichte zur Darstellung zu bringen, die den
zeitlichen Wachstumsprozeß innerhalb der Gleichzeitigkeit alles Daseienden
zu beschreiben fähig ist [...].”)20 In this context, he later argues similarly in
the introduction of the exhibition catalogue of the documenta, adding that the
perspective towards the historical development is important with regard to
the special position of German art:
“For example, it would not have been difficult to unite the recent painting,
which had prevailed in the European countries since the end of thewar, in an
exhibition in such a way that the attained points of view and the resulting
perspectives would have come to light. But this would not have been suf-
ficient for the peculiar German situation. Rather, it required a broader ap-
proach, from the perspective of history, so that this fleeting, ever-changing,
indeterminable by itself, one-dimensional point of the ‘present’ again gains
breadth, depth, and multidimensionality.”
“[E]s wäre z. B. nicht schwer gewesen, die seit dem Kriegsende sich in den
europäischen Ländern mächtig durchsetzende junge Malerei in einer Aus-
stellung so zu vereinen, daß die erreichten Standpunkte und die daraus sich
ergebendenPerspektiven klar zutage getretenwären. Damitwäre aber eben
der besonderen deutschen Lage nicht genüge getan gewesen. Diese ver-
langte vielmehr einen breiteren Ansatz, aus der Geschichte her, damit jener
flüchtige, in ständiger Wandlung begriffene, aus sich allein nicht bestimm-
bare, eindimensionale Punkt ‘Gegenwart’ wieder Breite, Tiefe, das Vieldi-
mensionale gewinnt.”21
Haftmann accentuates the development, the “progress of […] growth” of art
history, also with regard to the development of German art, andwants to trace
20 Haftmann, Painting in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 1, 11. Haftmann, Malerei im 20. Jahr-
hundert, Vol. 1, 11. Hemken, “Kuratorische Steuerung kultureller Diskurse: documenta
1955,” 131.
21 Haftmann,Werner, “Einleitung.” In documenta. Kunst des XX. Jahrhunderts (exh. cat. Kas-
sel, Museum Fridericianum), 2nd ed., Munich: Prestel-Verlag, 1979, 15–25, 16. Unless
otherwise specified, translations are my own, B. H.
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it up to the present.Through producing continuity by means of comparing he
declares (and legitimates) his concept of abstract art with the help of “natu-
ral” growth, grounded on a causal development.22 Haftmann wants to show
the “complex unity of ‘the present’” (“Ganzheitlichkeit von ‘Gegenwart’”).23 He
emphasizes his perspective as a contemporary narrator who tells the story (of
the present!) from an actual contemporary point of view by means of looking
backwards into the past. To realize this temporal mode of narration, and to
demonstrate “the process of temporal growth while dealing with simultane-
ous phenomena,” he has to arrange his narration by means of continuity and
discontinuity through practices of comparing. Angelika Epple and Walter Er-
hart have argued that different strategies of comparing generate—depending
on the situative context—the similarity (and continuity) or the difference (and
discontinuity) of two or more relata.24 Comparing is therefore not a neutral
modus operandi but a practice that unfolds its power by neutralizing its out-
come: practices of comparing hence are highly performative.25 They are not
22 A similar argumentation was used by Alfred H. Barr for his exhibition Cubism and Ab-
stract Art which took place in the Museum of Modern Art, New York, in 1936. His fa-
mous chart, which was reproduced on the cover of the exhibition catalogue, shows
the development of all the “isms” with the help of arrows, and it also starts with the
1890s. See for this way of narration of “progress” of art: Voss, Julia, “Wer schreibt Kunst-
geschichte? Kritik, Kunstwissenschaft, Markt undMuseum,” Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschich-
te 78, 2015: 16–31, 18. For the discussion of Barr’s diagram, see also Klonk, Charlotte,
Spaces of Experience. Art Gallery Interiors from 1800 to 2000, New Haven/London: Yale
University Press, 2009, 135–141; Hal Foster also examines continuities and discontinu-
ities within the narration ofmodernism in theMuseumofModern Art: Foster, Museum
Tales of Twentieth-Century art, 354. Lowry, Glenn D., “Abstraction in 1936: Barr’s Dia-
grams.” In Inventing Abstraction 1910–1925.How a Radical Idea changedModern Art, edited
by L. Dickerman, London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 2012, 359–363, esp. 361; Hoffmann,
Ausstellungen als Wissensordnungen, 95; Brennan, Marcia, Curating Consciousness. Mysti-
cism and the Modern Museum, London, MA: MIT Press, 2010, 30–57. Mitchell, W. J. T.,
Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation, Chicago/London, MA: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1994, 231–235. For the development of Barr’s diagram and its
relation to other art historiographicalmodels, see Schmidt-Burkhardt, Astrit, “Shaping
Modernism. Alfred Barr’s genealogy of art,”Word & Image 16 (4), 2000: 387–400.
23 Haftmann, Painting in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 1, 11. Haftmann, Malerei im 20. Jahr-
hundert, Vol. 1, 11 .
24 Epple, Angelika and Walter Erhart, “Die Welt beobachten – Praktiken des Verglei-
chens.” In Die Welt beobachten – Praktiken des Vergleichens, edited by A. Epple and W.
Erhart, Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 2015, 7–34, on p. 13.
25 Cf. Epple and Erhart, “Die Welt beobachten,“ 19.
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only dependent on the intentions of a (human) agent, in this case Haftmann,
but also on the situative context and its medial, i.e., also material, basis.26
The tertium comparationis is also not a neutral but a chosen aspect of two (or
more) chosen relata. If we look again at Haftmann’s order of narration, it is
remarkable that he begins his introduction with a comparison:
“For the profoundly revolutionary developments in painting, which set
in about 1890, cannot be viewed apart from modern mankind as a whole,
whose situation they illustrate. [...] It [modern painting; author’s note] bears
witness to the decline of an old conception of reality and the emergence
of a new one. The view of the world that is being superseded today is that
which was first shaped by the early Florentine masters with their naïve
enthusiasm for the concrete reality of the visible world, which they set out
to define. It was the foundation of the Renaissance and of the various styles
deriving from it down to Tiepolo, and sustained all the idealisations and
stylisations evolved over a period of four centuries. This foundation was first
breached by the Romantic movement, and the persistent nineteeth-century
attempts at restoration were unable to mend the breach.”
“Die revolutionären und radikalen Prozesse, die in der Malerei seit etwa
1890 in Gang gekommen sind, sind eben nicht isoliert vom Ganzen der
modernen Menschlichkeit zu sehen, sie haben repräsentativen Wert für
sie. [...] Sie berichten in sinnfällig einsehbarer Form vom Untergang eines
alten und der Heraufkunft eines neuen Wirklichkeitsbildes. Es handelt
sich um die Ablösung des Wirklichkeitsbildes, das die leuchtenden Geister
der florentinischen Frühzeit im begeisterten Vertrauen auf die wirkliche
Wirklichkeit des Sichtbaren in ihrer archaisch definierendenWeise langsam
heraufhoben und das dann bis hin zu Tiepolo die großen, auf jener ‘Renais-
sance’ gründenden Stilwelten trug. Dieser gesetzte Wirklichkeitsgrund, der
alle Idealismen und Stilisierungen über vier Jahrhunderte auf sich nahm,
begann in der Romantik brüchig zu werden.”27
26 Cf. Epple and Erhart, “Die Welt beobachten,“ 20.
27 Haftmann, Painting in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 1, 10. Haftmann, Malerei im 20. Jahr-
hundert, Vol. 1, 9. It is striking that Alfred H. Barr’s famous introduction within the cat-
alogue to the exhibition of Cubism and Abstract Art starts with the same comparison
of Renaissance art to declare a discontinuity and thus the basis for the continuity of
the progress of abstract art: “Sometimes in the history of art it is possible to describe
a period or a generation of artists as having been obsessed by a particular problem.
The artists of the early fifteenth century for instance were moved by a passion for im-
itating nature. In the North the Flemings mastered appearances by the meticulous
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Haftmann compares painting during the Renaissance with painting during
Romanticism as well as with that of the 1890s, a date which is connected to
the advent of Impressionism.These relata are compared with regard to the as-
pect (tertium comparationis) of style (“Stilwelten”) in which the painting refers to
“reality” and how this “reality” is understood (“Wirklichkeitsbild”). By empha-
sizing these aspects, the art of the Renaissance is put in contrast and temporal
discontinuity to that of Romanticism, which is itself compared to the art of
the 1890s. Haftmann uses this strategy of comparing to construct a narra-
tion of art that is perceived as “old”—the stylistic depiction of Renaissance
painters and the mode of figurative mimesis—towards art which is perceived
as “new”—the stylistic way of depiction brought up by Romanticism and its
mode of abstraction. The act of comparing makes it possible to declare dis-
continuity and continuity at the same time. Hence, in his introductory text of
the exhibition catalogue of documenta I, Haftmann argues that contemporary
art in Germany has to be understood in relation to modern European abstract
art. Even if German art and its modes of abstraction have been suppressed by
the Nazi regime, according to Haftmann, contemporary German art can pick
up on its early attempts at abstraction through the connection to European
modern art:
“Thus, the question regarding the meaning and purpose of a great art exhi-
bition in Germany ten years after the end of totalitarianism, if it had value
in general, should under no circumstances ignore the development process
of modern art that has lasted for decades. The widespread idea that a hand-
ful—depending on the point of view of the desperate or ingenious—indi-
vidualities so decisively changed the face of art should be replaced by that
other, correct one, according to which a general and legitimately developed
transformation of consciousness led to, indeed even forced, those changes.
Thus, history came into play, the question of continuity, the documentary.
And connected to that—the European, because all this was and is a Euro-
pean process down to the last ramifications, down to the very youngest gen-
observation of external detail. In Italy the Florentines employed a profounder science
to discover the laws of perspective, of foreshortening, anatomy, movement and relief.
In the early twentieth century the dominant interest was almost exactly opposite. The
pictorial conquest of the external visual world had been completed and refined many
times and in different ways during the previous half millennium.” Barr, Jr., Alfred H.,
Cubism and Abstract Art (exh. cat. New York, The Museum of Modern Art), New York:
The Museum of Modern Art, 1936, on p. 11.
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erations. The task was thus: development and European entanglement of
modern art. ”
“Es durfte also jetzt bei der Frage nach Sinn und Absicht einer, zehn Jah-
re nach dem Ende des deutschen Totalitarismus und in Deutschland un-
ternommenen großen Kunstschau, sollte sie Wert fürs Allgemeine haben,
gerade der seit Jahrzehnten währende Entwicklungsprozeß der modernen
Kunst unter keinen Umständen übergangen werden, um die verbreitete ge-
schichtslose Vorstellung, nach der eine Handvoll—je nach dem Blickpunkt
desperater oder genialischer—Individualitäten dasGesicht der Kunst so ent-
scheidend veränderte, durch jene andere, richtige zu ersetzen, nach der ei-
ne allgemeine und legitim heraufgewachsene Bewußtseinswandlung jene
Veränderungen begründete, ja nahezu erzwang. Damit trat die Geschichte
ins Spiel, die Frage nach der Kontinuität, das Dokumentarische. Und zusam-
menhängend damit—das Europäische, denn all’ dies war und ist bis in die
letzten Verästelungen, bis in die allerjüngsten Generationen hinein ein eu-
ropäischer Vorgang. Als Aufgabe stellte sich also: Entwicklung und europäi-
sche Verflechtung der modernen Kunst.”28
The progress of modernist art has to be understood as an entangled Euro-
pean project: For Haftmann, the development of modernist art can be pre-
sumed only with regard to the compared similarities between European art
and their abstract way of depiction. Here again, Haftmann constitutes conti-
nuity by means of comparing German contemporary art of the 1950s to Euro-
pean art of the twentieth century. The aspect in which he assumes similarity,
the tertium comparationis, is again the non-mimetic, abstract way of depiction,
which follows, according to Haftmann, from the “new” concept of “reality.” He
argues that the modernist painting still represents a relation to the “objective
world” but not in the modus operandi of a mimetic representation:
“Rather, it was precisely an in-depth mode of experiencing the objective
world from a special perspective that changed the entire behavior of mod-
ern mankind toward the visual world surrounding it. The insight was that
the objective world did not exist so unquestionably that the realm of greater
knowledge revealed itself only beyond its appearance, that it was already
defined by the nature of the beholder and the way of looking at it, often in
unexpected ways.”
“Vielmehr handelte es sich gerade um eine vertiefte Erlebnisweise der
28 Haftmann, „Einleitung,“ on p. 18.
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gegenständlichen Welt aus einer besonderen, die gesamte Verhaltens-
weise des modernen Menschen zur ihn umstehenden Erscheinungswelt
verändernden Erfahrung. Die Einsicht war, daß die gegenständliche Welt
gar nicht so fraglos existiere, daß sich erst hinter ihrer Erscheinung das
Reich größerer Erkenntnis erschlösse, daß sie sich allein schon durch die Art
des Betrachters und die Weise des Betrachtens in oft unerwarteter Weise
definierte.”29
To organize the narration with regard to this specificity of non-mimetic ref-
erentiality towards “reality”, Haftmann begins his survey with the emergence
of the Impressionists in the late nineteenth century. The table of contents
consists of thematic chapters which guide the reader from a discontinuity
(the first meta-chapter is entitled “The Turning Point in Art” (“Die Kunst-
wende”30) that is defined by the rise of the Impressionism, followed by other
“isms” of the twentieth century, to the final meta-chapter entitled “The Con-
temporary Scene. Art since 1945” (“Europäische Gegenwart. Die Kunst der
Nachkriegszeit”). The chapters present the individual “isms” of the twenti-
eth century, according to “nationality” or individual artists: “German Impres-
sionism,” “Les Fauves,” “Kandinsky and the Rise of Abstract Painting,” “Neo-
Realism in Germany” or “The Great Style of Pablo Picasso” (“Der deutsche Im-
pressionismus,” “Die Fauves,” “Kandinsky und die Entstehung der abstrakten
Malerei,” “Der Neorealismus in Deutschland” or “Der große Stil Pablo Picas-
sos”). Katja Hoffmann has pointed out that Haftmann uses distinctions in
style to differentiate between epochs, persons, nationalities and “isms.”31
At the same time, a linear progress is presented: The tertium comparationis
with regard to the non-mimetic referentiality towards “reality” is the basis
for this argumentation without explicit comparisons between the different
“isms.”The link between the “isms” and their mode of depiction is emphasized
only through words like “also” and “too.” In the chapter “The Early Picasso and
29 Haftmann, “Einleitung,“ on p. 18 and 19.
30 The temporal discontinuity is already emphasized in the first sentences of this chapter:
“As the nineteenth century was drawing to its end, the peoples of Europe were seized
with a strange spiritual restlessness. By 1890 this had brought about great changes in
the prevailing life-feeling and its stylistic expression.“ Haftmann, Painting in the Twen-
tieth Century, Vol. 1, 17. “Eine eigentümliche Unruhe hatte den Geist der europäischen
Länder erfaßt, als das 19. Jahrhundert zu Ende ging. Um 1890 bereits hatte sie Lebens-
empfindung und Stilausdruck weitgehend verändert”. Haftmann, Malerei im 20. Jahr-
hundert, Vol. 1, 16.
31 Hoffmann, Ausstellungen als Wissensordnungen, on p. 76.
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Cubism” (“Der frühe Picasso und der Kubismus”), Haftmann argues implicitly
for the growing progress of non-representational style: “Cubism is also a striv-
ing to fit the representational elements of the picture into the autonomous
order of coloured forms, a task that seemed so urgent to the art theorists
during that decade” (“Auch der Kubismus ist ein Ergebnis des Angleichens
der gegenständlichen Bildinhalte an das selbstständige Ordnungsgefüge der
farbigen Formen, das dem bildnerischen Denken des Jahrzehnts so dringlich
schien”).32 At the end of each of four meta-chapters of the German edition,
however, Haftmann also adds one section entitled “A Backward Glance” (“Der
Blick zurück”), in which he refers to the discontinuity by means of a temporal
comparison that is marked by the words “no longer”:
“The painter no longer looks outward to the ‘motif’, but inward to an emotion
that strives to manifest itself in the picture. For this reason, the greatest im-
portance is attached to the cultivation of form and colour. Formal invention
replaces thematic invention. The picture becomes an independent organ-
ism, an architecture of coloured forms in a non-illusionist, non-perspective
space that belongs exclusively to the picture.”
“Vom Standpunkt des Malers gesprochen, richtet sich jetzt der Blick nicht
mehr auf das Draußen und das ‘Motiv’, er richtet sich mit aller Kraft auf das,
was im Bilde zur Erscheinung gelangen will. Aus diesem Grunde wird die
Kultivierung der farbigen und formalen Mittel von größter Wichtigkeit. Die
formale Erfindung ersetzt die motivische Erfindung. Das Bild ist ein selbst-
ständiger Organismus, eine Architektur aus farbigen Formen in einer nicht
illusionistischen Räumlichkeit, die in ihrer Aperspektivik allein dem Bilde
zugehört.”33
Therefore, Haftmann claims that contemporary modern painting takes place
exactly on the edge between figuration and abstraction.34 The asserted dis-
continuity is the product of a comparison of style with regard to the mode
of pictorial referentiality.35 On the whole, Haftmann’s narration is linear in
the order of the “isms,” which he refers to in his chapters in their “national”
32 Haftmann, Painting in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 1, 95. Haftmann, Malerei im 20. Jahr-
hundert, Vol. 1, 139.
33 Haftmann, Painting in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 1, 145. Haftmann, Malerei im 20. Jahr-
hundert, Vol. 1, 221.
34 Cf. Haftmann, “Einleitung,“ on p. 21.
35 Hoffmann points out that Haftmann fulfills an analysis that is based on formalistic
characteristics of the works of art. From that it would follow that he argues with stylis-
188 Britta Hochkirchen
tradition.36 There are no figures within this first volume of his survey (de-
spite a few portraits of the artists he mentions) and rarely direct comparisons
between the different paintings of the different “isms.” On the contrary: Al-
though he claims that there is a relation between European modern paint-
ing and German art before and after the Nazi regime, he does not explicitly
compare them in his first volume.There are chapters about German art (“Ex-
pressionism in North Germany,” “The Neue Künstlervereinigung of Munich”
or “The Bauhaus Painters” / “Der norddeutsche Expressionismus,” “Neue Kün-
stlervereinigung München” or “Die Maler vom Bauhaus”) as well as chapters
on the other “national” “isms”: “Italy and the Modern Spirit,” “Russian Supre-
matism and Constructivism” or “The Italian Contribution” (“Italien und der
moderne Geist,” “Der russische Suprematismus und der Konstruktivismus”
or “Der Beitrag Italiens”). However, Haftmann leaves it up to the reader to
compare these “isms.” Only with regard to the present state of the art, which
is the topic of the last meta-chapter entitled “The Contemporary Scene. Art
since 1945” (“Europäische Gegenwart. Die Kunst der Nachkriegszeit”), does
Haftmann compare works by artists of different nations.
This strategy becomes even more obvious in the second volume of Painting
in the Twentieth Century, in which Haftmann makes use of figures to under-
line his arguments visually. Chapters which solely concentrate on the art of
one European country (“Italian Painting between the Wars,” “German Paint-
ing between theWars” and “French Painting between theWars” / “Italienische
Malerei zwischen den Kriegen,” “DeutscheMalerei zwischen den Kriegen” and
“Französische Malerei zwischen den Kriegen”) are followed by one (“Paint-
ing of the Present” / “Malerei der Gegenwart”) that focuses on the underlying
similarity of contemporary post-war art of the European countries, including
German art. While the works of art are compared within the text, the figures
are arranged separately:The works of one artist are in most cases arranged on
double pages, so that an immediate comparison between paintings by artists
from different countries is not initiated directly.37 Furthermore, the line-up
tic devices and produces a formalistic historiography. Hoffmann, Ausstellungen alsWis-
sensordnungen, 76.
36 Cf. Fastert, “‘Ich habe als europäischer Historiker geschrieben über europäische Male-
rei‘. Werner Haftmanns Prinzipien der Kunstbetrachtung,“ 318.
37 There are some exceptions within the German original edition Haftmann, Malerei im
20. Jahrhundert, Vol. 2: Double-pagewith paintings of LeoneMinassian andRolf Nesch,
452 and 453; Werner Heldt and Eduard Bargheer, 458 and 459; Mattia Moreni and
Roberto Crippa, 490 and 491; Victor de Vasarely andMax Bill, 498 and 499; Fritz Glarner
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of the different European artists makes it possible to compare them to each
other but not—at the same time—to former “isms” of art history. To make
this clear: One of the contemporary German artists, FritzWinter, is presented
in the chapter “Painting of the Present” (“Malerei der Gegenwart”), followed
by figures showing two of his paintings on a double-page, Große Komposition
(Wandlung) of 1953 and Komposition Nr. 5 from 1949 (fig. 1).38
Figure 1: Double-page with Fritz Winter’s »Große Komposition
(Wandlung)« of 1953 and »Komposition Nr. 5« from 1949
In Werner Haftmann,Malerei im 20. Jahrhundert, Vol. 2, Munich:
Prestel-Verlag, 1955, 494 and 495.
© VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn 2020.
Creative Commons license terms for re-use do not apply to this pic-
ture and further permission may be required from the right holder.
It is striking that the painting on the left is older than that on the right, so
that the chronology of “progress” is undermined by the direction of reading.
Furthermore, the left figure is black and white while the right one is in color.
The comparative perspective does not focus on color but on the abstract mode
of depiction. A leading artist of abstraction like Picasso is shown i. a. in the
chapter “French Painting between the Wars” (“Französische Malerei zwischen
and Vordemberge-Gildewart, 500 and 501; Giuseppe Capogrossi and Ben Nicholson,
502 and 503.
38 FritzWinter,GroßeKomposition (Wandlung), 1953, oil on canvas, 160 x 190 cm, possession
of the artist; Fritz Winter, Komposition Nr. 5, 1949, oil on canvas, 95 x 110 cm, private
collection. Haftmann,Malerei im 20. Jahrhundert, Vol. 2, on p. 494 and 495.
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den Kriegen”)—followed by ten figures on double-pages within the image-
part: for example, Der Hahn (1938) vis-à-vis Guernica (1937) as well as Nachtfi-
schen bei Antibes (1939) vis-à-vis Die Frauen von Algier (15. Version) (1955).39 The
immediate comparison between the contemporary works ofWinter and those
of Picasso is not initiated by how the pictures are organized or by the thematic
order of chapters. Haftmann’s introductory text of the exhibition catalogue of
documenta I, however, emphasized this comparison with regard to the aspect
of similarity in the non-mimetic and non-figurative referentiality.
As a first conclusion of the strategy of narration within texts, we can see
that Haftmann uses practices of comparing for the temporal organization of
his “narration” of modern, abstract painting. He takes a present perspective
but looks back at the past to gain insights into the progress of modernist
painting. By means of comparing he constructs a discontinuity of modernist
painting that emerged with the Romantic movement and was different than
anything before. The difference is proponed with regard to the style of depic-
tion: there is no longer a mimetic depiction of the world (like in Renaissance
painting). The comparison between modernist paintings is based on this ter-
tium comparationis:They show a continuity of similarity in theway of depiction.
And it is through comparing that Haftmann can also argue that German post-
war art is part of this progress: despite the break caused by the Nazi regime,
modernist abstract art could continue as it is shown as an European project.
The discontinuity Haftmann claims between the mode of referentiality
in paintings before and after the Romantic movement, especially with the
rise of the Impressionism, is constructed in the narration of the postwar art
in parallel to another break. This narration is again structured by means of
practices of comparing. In the final chapter (“Present-Day Painting” / “Malerei
der Gegenwart”) of the second volume, Haftmann compares the present art of
western parts of Europe to that of the GDR.The tertium comparationis is again
the mode of depiction. In this case, Haftmann claims that there is disconti-
nuity and emphasizes this by means of comparing: “Needless to say, they [the
modernist painters and the abstract way of depiction; author’s note] did not
39 Haftmann, Malerei im 20. Jahrhundert, Vol. 2, on p. 426–435. Pablo Picasso, Der Hahn,
1938, pastell, 56. 5 x 77.5 cm, The Museum of Modern Art, New York; Pablo Picasso,
Guernica, 1937, oil, 350 x 716 cm, The Museum of Modern Art, New York; Pablo Picasso,
Nachtfischen bei Antibes, 1939, oil, 206 x 346 cm, The Museum of Modern Art, New York;
Pablo Picasso, Die Frauen von Algier (15. Version), 1955, oil, 145 x 146 cm, possession of
the artist.
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entirely eliminate representational painting, but to judge by the general situa-
tion of painting today, the capacity of the object to convey ideas and forms has
diminished appreciably.” (“Selbstverständlich verdrängten sie [the modernist
painters and the abstract way of depiction; author’s note] nicht die Malerei,
die sich auf die sichtbaren Bilder der Wirklichkeit richtete, aber es ist ange-
sichts der allgemeinen Situation der Malerei heute nicht zu leugnen, daß die
ideelle und formale Tragkraft des Gegenständlichen ganz fühlbar nachgab”).40
The style of the GDR, the Socialist Realism, with its mimetic referentiality is
put in total contrast to that of modernism. Through the comparison, Haft-
mann creates a discontinuity which connects the style of the Socialist Realism
to the past and that of western modernism to the present, if not to the fu-
ture. To underline this, Haftmann presents an example of Socialist Realism:
Renato Guttuso’s Landnahme in Sizilien from 1949–50 (fig. 2).41 The painting
shows in a figurative style a landscape as well as precisely depicted and dif-
ferentiated characters in the foreground.Haftmann proposes the comparison
in his survey which again emphasizes the progress of abstract art:
“This becomes clear themomentweexamine anyof theworks inspiredby So-
cialist Realism. The Occupation of Uncultivated Land in Sicily [...] by the highly-
talented and vigorous Sicilian artist Renato Guttuso may serve as an exam-
ple. The artist is unable to transform his social enthusiasm into a compact
pictorial reality, and the result is not a viable realism but hollow declama-
tion. And yet the definition of reality in our century had found a highly-pre-
cise expression inPicasso, Beckmann, and Léger.Herewas apracticable point
of departure, and a good many young artists found their way to this possi-
bility of rendering the experience of reality.” 
“Das wird unmittelbar anschaulich, wenn man einmal ein Werk des sozia-
listischen Realismus betrachtet—und als Beispiel stehe hier die ‘Landnah-
me in Sizilien’ des hochbegabten und blutvollen Sizilianers Renato Guttuso
[...]—das Pathos am Ereignis in seiner lebendigen Wirklichkeit verwandelt
sich nicht in bildnerisch verdichteteWirklichkeit, in einen tragkräftigenRea-
lismus. Nun war es doch aber so, daß dieWirklichkeitsbestimmung in unse-
rem Jahrhundert einen ganz präzisen Ausdruck gefunden hatte bei Picasso,
40 Haftmann, Painting in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 2, 439. Haftmann, Malerei im 20. Jahr-
hundert, Vol. 2, 438.
41 Haftmann, Malerei im 20. Jahrhundert, Vol. 2, on p. 438. Renato Guttuso, Landnahme in
Sizilien, 1949–50, ca. 220 x 300 cm, possession of the artist.
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Figure 2: Renato Guttuso’s »Landnahme in Sizilien« from
1949–50
In Werner Haftmann,Malerei im 20. Jahrhundert, Vol. 2, Mu-
nich: Prestel-Verlag, 1955, 439. © VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn 2020.
Creative Commons license terms for re-use do not apply to
this picture and further permission may be required from the
right holder.
bei Beckmann, bei Léger. Hier ließ sich wirklich anknüpfen und ein erhebli-
cher Teil der jüngerenMaler fand zu dieser Darstellungsweise vonWirklich-
keitserlebnissen.”42
Haftmann ends his narration of modern, abstract art in the first volume with
a chapter that clearly refers to the future, entitled “A Glance Forward” / “Ein
Blick nach vorn” (in contrast to the former chapters “The Backward Glance” /
“Der Blick zurück”):
42 Haftmann, Painting in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 2, 439. Haftmann, Malerei im 20. Jahr-
hundert, Vol. 2, 439. In the following, Haftmann refers to an example showing how
younger generations connect to the way of depiction proposed by Picasso and the
others and not to the one brought forward by Socialist Realism: He shows a figure
of Giuseppe Zigaina’s Gras für die Kaninchen, also from 1949 (like the one by Guttuso).
In the original German edition the picture is shown on the next page (440) so that no
immediate comparison between the paintings of Guttuso and Zigaina is possible. The
reader is forced to turn the page.
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“Our path has led us to the present day, but it is not ended. Everything in
the art of today points to an unknown future. Post-war painting as a whole
has a peculiarly fragmentary character. To be sure, it takes its place within
the great stylistic pattern that has been shaping itself since the turn of the
century. But within the general pattern it concentrated overwhelmingly on
abstraction. Contemporary artists have greatly enlarged and defined the ab-
stract domain.”
“Unser Weg ist ausgeschritten, aber nicht zu Ende. Die Grenzmarke des Vor-
handenen haben wir erreicht, aber sie schließt nichts ab. Über sie hinaus
drängt alles in das noch Ungeborene der Zukunft. Die Gesamterscheinung
der europäischen Nachkriegsmalerei hat einen eigentümlichen Fragment-
charakter. Zwar ist sie eingeschrieben in den großen Stilentwurf, der das Er-
gebnis der bildnerischen Tätigkeit seit der Jahrhundertwende war, aber sie
hat innerhalb dieses Stilentwurfes mit Beharrlichkeit das abstrakte Gebiet
sich zur Domäne gemacht. Sie hat es erstaunlich erweitert und präzisiert.”43
As a conclusion, Haftmann shifts his view from the present towards the tele-
ologically framed future. It is the documenta exhibition that opens the possi-
bility to experience the upcoming modernist art and its non-mimetic refer-
entiality in the mode of depiction. Haftmann refers to this exhibition in the
introduction of the catalogue with an explicit invitation to compare: “Here we
now have the first encounter in Germany between younger German art and
artists of the other European countries. This is a great and wonderful event
for us. We can now compare for the first time how the European countries
relate to each other in their contemporary expressions of art.” (“Hier vollzieht
sich jetzt für uns in Deutschland die erste Begegnung der jüngeren deutschen
Kunst mit den Künstlern der anderen europäischen Länder. Das ist für uns
ein großes und wundervolles Ereignis. Wir können nun zum ersten Mal ver-
gleichen, wie sich die europäischen Länder in ihren heutigen Kunstäußerun-
gen zueinander verhalten.”)44These sentences refer to practices of comparing
as a mode to continue the narration of the progress of the non-mimetic art
of modernism. It is the presence of the exhibition that offers access to this
narration.
43 Haftmann, Painting in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 1, 374. Haftmann,Malerei im 20. Jahr-
hundert, Vol. 1, 478 and 479.
44 Haftmann, “Einleitung,“ on p. 25.
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3. Narrating and comparing within the art exhibition: documenta I
The documenta I exhibition of 1955 staged the narration of abstract, non-
mimetic art:45 Bode, on the one hand, kept the raw walls of the destroyed
Fridericianum while, on the other hand—and in contrast to these signs
of destruction—he exaggerated the exhibition’s space by means of textile
panels and metal rods on which the artworks were presented—in distance
to the disintegrating walls.46 The art historian Charlotte Klonk has therefore
pointed out that this curatorial practice could be understood as indicating a
break-up—or in the context of our argumentation: discontinuity—between
the presented artworks and the traces of history.47 Starting from this ob-
servation, the documenta will be examined in the following with regard to
the curatorial strategies with which the narration of postwar art history
is produced. In the previous chapter we followed Haftmann’s strategies to
narrate a teleogical story of progress with regard to the modernist non-
mimetic image. By means of practices of comparing, the written narration
was structured concerning discontinuity (mimetic art before Romanticism
and contemporary art like Socialist Realism) and continuity (non-mimetic
art before the Nazi regime and European abstract art). But how was this
narration transferred into the exhibition space? In what way did curatorial
practices of comparing constitute the temporal organization of the narration
concerning continuity and discontinuity?
The documenta I presented ca. 150 works of art by European modern
artists,48 which in most cases were also referred to in Haftmann’s Painting
45 Cf. Grasskamp, “Modell documenta oder wie wird Kunstgeschichte gemacht?“. At this
point, reference is made only by way of example to research literature on docu-
menta: documenta – Idee und Institution. Tendenzen – Konzepte –Materialien, edited by M.
Schneckenburger, Munich: Bruckmann, 1983. Documenta. Curating the History of the
Present, edited by N. Buurman and D. Richter, in OnCurating 33 (June 2017).
46 See for a closer examiniation of Bode’s display: Hemken, “Kuratorische Steuerung kul-
tureller Diskurse,” 136–145.
47 Klonk, Charlotte, “Die phantasmagorische Welt der ersten documenta und ihr Erbe.”
In Die Ausstellung. Politik eines Rituals, edited by D. von Hantelmann and C. Meister, Zu-
rich/Berlin: Diaphanes, 2010, 131–159, 134. See also for the documenta and its curatorial
practices to produce a spatial experience (mostly with regard to the second edition):
Klonk, Spaces of Experience, esp. 174-175.
48 See for this data Winkler, “II. documenta 59”, 427.
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in the Twentieth Century.49 Additionally, Bode exhibited contemporary artists,
again in reference to Haftmann’s survey: Wols, Ernst Wilhelm Nay, Fritz Win-
ter, Emilio Vedova or Pierre Soulages.50 In comparison to Haftmann’s written
narration, the exhibition deals with the physical presence of the artworks
which—brought together in the exhibition space—produce a mixture of
different times and temporalities: but within the immediate presence of the
exhibition.51 The linear progression of the text is—at least partly—replaced
by the simultaneity of the exhibition. Recent surveys have emphasized the
anachronistic character of exhibitions: In an exhibition, different times
on different levels—for example, concerning the date of the artwork, the
experience of the visitor, the represented time—come together.52 And in this
“simultaneity of the non-simultaneous,”53 there is no narrator who argues
for a special temporal perspective as Haftmann did in the introduction of
his survey. The speaker of the exhibition—on the whole, most exhibitions do
not have an explicit narrator as Mieke Bal has pointed out54—instead places
emphasis on the overall presence of the artworks. The performativity of the
act of comparing focuses on the quality of evidence, as the artworks—and
therefore the narration—are literally (physically) in front of one’s eyes. Jo-
hannes Grave has argued that practices of comparing also influence the
reception of the temporality of pictures and, connected to that—this paper
argues—the historiographical attribution of the work of art.55
49 Therefore also Annette Tietenberg asks how the art historical narration of Painting in
the Twentieth Century had an impact on the presentation of the artworks within the
exhibition (271). She identifiesHaftsmann’s written survey as “script” for the exhibition
(273). Tietenberg, “Eine imaginäre documenta”.
50 A main difference between the exhibition and Haftmann’s survey on painting is the
integration of sculptures within documenta I.
51 Cf. Pomian, Krzysztof, Der Ursprung des Museums. Vom Sammeln, Berlin: Wagenbach,
1986, 44.
52 Cf. Bismarck, “Der Teufel,“ 234–235 . For the question of the special quality of time in ex-
hibitions, see: Bismarck, Beatrice von, Frank, Rike,Meyer-Krahmer, Benjamin, Schafaff,
Jörn andWeski, Thomas, Timing. On the Temporal Dimension of Exhibiting, Berlin: Stern-
berg Press, 2014.
53 Koselleck, “Einleitung,“ 9.
54 Cf. Bal, “Telling, Showing, Showing Off,” 174.
55 Cf. Grave, Johannes, “Vergleichen als Praxis. Vorüberlegungen zu einer praxistheore-
tisch orientierten Untersuchung von Vergleichens.” In Die Welt beobachten – Praktiken
des Vergleichens, edited by A. Epple andW. Erhart, Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag,
2015, 135–159, on p. 150-151.
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Figure 3: Installation shot of »documenta I«, 1955, Museum Fridericianum, Kassel
© documenta Archiv (Dauerleihgabe der Stadt Kassel) / Foto: Günther Becker.
Creative Commons license terms for re-use do not apply to this picture and further
permission may be required from the right holder.
With this in mind, it is striking that the exhibition narrates the history
of art in the twentieth century in a different way than Haftmann’s text.56 The
exhibition is only focused on the temporal dimension of continuity, while the
dimension of discontinuity is left out. Paintings which follow a mimetic way
of depiction are not integrated into the exhibition: there are no works from
before Romanticism as well as no works of Socialist Realism.57 While Haft-
56 Tietenberg emphasizes more the similarities between Haftsmann’s written survey
(volume one and two) and the exhibition: Tietenberg, “Eine imaginäre documenta,”
273. See for a close examination of the exhibition’s narration with regard to continuity
(87), discontinuity (98) and practices of comparing (113): Grasskamp, Walter, Die unbe-
wältigte Moderne. Kunst und Öffentlichkeit,Munich: Beck, 1989, esp. 76–145.
57 Cf. Klonk, “Die phantasmagorische Welt,“ 142. Furthermore—although following an
abstract mode—also works of art by Jewish artists are not exhibited. Cf. Grasskamp,
Die unbewältigte Moderne. Kunst und Öffentlichkeit, 96.
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Figure 4: Installation shot of »documenta I«, 1955, Museum Fridericianum, Kassel
© documenta Archiv (Dauerleihgabe der Stadt Kassel) / Foto: Günther Becker.
Creative Commons license terms for re-use do not apply to this picture and further
permission may be required from the right holder.
mann narrates the story of modernism by comparing it within his text to the
art of Renaissance painting—and visually to the art of Social Realism (with the
visual example of Renato Guttuso’s Landnahme in Sizilien)—in order to high-
light differences in modes of depiction and referentiality, the exhibition lacks
these comparisons and counter-examples. Only the exhibition space—the de-
stroyed walls of the Fridericianum—conveys a trace towards discontinuity.58
In contrast, the documenta I exhibition highlights the narration of tem-
poral continuity by means of comparing. While in Haftmann’s Painting in the
Twentieth Century the comparison between works of art before and during the
World Wars was not directly initiated because of the linear and separated
structure of the chapters of the book (and its visual apparatus), the exhibition
emphasizes this comparison with the help of curatorial practices.The famous
example is the presentation of Pablo Picasso’sGirl before aMirror from 1932 and
58 Cf. Klonk, “Die phantasmagorische Welt,“ 134.
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Fritz Winter’s Komposition vor Blau und Gelb from 1955 facing each other in the
central hall on the second floor of the Fridericianum (figs. 3 and 4).59
It should be noted here that some physical preparations were necessary to
make this comparison possible. That meant not only to bring these artworks
physically together in one room as it is always the case with art exhibitions.
Bode commissioned the work by Winter, but it was eventually too broad to
fit on the movable wall that Bode had in mind to confront the two paintings.
Therefore, as we learned from a report of later restorers, Bode decided to scale
the panel down by folding the canvas on all four sides to the rear.60Thepicture
was literally and physically “trimmed” tomake this comparison possible on the
material level.
But what tertium comparationis is produced by this comparative confronta-
tion of two paintings from different periods and different countries? Both
are paintings but show decisive differences in format (Picasso’s upright for-
mat vs. Winter’s landscape format). There is, however, a similarity within the
mode of referentiality: Both paintings do not follow a mimetic conception of
referentiality but show the value of formal pictorial qualities within the logic
of the image. In Picasso’s Girl before a Mirror the artist even thematizes this
question of referentiality in a non-mimetic mode with regard to the motif
59 Picasso,Girl before aMirror, 1932, oil on canvas, 162.3 x 130.2 cm,MuseumofModern Art,
New York, Gift of Mrs. Simon Guggenheim and Fritz Winter, Komposition vor Blau und
Gelb (today entitled: Durchbrechendes Rot, 1955, oil on canvas, 381 x 618 cm, Museum
Abtei Liesborn des Kreises Warendorf, Wadersloh-Liesborn (Leihgabe Fritz-Winter-
Haus, Ahlen). See for the contrasting juxtaposition of these two paintings Klonk, “Die
phantasmagorische Welt,” 143. Grasskamp, documenta, on p. 21. Hemken, “Kuratori-
sche Steuerung kultureller Diskurse,“ 134–135. Moser, “‘Kunst [ist das], was bedeutende
Künstler machen’,” 40–41. Spies, Christian, “Fritz Winter. Kontinuität und Experiment.“
In FritzWinter. Vom Bauhaus zur Documenta, edited byW. Utermann, Dortmund: Verlag
Galerie Utermann, 2018, 34–47, esp. 34. Spies emphasizes Winter’s specificity: “Fritz
Winter was not just one German post-war painter among many. Like no other, he rep-
resented an art that, ten years after the end of the war, was redefining its regained
freedom, not just in its coming to terms with the most recent past but also in terms
of its status in the present” (37). Furthermore Winter’s biography was highly marked
through the National Socialists: “in 1937 his works in public collections were confis-
cated as part of the ‘Degenerate Art’ campaign and accompanied by an order forbid-
ding him to paint and exhibit […].” (39/41).
60 See Herpers, Iris, “Fritz Winter, ‘Durchbrechendes Rot’. Restaurierung und Transport
eines großformatigen documenta I-Gemäldes,” VDR-Beiträge zur Erhaltung von Kunst-
und Kulturgut (1), 2011: 61–67, esp. 63. I thank Peter Gaida for hinting at these circum-
stances.
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of the mirror (fig. 5).61 At the same time, a gradual difference between the
two paintings becomes obvious: While Picasso deals with a recognizable mo-
tif (and therefore offers some kind of mimetic reference), Winter’s painting
is non-objective (fig. 6).
Figure 5: Pablo Picasso, »Girl before a Mirror« (Bois-
geloup, March 1932), 1932, oil on canvas, 162.3 x 130.2 cm,
New York, Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), Gift of Mrs.
Simon Guggenheim, Acc. n.: 2.1938.
© 2020. Digital image, The Museum of Modern Art, New
York/Scala, Florence.
© Succession Picasso/VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn 2020.
Creative Commons license terms for re-use do not apply to
this picture and further permission may be required from the
right holder.
Through this curatorial practice of comparing, a continuous progress be-
tween Picasso’s work of art from 1932, as representative of postwar art, and
contemporary art is visually predicated. Moreover, the comparative viewing
claims a continuous connection—and at least equality—between European
61 With regard to the motif of the mirror, see Meyer zu Eissen, Annette, Spiegel und Raum
in der bildenden Kunst der Gegenwart, Bonn: Univ. Diss, 1980.
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Figure 6: Fritz Winter, »Komposition vor Blau und Gelb« (today entitled:
»Durchbrechendes Rot«), 1955, 381 x 618 cm, oil on canvas, Museum Abtei Lies-
born des Kreises Warendorf, Wadersloh-Liesborn. Leihgabe Fritz-Winter-Haus, Ahlen
© Fritz-Winter-Haus, Ahlen
Creative Commons license terms for re-use do not apply to this picture and further
permission may be required from the right holder.
modernism and German contemporary art—despite the break through the
Nazi regime.The curatorial practice of comparing, staged here as a confronta-
tion to show the progress of-non mimetic, abstract art, becomes even more
obvious through the fact that the paintings hang on the left and right walls
of the exhibition room.62 Thus, the visitor is situated in-between the two or
better: within the progress of abstract painting and the modernist historiog-
raphy of art. As a bridge-builder, the visitor at the same time observes the
progress and is an integral part of this European project of modernism, a
position which was assumed as important within the young FRG. The histo-
riography of postwar art history—as it was staged in the documenta I—played
a decisive part in this political ideoligization.
62 For a closer examination of these artworks Hemken, “Kuratorische Steuerung kulturel-
ler Diskurse,” 134-135.
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4. Conclusion
The historiography of German postwar art has often been told, even with re-
gard to documenta I. In this context, two strategies have been emphasized
within the research on this exhibition: the demarcation from National So-
cialism as well as from Social Realism.63 Moreover, the role of documenta I
within the narration of modernism has been the topic of many surveys: the
discourse of the exhibition propagated a formalistic understanding of the im-
age, claiming the progress of abstract, non-mimetic depiction.64 On the basis
of this research, the paper has taken a closer look on how this narration has
been told, in the written survey of Haftmann’s Painting in the Twentieth Century,
on the one hand, and in the exhibition, on the other. In the comparison of the
mode of narration the focus was on the ordering of time. It could be veri-
fied that the temporal structure of the narration of modern art history was
achieved by practices of comparing, which produce continuity and disconti-
nuity. The practices of comparing changed, of course, between written text
and a staged exhibition. The different mediality, for example, required trim-
ming of Winter’s panel to make it suitable for a confrontation with Picasso’s
painting Girl before a Mirror on two movable walls. The temporal dimensions
also changed. While Haftmann’s survey Painting in the Twentieth Century pro-
duces a temporal order by means of comparing with regard to discontinuity,
towards mimetic depiction in pre-Romanticist art and towards mimetic de-
piction of Socialist Realism, he also constitutes continuity with regard to pre-
war art and the European abstract art movement. The tertium comparationis
was always the mode of referentiality. The narration of the progress of non-
mimetic, abstract art, the story of modernism, was achieved through these
practices of comparing and their production of continuity and discontinuity.
In contrast, the documenta I exhibition relinquished the mode of discontinu-
ity by neither preparing a comparison to paintings in the mimetic mode of
depiction from pre-Romanticist times nor to themimetic, figurative art of So-
cialist Realism.65 On this basis, the exhibition staged the quality of continuity
63 Cf. Katja Hoffmann, who refers to Harald Kimpels research on documenta: Ausstellun-
gen als Wissensordnungen, 93.
64 Cf. Hoffmann, Ausstellungen als Wissensordnung, 76–78.
65 There is one important exception with regard to the medium of photography: The en-
trance hall with its photographies showing historical works of art from different coun-
tries and epochs. Cf. Grasskamp, Die unbewältigte Moderne. Kunst und Öffentlichkeit, on
p. 83.
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all the more: through contrasting artworks from the pre-war era with ones
from the postwar era as well as European artists with German artists—as was
examined with the case of Picasso’s Girl before a Mirror and Winter’s Komposi-
tion vor Blau und Gelb. Practices of narrating and comparing play an important
role within the construction of such politically important historiographic con-
cepts. But to take them seriously as a subject matter of research also means to
differentiate between the various modes of their production: in written texts
and in staged exhibitions.
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